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P i e r c e ,  Douglas E.., .M.A., June ,  1983 Ph i losophy
Heidegger  and The Sense o f  Freedom, The Formal and . the  
S u b s t a n t i v e  Approach to  Freedom in  L igh t  of  the  Development of  
H e i d e g g e r ' s  Thought.
P h i l o s o p h i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  freedom a re  of  two t y p e s :  fo rm al  and
s u b s t a n t i v e .  Formal d i s c u s s i o n s  s eek  to  e s t a b l i s h  th e  c o n d i t i o n s  
f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  freedom w hi le  s u b s t a n t i v e  d i s c u s s i o n s  
approach  the  i s s u e  from th e  p e r s p e c t i v e  of  e x p e r i e n c e .  Formal
d i s c u s s i o n s  can be d iv i d e d  in t o  two t y p e s :  l i b e r t a r i a n  and
d e t e r m i n i s t i c .  Formalism, though r i g o r o u s ,  u l t i m a t e l y  f a i l s  to  
a d d re s s  our  most c r u c i a l  conce rns  w i th  freedom. I f  d i s c u s s i o n s  of  
freedom a re  to  succeed ,  t h a t  i s ,  i f  they  a r e  to i l l u m i n a t e  the  
human c o n d i t i o n ,  they  must be gu ided  by s u b s t a n t i v e  c o n c e rn s .
This  t h e s i s  examines the  s t r e n g t h s  and weaknesses o f  fo rmal
l i b e r t a r i a n i s m  and d e te rm in i sm  v i a  a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  C.A. 
Campbell and J . J . C .  Smart r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The work o f  M ar t in
Heidegger p ro v id e s  the  framework fo r  the  s u b s t a n t i v e  d i s c u s s i o n .  
The exam ina t ion  o f  Heidegger  i n c lu d e s  Being and Time, "On the  
Essence  o f  T r u t h " ,  "The Th ing" ,  and "The Q ues t ion  Concerning 
Technology" .  Of c e n t r a l  i n t e r e s t  i s  H e id e g g e r ' s  a n a l y s i s  of  
" t h i n g s "  and te chno logy  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  t h e i r  b e a r i n g  on the  
q u e s t i o n  o f  freedom.
Working w i t h i n  the  framework o f  H e id e g g e r ' s  th ough t  and respond ing  
t o  the  f a i l u r e  o f  fo rm a l i sm ,  a c o n c e p t io n  of  freedom i s  dev e lo p ed .  
Such a c o n c e p t io n  r e s t s  upon the  human c a p a c i t y  to  comprehend and 
respond  to  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h i n g s  and e v e n t s .  I t  i s  argued  t h a t  
t e c h n o lo g y ,  as  Heidegger u n d e r s t a n d s  i t ,  i s  a t h r e a t  to  t h i s  
freedom.
D i r e c t o r :  A l b e r t  Borgmann
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1 .0  INTRODUCTION
The impetus f o r  t h i s  t h e s i s  was my d e s i r e  to  c u l m in a t e ,  r a t h e r  than  
simply end,  my work a t  the  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Montana.  A cc o rd in g ly ,  I wanted 
to  draw t o g e t h e r  some o f  the  i s s u e s  and t h i n k e r s  t h a t  have been d e c i s i v e  
f o r  me. Perhaps  most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  I  wanted to  fo l l o w  the  d i r e c t i v e  of  
what I  b e l i e v e  to  be the  h e a r t  o f  e s s e n t i a l  th o u g h t ,  the  i l l u m i n a t i o n  of  
r e a l i t y  i n  i t s  c r u c i a l  demens i o n s .  The q u e s t i o n  o f  freedom i s  paramount
in  t h i s  l a t t e r  t a s k  because  i t  i n v i t e s  us to  c o n s id e r  the  c r u c i a l
f e a t u r e s  o f  human e x i s t e n c e .  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i f  a d i s c u s s i o n  of  freedom 
i s  to  i l l u m i n a t e  the  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  r e a l i t y  i t  must ad d re s s  the
h i s t o r i c a l  and c u l t u r a l  h o r i z o n  w i t h i n  which i t  o c c u r r s .  Thus ,  a 
d i s c u s s i o n  of  freedom today  must c o n s i d e r  the  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c h a r a c t e r  of  
our  w o r ld .  M ar t in  Heidegger  p ro v id e s  a u s e f u l  framework f o r  such a 
d i s c u s s i o n .  His c e n t r a l  conce rn  i s  the  q u e s t i o n  o f  Being.  Yet ,  as  h i s
work m a tu red ,  "Being"  came to  be un d e r s to o d  i n c r e a s i n g l y  in  terms o f  the  
p re s e n c e  of  modern r e a l i t y .  Along h i s  way Heidegger  r e p e a t e d l y  
e n c o u n te r s  th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  freedom and in  h i s  l a t t e r  work he e x p l i c i t l y  
d i s c u s s e s  the  n a t u r e  o f  freedom w i t h i n  a t e c h n o l o g i c a l  s e t t i n g .  To 
f u l l y  a p p r e c i a t e  the  s u b s t a n t i v e  f o r c e  o f  H e id e g g e r ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  i t .  i s  
h e l p f u l  to  c o n t r a s t  i t  w i th  p u re ly  formal d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  freedom. C.A. 
Campbell and J . J . C .  Smart a r e  exemplars of  t h i s  approach .
D i s c u s s i o n s  o f  freedom can be d iv i d e d  i n t o  two t y p e s :  formal and
s u b s t a n t i v e .  F o rm a l ly ,  one t r i e s  to  e s t a b l i s h  the  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  freedom r a t h e r  than  examining our  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  freedom 
i t s e l f . .  S u b s t a n t i v e l y ,  one c o n s i d e r s  freedom from the  p e r s p e c t i v e  of  
e x p e r i e n c e .  Formal d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  freedom a re  o f  two v a r i e t i e s :  
L i b e r t a r i a n  and D e t e r m i n i s t i c .  In  s e c t i o n s  1 th rough  8 I  e x p l i c a t e  and
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c r i t i q u e  th e  fo rm al  app ro ac h .  C.A. Campbell and J . J . C .  Smart 
r e p r e s e n t  l i b e r t a r i a n i s m  and de te rm in i sm  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Though I b e l i e v e  
t h a t  d e te rm in ism  i s  the  s t r o n g e r  of  th e  two p o s i t i o n s ,  as  I  s h a l l  a rg u e ,  
bo th  s u f f e r  from th e  l i a b i l i t y  o f  fo rmal ism in  g e n e r a l .  Without  the 
gu idance  from s u b s t a n t i v e  concerns  p u r e ly  fo rmal  d i s c u s  ions remain 
a i m le s s  and d i s o r i e n t e d .  What i s  c a l l e d  f o r ,  t h e n ,  i s  a d i s c u s s i o n  of  
f reedom t h a t  i s  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  co h e re n t  bu t  which goes beyond formal  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  I  beg in  t h i s  t a s k ,  in  s e c t i o n  9 ,  by t u r n i n g  to  the work 
o f  M ar t in  H e idegge r .  S e c t i o n s  9,  10,  and 11 a r e  devo ted  to  Being and 
Time. Here in  h i s  e a r l y  work one can see  the  am bigu i ty  which a r i s e s  
from th e  d i s p a r i t y  between h i s  fo rm al  approach  and h i s  s u b s t a n t i v e  
c o n c e r n s .  S e c t i o n  12,  c o n t a i n i n g  an exam ina t ion  of  "On The Essence of  
T r u t h " ,  marks th e  t r a n s i t i o n  to  h i s  l a t e r ,  unambiguously s u b s t a n t i v e  
work.  Fo llowing  H e i d e g g e r ' s  l e a d ,  in  S e c t io n  13,  I  o f f e r  a s u b s t a n t i v e  
account  o f  freedom. A f t e r  accomodat ing  s e v e r a l  p l a u s i b l e  c r i t i c i s m s  to  
my p o s i t i o n  i n  S e c t io n  14,  I  t u r n  to  th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  freedom and 
techno logy  in  th e  rem ain ing  two s e c t i o n s .  Here I  a rgue  t h a t  t e c h n o lo g y ,  
as  Heidegger  u n d e r s t a n d s  i t ,  poses  a n o v e l  t h r e a t  to  man's  freedom.
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2 .0  FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE APPROACHES TO FREEDOM
With the  above i n t r o d u c t o r y  remarks behind  us we can t u r n  to  the  
q u e s t i o n  of  freedom i t s e l f .  Th is  q u e s t i o n  has h e ld  the  a t t e n t i o n  of  
p h i l o s o p h e r s  from the  b eg inn ing  o f  our  t r a d i t i o n .  Rare ly  does a t h i n k e r  
o f  n o t e  f a i l  to  g r a p p le  w i th  a t  l e a s t  some a s p e c t  of  the  q u e s t i o n .  
However, g r a p p l i n g  w i th  the  q u e s t i o n  of  freedom i s  l i k e  w r e s t l i n g  w i th  
P ro teus . ; ou r  c a p t i v e  t h r e a t e n s  to  escape  our  g ra s p  by c o n s t a n t l y  
changing  fo rms .  The a d v ic e  g iven  to  Menelaos,  t h a t  he hold h i s  
q u e s t i o n s  u n t i l  P r o t e u s  had ceased  h i s  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s ,  s e rv es  us 
e q u a l ly  w e l l . [1]  I f  our  q u e s t i o n i n g  o f  freedom i s  to  be s u c c e s s f u l ,  t h a t  
i s ,  i f  i t  i s  to  r e s u l t  i n  a b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  th e  human c o n d i t i o n ,  
we must f i r s t  d e c id e  what form i t  i s  to  t a k e .
We can b e g in  by- e s t a b l i s h i n g  two ty p e s  o f  q u e s t i o n i n g :  fo rm al  and
s u b s t a n t i v e . [2]  Formal d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  freedom seek  to  e s t a b l i s h  the  form 
as  p e r i m e t e r  of  freedom r a t h e r  than  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  i t s  c o n t e n t .  Formally 
we t r y  to  d e l i n e a t e  a framework w i t h i n  which our  i n t u i t i o n s  o f  freedom 
can be d i s c u s s e d .  T y p i c a l l y  t, t h e  framework i s  grounded in  a
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  r e g u l a r i t i e s  o f  p h y s i c s ,  l o g i c ,  or  
p s y cho logy .  I f  our  i n t u i t i o n s  o f  freedom a re  to  be b rought  to  p r e c i s e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n  -  as  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  fo rmal th ough t  d i r e c t s  
-  they  must f a l l  w i t h i n  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  framework.  Borrowing K a n t ' s  
te rm ino logy  we can say t h a t  fo rm al  d i s c u s s i o n s  seek the  c o n d i t i o n s  fo r  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  freedom r a t h e r  than  examining freedom i t s e l f . [3] 
S u b s t a n t i v e  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  freedom t u r n  to  the  e x p e r i e n t i a l  su b s t a n c e  of  
freedom r a t h e r  than  the  form o r ,  in  o t h e r  words,  . to  the  a c t u a l i t y  of  
freedom r a t h e r  than  i t s  p o s s i b i l i t y .  The f o r c e  of  s u b s t a n t i v e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i s  d e r iv e d  from th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e .  I n  such
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d i s c u s s i o n s  one i s  concerned  w i th  c l a r i f y i n g  and s u p p o r t i n g  the
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  freedom o r  the  l a c k  t h e r e o f .  S u b s t a n t i v e  d i s c u s s i o n s  a r e  
u l t i m a t e l y  grounded i n  a n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  how we 
u n d e r s t a n d  o u r s e l v e s  to  be in  the  w o r ld .
Formal q u e s t i o n i n g  o f  freedom can be d iv i d e d  i n t o  two c e n t r a l
g ro u p s ,  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  and Dete rmin ism.  The e i g h t e e n t h  c e n tu ry
m a th em a t ic ian  L ap lace  s k e tc h e s  th e  e s s e n c e  of  Determinism in  the
fo l lo w in g  p a s s a g e .
An i n t e l l i g e n c e  knowing a l l  the  f o r c e s  a c t i n g  in  n a t u r e  a t  a 
g iv e n  i n s t a n t ,  as  w e l l  as  the  momentary p o s i t i o n s  of  a l l  
t h i n g s  in  th e  u n i v e r s e ,  would be a b l e  to  comprehend i n  one 
s imple  fo rmula  th e  mot ions  o f  th e  l a r g e s t  bod ie s  as  w e l l  as  
th e  l i g h t e s t  a t o m s . . . . T o  i t  n o th i n g  would be u n c e r t a i n ,  th e
f u t u r e  as w e l l  as  the  p a s t  would be p r e s e n t  to  i t s  e y e s . [4]
D e te rm in ism 's  two c e n t r a l  f e a t u r e s  a r e ,  b e l i e f  in  u n i v e r s a l l y  b in d in g
c a u s a l i t y  . and th e  c o r o l l a r y  o f  p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  ( p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  in
p r i n c i p l e ) . [ 5 ]  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  i s  b e s t  u n d e r s to o d  as a d e n i a l  of
Dete rmin ism.  L i b e r t a r i a n s  hold  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a c l a s s  o f  even ts  which
cannot be t r a c e d  t o  a n t e c e d e n t s  from which they  f o l l o w ,  and which .
t h e r e f o r e  cannot  be p r e d i c t e d  (even in  p r i n c i p l e )  from knowledge of
a n t e c e d e n t  c o n d i t i o n s .  Such a c t s  and only  such a c t s  a re  f r e e .
I n  th e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  I  w i l l  examine arguments f o r  both  
L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  and Dete rmin ism.  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  Determinism i s  the 
s t r o n g e r  t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  because  i t  e s t a b l i s h e s  the  more co h e re n t  
and f o r c e f u l  framework w i t h o u t ,  as  many c l a im ,  s a c r i f i c i n g  the  n o t i o n  of  
freedom. However, as  we w i l l  s e e ,  the  b e n e f i t s  of  such a framework a re  
a c t u a l i z e d  only  th rough  s u b s t a n t i v e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  F a i l i n g  to  t u r n  to 
our  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  the  human s i t u a t i o n  would r e s u l t  in  our  d i s c u s s i o n  
runn ing  aground p r e c i s e l y  where th e  fo rm al  d i s c u s s i o n s  of  freedom have
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run aground s i n c e ,  p e r h a p s ,  L u c r e t i u s .  That  i s ,  even when c o h e r e n t ,  
they  s u f f e r  from a lo s s  o f  d i r e c t i o n  and f o c u s .  C o n s id e r in g  the  
q u e s t i o n  o f  freedom from the  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  r e v e a l s  bo th  why 
the  fo rmal ( t h e o r e t i c a l )  d i s c u s s i o n s  have f a i l e d  to  r e s o l v e  the 
"problem" and why the  i s s u e  c o n t in u e s  to  a t t r a c t  u s .
3 .0  LIBERTARIAN FORMALISM: C.A. CAMPBELL
C.A. Campbell ,  i n  On Se l fhood  and Godhood. o f f e r s  a c l e a r  and 
co n c i se  account  o f  fo rm al  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m . [6] He b e g in s  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  by 
c o n s id e r i n g  th e  f o r m u l a t io n  of  th e  problem o f  freedom. Campbell c la im s  
t h a t  c a r e f u l  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  problem leads  one a long way toward 
s o l v in g  i t .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  he wants to  d i s t i n g u i s h  th e  freedom which i s  
c e n t r a l  to  the  f r e e - w i l l  problem from o t h e r  c o n c e p t io n s  o f  freedom.  He 
b e l i e v e s  t h a t  the  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  th e  f r e e - w i l l  i s s u e  l i e s  in  th e  f a c t  
t h a t  the  freedom w i th  which i t  i s  concerned  " i s  commonly r ec o g n iz e d  to  
be in  some sense a p r e c o n d i t i o n  o f  moral  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " [ 7 ]  Before 
d e t e rm in in g  w hether  o r  n o t  t h i s  freedom e x i s t s  we must c l a r i f y  what i t  
i s .
Campbell i s o l a t e s  t h r e e  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h i s  co n c e p t io n  of  freedom. 
F i r s t ,  freedom p e r t a i n s  to  i n n e r  r a t h e r  than  o v e r t  a c t i o n s . [8] Examining 
mora l  judgments Campbell f i n d s  t h a t  we a r e  concerned  w i th  o v e r t  a c t s  
on ly  i n s o f a r  as  they  embody or r e f l e c t  i n n e r  a c t s .  Moral c u l p a b i l i t y  i s  
d e te rm ined  by examining th e  a g e n t ' s  i n t e n t i o n s  There a r e  p l e n t y  o f  cases  
where the  o v e r t  a c t i o n  i s  d e p l o r a b l e  but  the  in n e r  a c t i o n  i s  no t  and 
v i c e  v e r s a . The d e c i d in g  f a c t o r ,  a c c o rd in g  to  Campbell ,  i s  whe ther  or 
not  the  in n e r  a c t i o n  r e f l e c t s  c h o i c e . [9]
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Second,  he a rgues  t h a t  i f  a pe r son  i s  to  be he ld  m ora l ly
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  an a c t  he must be the  " s o l e  a u t h o r "  of  i t . [10] I f  we
acknowledge d e t e rm in a n t s  o t h e r  than  the  p e r son  in  q u e s t i o n ,  how can we
ho ld  him r e s p o n s i b l e ?  He says :
I t  seems p l a i n  enough t h a t  i f  t h e r e  a r e  any o t h e r  d e t e rm in a n t s
o f  t h e  a c t ,  e x t e r n a l  to  the  s e l f ,  to  t h a t  e x t e n t  the  a c t  i s
n o t  an a c t  which the  s e l f  d e t e r m in e s ,  and to  t h a t  e x t e n t  not  
an a c t  f o r  which the  s e l f  can be he ld  m o ra l ly  r e s p o n s i b l e . [1 1 ]
One might  wonder,  g iven  t h i s  s t r i c t  d e f i n i t i o n  of  moral  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and the  u n d en iab ly  p rofound i n f l u e n c e  of  h e r e d i t y  and the 
env i ronm en t ,  whether  we a re  e v e r  m ora l ly  r e s p o n s i b l e .  Campbell ag ree s  
t h a t  i t  would be a bsu rd  to  deny h e r e d i t a r y  and e n v i ro n m en ta l  i n f l u e n c e ,  
y e t  he c l a im s  t h a t  i f  we a r e  to  r e t a i n  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  moral  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  we must b e l i e v e  t h a t  somewhere, beyond th e  r e a c h  of  a l l  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  i s  something o f  which we a r e  the  s o l e  a u t h o r .  E i t h e r  we 
abandon th e  n o t i o n  of  moral  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  which ,  f o r  Campbell ,  i s  as 
i n t u i t i v e l y  repugnan t  as  i t  i s  p r a g m a t i c a l l y  i m p o s s ib l e ,  o r  we b e l i e v e  
in  and s e a r c h  f o r  t h a t  o f  which we a r e  the  s o l e  a u t h o r .
B e l i e v i n g  " s o l e  a u t h o r s h i p "  to  be a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  of  freedom, 
Campbell a sks  whether  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  as  w e l l .  He f i n d s  t h a t  i t  i s
h o t .  The i n s u f f i c i e n c y  a p p ea r s  when we c o n s i d e r  a c t s  of  which we seem
to  be t h e  s o l e  a u t h o r  but  which a r e  o f  th e  s o r t  t h a t  we would h e s i t a t e  
to  c a l l  them f r e e .  Such an a c t  would be one which fo l low s  n e c e s s a r i l y  
from our  " c h a r a c t e r "  or  " n a t u r e " . [12 ]  The t r u l y  f r e e  a c t  must be f r e e  
from no t  only  e x t e r n a l  d e t e r m in a n t s  ( h e r e d i t y ,  env i ronm ent)  b u t  a l s o  
from i n t e r n a l  d e t e r m in a n t s  ( c h a r a c t e r ,  n a t u r e ) .
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This  leads  to the  t h i r d  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  freedom, the  a b i l i t y  to
"do o t h e r w i s e " .  I f  an a c t  i s  to  be c o n s id e re d  a f r e e  one,  the  agent
r e s p o n s i b l e  must be th e  s o l e  a u t h o r  of  i t  and he must have been a b l e  to  
do o t h e r w i s e .  C am pbe l l ' s  a p p ea l  to  the  a p p a r e n t l y  i n t u i t i v e  soundness 
o f  t h i s  c la im  does c a r r y  some w e ig h t .  I t  seems s e n s i b l e  to  say t h a t  i f  
A could  n o t  have he lped  bu t  to  do x he was n o t  a c t i n g  f r e e l y .  Campbell 
m a in t a i n s  t h a t  most p h i l o s o p h e r s  ag ree  t h a t  some sense  o f  "cou ld  have 
done o th e rw i s e "  i s  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  of  moral  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
T y p i c a l l y ,  th o s e  p h i l o s o p h e r s  who a re  wary of  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m ,  ye t  who 
r e f u s e  to  abandon th e  n o t i o n  o f  mora l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  a t t e m p t  to 
e s t a b l i s h ,  a h y p o t h e t i c a l  sense o f  "could  have done o t h e r w i s e " .  Campbell 
g iv e s  two examples :  x could have done o th e rw is e  i f  he had chosen to  and
A could  have done o th e rw is e  i f  he had been c o n s t i t u t e d  or  s i t u a t e d  
d i f f e r e n t l y .  Although Campbell c l a im s  to  a p p r e c i a t e  and,  to  an e x t e n t ,  
sympath ize w i th  the  mot ives  u n d e r ly i n g  th e s e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  he r e j e c t s  
b o th  on th e  grounds  t h a t  n e i t h e r  f u l f i l l s  the  r equ i rem en ts  o f  moral
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
The f i r s t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  amounts to  n o th in g  more than  th e  c la im  
t h a t  A "could  have done o th e rw i s e "  i f  n o th in g  p r e v e n te d  him from doing 
s o .  I f  A would have chosen x r a t h e r  than  y n o th i n g  would have p re v e n te d  
him from acc om pl i sh ing  x .  This  approach  begs the  c e n t r a l  q u e s t i o n  of
d e l i b e r a t i o n s  conce rn ing  moral  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  In  such d e l i b e r a t i o n s  we 
a r e  no t  so much concerned  w i th  whether  or  no t  A could have accompl ished 
x bu t  whe ther  o r  not  A could  have chosen to do x .
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The second i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  s i m i l a r l y  f a i l s  the  r e q u i r e m en ts  o f  moral  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  This  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  c la im s  t h a t  A "could  have done 
o th e r w i s e "  i f  A was c o n s t i t u t e d  or  s i t u a t e d  d i f f e r e n t l y .  Campbell 
c l a im s  t h a t  t h i s  a c c o u n t ,  l i k e  th e  f i r s t ,  s imply s i d e s t e p s  the r e a l  
i s s u e .  We a re  no t  concerned  about  how A could  have a c t e d  g iven  a 
d i f f e r e n t  env i ronm ent ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  temperament b u t  how A, as he i s ,  
a c t e d .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  -  could  t h i s  per son  have a c t e d  d i f f e r e n t l y ?
Campbell a rgues  t h a t  a c o h e re n t  n o t i o n  o f  mora l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
r e q u i r e s  us to  unders tand ,  "cou ld  have done o th e r w i s e "  c a t e g o r i c a l l y .
Summarizing what he c o n s i d e r s  to  be the  freedom n e c e s s a r y  f o r  moral
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  he s a y s ,
I t  i s  t h a t  a man can be s a i d  to  e x e r c i s e  f r e e  w i l l  in  a
m o ra l ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  sense  only  in  so f a r  as  h i s  chosen a c t  i s
one o f  which he i s  the  s o l e  a u t h o r ,  and on ly  i f  -  in  the 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ,  c a t e g o r i c a l  sense o f  th e  ph ra se  -  he ' c o u ld  
have chosen o t h e r w i s e ' . [13]
Now t h a t  Campbell has c l a r i f i e d  the  sense o f  freedom t h a t  concerns  
him he asks  whether  o r  no t  i t  i s  " r e a s o n a b le  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  man does in
f a c t  p o s s e s s  a f r e e  w i l l  o f  th e  k ind  s p e c i f i e d . . . " [ 1 4 ]  and i f  i t  i s
r e a s o n a b l e  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  we p o s s e s s  f r e e  w i l l ,  where i s  i t  to  be 
l o c a t e d ?  Campbell  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  f a i l i n g  to  a d d re s s  the  l a t t e r  q u e s t i o n  
a d e q u a te ly  has led  bo th  L i b e r t a r i a n s  and D e t e r m in i s t s  a s t r a y .  C l e a r l y ,  
says  Campbell ,  the  freedom r e q u i r e d  f o r  moral  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  a m a t t e r  
of  v o l i t i o n .  I t  i s  e q u a l ly  c l e a r  t h a t  freedom does not  p e r t a i n  to  a l l  
v o l i t i o n s ,  indeed  n o t  even to  a l l  v o l i t i o n s  commonly l a b e l e d  " c h o i c e s " .  
He a rgues  t h a t  D e t e r m i n i s t s  t y p i c a l l y  f a i l  to  a p p r e c i a t e  how r e l a t i v e l y  
nar row the  o p e r a t i n g  range  of  freedom r e a l l y  i s . [15] Consequen t ly ,  he 
b e l i e v e s  t h a t  c a r e f u l l y  l o c a t i n g  freedom w i t h i n  v o l i t i o n a l  a c t i v i t y  
e f f e c t i v e l y  " a n n u l s . . .some o f  th e  more t i r e s o m e  c l i c h e ' s  of  D e te r m in i s t
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c r i t i c i s m " . [16]
He a t t e m p t s  to  l o c a t e  freedom w i t h i n  v o l i t i o n  by examining t h a t
"som eth ing"  o f  which we a r e  the  s o l e  a u t h o r .  Campbell asks  us to
c o n s i d e r  why we b e l i e v e  i t  p ro p e r  to  make a l low ances  f o r  peop le  whose
envi ronment a n d / o r  h e r e d i t y  i s  d e b i l i t a t i n g . [17] We do so ,  he c l a im s ,
because  we r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  such a p e r son  w i l l  have to  work h a r d e r  to
behave a p p r o p r i a t e l y  than  w i l l  someone whose s i t u a t i o n  i s  l e s s  s e v e r e .
R e s i s t i n g  t e m p t a t i o n  and doing what we should  r e q u i r e  the  e x e r t i o n  of
"moral  e f f o r t " .  , The amount o f  mora l  e f f o r t  - r e q u i r e d  by the  s i t u a t i o n
v a r i e s  from p e r son  to  p e r son  and s i t u a t i o n  to  s i t u a t i o n .  But,
r e g a r d l e s s  o f  th e  p e r son  o r  th e  s i t u a t i o n ,  "moral  e f f o r t "  i s  t h a t
something o f  which we a r e  th e  s o l e  a u t h o r .  Campbell s a y s ,
Here ,  and h e re  a l o n e ,  so f a r  as  I  can s e e ,  in  the  a c t  of  
d e c i d i n g  whether  to  p u t  f o r t h  o r  w i thho ld  t h e  moral  e f f o r t  
r e q u i r e d  to  r e s i s t  t e m p ta t i o n  and r i s e  to  d u t y ,  i s  to  be found 
an a c t  which i s  f r e e  in  the  sense  r e q u i r e d  f o r  moral  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ;  an a c t  o f  which th e  s e l f  i s  the  s o l e  a u t h o r ,  
and o f  which i t  i s  t r u e  to  say t h a t  " i t  could  be"  ( o r ,  a f t e r  
th e  e v e n t ,  "could  have been")  ' o t h e r w i s e ' . [181
Here Campbell makes h i s  s t a n d .  The argument r e q u i r e d  to  defend  t h i s
p o s i t i o n  i s  t w o - f o l d :  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  th e  ev idence  o f  our  " in n e r
e x p e r i e n c e "  and c o u n t e r i n g  s e v e r a l  s p e c i f i c  D e t e r m i n i s t i c  c r i t i c i s m s .
4 .0  CAMPBELL'S DEFENSE OF LIBERTARIANISM
Campbell b e g in s  h i s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  " in n e r  e x p e r i e n c e "  by 
a p p e a l in g  t o  our  e x p e r i e n c e  of  " s e l f - a c t i v i t y " ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h a t  
a c t i v i t y  p r e s e n t  i n  mora l  d e c i s i o n s . [1 9 ]  He d i s t i n g u i s h e s  two c a t e g o r i e s  
o f  moral  d e c i s i o n s .  F i r s t ,  the  s i t u a t i o n  where in  we have two or more 
c o u r s e s  o f  a c t i o n  and we must d e c id e  which cou rse  i s  most c o n s i s t e n t  
w i th  what w7e u n d e r s t a n d  to  be our d u t y .  Second,  the  s i t u a t i o n  where in
Page 10
we know p e r f e c t l y  w e l l  what we should do bu t  i t  i s  no t  what we want to  
do .  This  i a t t e r  d e c i s i o n  i s  between what we u n d e r s t a n d  our  du ty  to  be 
and what "we most s t r o n g l y  d e s i r e " . [20] The former  s i t u a t i o n  i s  
p r i m a r i l y  an i n t e l l e c t u a l  m a t t e r  w h i le  th e  l a t t e r  i s  wholly a moral  
i s s u e ;  hence ,  Campbell b e l i e v e s  t h a t  the  l a t t e r  d e c i s i o n  i s  th e  h e a r t  
o f  th e  moral  l i f e .  Examining mora l  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  s o r t  r e v e a l s  
a unique k ind  o f  s e l f - a c t i v i t y .
Campbell ,  c o n s i d e r i n g  an a c t  o f  moral  t e m p t a t i o n ,  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  the 
agen t  e x p e r i e n c e s  th e  d e c i s i o n  as  an e x p r e s s i o n  o f  s e l f - a c t i v i t y .  We 
cannot  deny t h a t  i t  i s  o u r s e l v e s  making the  d e c i s i o n  in  such a 
s i t u a t i o n .  Moreover,  he a rgues  t h a t  th e  d e c i s i o n  i s  n o t  de te rm ined  by 
our  n a t u r e  o r  c h a r a c t e r .  Campbell d e f i n e s  " c h a r a c t e r "  as "a r e l a t i v e l y  
s t a b l e  and s y s t e m a t i c  complex o f  emotive and c o g n i t i v e  d i s p o s i t i o n s " .  
[21] A p e r s o n ' s  s t r o n g e s t  d e s i r e  r e s u l t s  from the  i n t e r a c t i o n  between 
c h a r a c t e r  and env i ronm en t .  T h e r e f o r e ,  moral  d e c i s i o n ,  un d e r s to o d  as the 
d e c i s i o n  whether  o r  n o t  to  f o l l o w  du ty  i n s t e a d  o f  our  s t r o n g e s t  d e s i r e ,  
cannot  be u n d e r s to o d  as " f lowing  from the  c h a r a c t e r "  because  i t  opposes 
the  c h a r a c t e r . [2 2 ]  The s e l f - a c t i v i t y  e x p re s s e d  in  mora l  d e c i s i o n s  
d i f f e r s  from o r d i n a r y  s e l f - a c t i v i t y  in  t h a t  i t  t r a n s c e n d s  the  formed 
c h a r a c t e r  of  th e  s e l f ,  whereas u s u a l l y  s e l f - a c t i v i t y  e x p re s s e s  the  
s e l f ' s  c h a r a c t e r .
Campbell i s  aware t h a t  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  l e av es  one w i th  a somewhat 
s c h i z o i d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  th e  s e l f  and i t s  a c t i v i t y .  He a rgues  t h a t  
a l th o u g h  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between the  s e l f  and i t s  c h a r a c t e r  appea rs  
a b s u rd ,  we i m p l i c i t l y  r e l y  on i t  every  t ime we make a moral  d e c i s i o n ;  
t h a t  i s ,  every  t ime we d e c id e  between what we b e l i e v e  to  be our  duty  and 
what we most s t r o n g l y  d e s i r e  to  do.  This  b r i n g s  Campbell to  the  second
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p a r t  o f  h i s  d e f e n s e .
I f  we g r a n t  t h a t  th e  mora l  agen t  cannot  d i s b e l i e v e  t h a t  he has f r e e  
w i l l ,  a r e  t h e r e  t h e o r e t i c a l  o b j e c t i o n s  to  t h i s  c l a im  which would compel 
us to  d i s t r u s t  the  ev idence  o f  i n n e r  e x p e r i e n c e ?  In  o t h e r  words,  a r e  
t h e r e  r e a s o n s  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  our  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  f r e e  w i l l  i s  i l l u s o r y ?  
Campbell m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  i n s o f a r  as  h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  m ora l  l i f e  i s  
c o r r e c t ,  we cannot  h e lp  b u t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  we have f r e e  w i l l ,  even i f  we 
have been convinced  by D e te r m i n i s t  a rg u m e n ts . [2 3 ]  This  r e s u l t s  in  a 
dilemma s i m i l a r  in  form to  t h a t  which fo l low ed  Parmenides and Zeno; 
what we know e x p e r i e n t i a l l y  c o n f l i c t s  w i th  what we know t h e o r e t i c a l l y .  
Campbell c l a im s  t h a t  D e t e r m i n i s t s  u s u a l l y  f a i l  t o  t a k e  t h i s  dilemma 
s e r i o u s l y  enough.  They a r e  more th a n  w i l l i n g  to  reduce  e x p e r i e n c e  to  
th e  s t a t u s  o f  i l l u s i o n  on the  grounds  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  a rgum en ts .  
Campbell c l a im s  t h a t  as  long as th e  D e t e r m in i s t  can n o t  r e f u t e  the  
L i b e r t a r i a n ' s  e x p e r i e n t i a l  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e r e  i s  no r e a s o n  to  opt  f o r  one 
ove r  th e  o t h e r .  I f  Determin ism i s  t o  c a r r y  the  day ,  i t  must no t  only  be 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  sound i t  must a l s o  account  f o r  our  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  freedom.  
L i b e r t a r i a n s ,  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t ,  convinced  by the  soundness of  t h e i r  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  f r e e  w i l l  must expose the  e r r o r s  o f  th e  D e t e r m i n i s t ' s  
t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s i t i o n .
Campbell m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  the  c e n t r a l  arguments o f  Determinism are  
f a r  from c o m p e l l i n g . [24] He b e g in s  h i s  c r i t i c i s m  o f  Determinism by 
r u l i n g  ou t  s e v e r a l  D e t e r m i n i s t i c  approaches  which no lo n g e r  ho ld  sway 
among p h i l o s o p h e r s . [2 5 ]  Of th e  arguments r e g a rd e d  as im p o r tan t  by 
contemporary  p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  Campbell d i s t i n g u i s h e s  two forms;  th o s e  from 
th e  n o t i o n  o f  p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  and th o s e  which p resuppose  t h a t  an a c t  of  
th e  s e l f  t h a t  does not  ex p re s s  i t s  c h a r a c t e r  i s  m e a n in g le s s .
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The argument from p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  s t a t e s  t h a t  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m ,  i f  
t r u e ,  r e s u l t s  i n  our  having  no r a t i o n a l  b a s i s  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  in  the  
s t a b i l i t y  and o r d e r  o f  ou r  w o r ld .  I f  man p o s s e s s e s  f r e e  w i l l  why would 
we be s u r p r i s e d  i f  our  p r e v i o u s l y  t e e t o t a l l i n g  mother  suddenly  went on a 
w i ld  d ip s o m a n ia c a l  b inge  o r  "your f r i e n d  whose t a s t e  f o r  r e a d i n g  had 
h i t h e r t o  been s a t i s f i e d  w i th  the  s p o r t i n g  c o l u m n . . . sh o u ld  be d i s c o v e r e d  
on a f i n e  Sa tu rday  a f t e r n o o n  pou r ing  o ve r  the  works o f  Hegel?"[26]  Of 
course  we a r e  indeed  s u r p r i s e d  when t h e r e  i s  a sudden,  r a d i c a l  change in  
a p e r s o n ' s  b e h a v i o r .  We a r e  s u r p r i s e d  because  our  world t y p i c a l l y  
e x h i b i t s  a h ig h  deg ree  o f  s t a b i l i t y .  The argument from p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  
a t t e m p t s  to  c a p t u r e  the  L i b e r t a r i a n  i n  t h e i r  own t r a p ,  by showing t h a t  
t h e i r  t h e o ry  f a i l s  to  meet t h e i r  own c r i t e r i o n ;  th e  i l l u m i n a t i o n  of  the  
world o f  e x p e r i e n c e .
In  r e s p o n s e  to  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m ,  Campbell r e i t e r a t e s  t h a t ,  the  
l o c a t i o n  o f  freedom i s  w i t h i n  our  v o l i t i o n a l ,  l i f e .  Freedom p e r t a i n s  
on ly  to  the  s i t u a t i o n  w here in  we a r e  c o n f r o n te d  w i th  having  to  d e c id e  
w hether  o r  n o t  to  e x e r t  the  moral  energy  needed t o  r e s i s t  d e s i r e  and 
fo l l o w  d u t y .  This  s i t u a t i o n ,  a c c o rd in g  t o  Campbell ,  i s  v e ry  r a r e ,  in  
f a c t  i t  com prises  on ly  1% o f  ou r  l i v e s .  And i t  i s  only  he re  t h a t  the  
q u e s t i o n  o f  freedom i s  p e r t i n e n t .  For the  remain ing  99% o f  our  l i v e s ,  
c h a r a c t e r  and environment de te rm ine  our  co n d u c t .  Hence,  f o r  the  v a s t  
m a j o r i t y  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  p r e s e n t s  no o b s t a c l e  to  s u c c e s s f u l  
p r e d i c t i o n .
Even i n  th e  ex ce ed in g ly  r a r e  c a s e s  of  genu ine  moral  d e c i s i o n s ,  the  
s i t u a t i o n  i s  no t  com ple te ly  i n d e t e r m i n a t e .  A moral  d e c i s i o n ,  as  
Campbell has d e f i n e d  i t ,  i s  always bounded by two t h i n g s ,  duty  and 
d e s i r e .  The freedom c la im ed  by Campbell i s  th e  freedom to  dec ide
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between th e s e  two o p t i o n s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  says Campbell ,  the  o f t e n  to u t e d  
"freedom o f  c a p r i c e  has no ' h a b i t a t '  i n  h i s  t h e o r y . " ! 27J Not only  i s  the 
moral  d e c i s i o n  bounded by two o p t i o n s ,  th e  d e c i s i o n  i t s e l f  i s  com pa t ib le  
w i th  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  p r e d i c t i o n .  We a re  a b l e  to  p r e d i c t ,  g iven  knowledge 
o f  th e  person  and the  s i t u a t i o n ,  how much moral  e f f o r t  w i l l  be r e q u i r e d  
and ,  c o n s e q u e n t ly ,  how l i k e l y  i t  i s  th e  d e s i r e  w i l l  be r e s i s t e d .
The argument from th e  supposed m e a n in g le s s n e s s  o f  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  
ho ld s  t h a t  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  u n i n t e l l i g i b l e  and r e s u l t s  i n  the  lo s s  of  
m ora l  ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  The l i b e r t a r i a n  co n c e p t io n  of  freedom i s  
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e  because  no r e a s o n  can be g ive n  f o r  i t .  S ince  t h e r e  i s  no 
r e a s o n  why one d e c id e s  to  e x e r t  o r  w i th h o ld  moral  e f f o r t ,  the  a c t  i s  
m e a n in g le s s .  I f  a f r e e  a c t ,  though a t t r i b u t e d  t o  the  s e l f ,  has  n o th in g  
to  do w i th  i t ,  how can we hold  th e  s e l f  m o ra l ly  r e s p o n s i b l e ?  Thus 
L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  r e s u l t s  in  a l o s s  o f  mora l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
Campbell b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  c a l l s  f o r  a c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of  
" i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y " . -  I f  " i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y "  r e f e r s  to  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  an 
a c t  to  be i n f e r r e d  from th e  knowledge o f  a n t e c e d e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  then  
L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  i s  c e r t a i n l y  u n i n t e l l i g i b l e .  However, f a r  from b e in g  a 
d e v a s t a t i n g  c r i t i q u e  o f  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m ,  t h i s  i s  mere ly  a d e s c r i p t i o n  of  
i t .  By assuming t h a t  L i b e r t a r i a n s  must e x p l a i n  freedom ( l o c a t e  i t  i n  a 
c a u s a l  n e x u s ) ,  t h e  r eq u i re m en t  begs the  v e ry  q u e s t i o n  a t  i s s u e .  The 
burden o f  p r o o f  in  t h i s  r e g a r d  l i e s  w i th  th e  D e t e r m in i s t  no t  the  
L i b e r t a r i a n .
However, Campbell r e a l i z e s  t h a t  the c r i t i c  u s u a l l y  has a second 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  " i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y "  in  mind when he c la im s  t h a t  
L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  i s  u n i n t e l l i g i b l e .  Th is  second sense i s  th e  a c t i o n ' s
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c a p a c i t y  to  have meaning a t t a c h e d  to  i t .  T y p i c a l l y ,  the  c r i t i c  assumes 
t h a t  u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  in  the  f i r s t  sense e n t a i l s  u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  i n  
second s e n s e .  Campbell a g re e s  t h a t  i f  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  was shown to  be 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e  in  th e  second sense i t  would c e r t a i n l y  be " c o n c l u s i v e l y
r e f u t e d " . [28]
I t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h i s  which cannot  be p ro v e n .  The c r i t i c ,  a c c o rd in g
to  . Campbell ,  has  a l low ed  h im s e l f  to  become misguided  by a c c e p t i n g  a
" . . . f u n d a m e n t a l l y  v i c i o u s  a s s u m p t i o n . "[29]  He has assumed t h a t  the  only
v a l i d  p e r s p e c t i v e  w i th  r e g a r d  to  the  q u e s t i o n  of  freedom i s  t h a t  o f  the .
e x t e r n a l  o b s e r v e r .  I f  one a c c e p t s  t h i s  a s sum pt ion ,  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  i s
indeed  m e a n in g le s s .  C o n s id e r in g  t h a t  freedom p e r t a i n s  to  in n e r  a c t s
Campbell a sks  whether  or  n o t  the  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  e x t e r n a l  o b s e r v a t i o n  i s
a p p r o p r i a t e .  He, o f  c o u r s e ,  c l a im s  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t .
For th e  ap p re h e n s io n  o f  s u b j e c t i v e  a c t s  t h e r e  i s  a n o th e r  
s t a n d p o i n t  a v a i l a b l e ,  t h a t  o f  i n n e r  e x p e r i e n c e ,  o f  th e
p r a c t i c a l  c o n s c io u s n e s s  i n  i t s  a c t u a l  f u n c t i o n i n g .  I f  our
f r e e  w i l l  shou ld  t u r n  ou t  t o  be something from t h i s  
s t a n d p o i n t ,  no more i s  r e q u i r e d .  And no more ought  t o  be
e x p e c t e d . [30]
From th e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  i n n e r  e x p e r i e n c e  we can see an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  
c l a im in g  t h a t  e i t h e r  an a c t  i s  l o c a t e d  w i t h i n  a c a u s a l  nexus ( o r ,  a t  
l e a s t ,  could  be so l o c a t e d  in  p r i n c i p l e )  o r  i t  i s  m e a n in g le s s .  Campbell 
c a l l s  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  " c r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y " .  I t  i s  c r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y  
which l i e s  a t  the  h e a r t  o f  freedom and which i s  d e te rm ined  n e i t h e r  by 
th e  envi ronment nor  t h e  s e l f .
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5 .0  CRITIQUE'OF LIBERTARIANISM
C am pbe l l ' s  account  i s  f o r c e f u l  and a t t r a c t i v e  y e t  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t
i s  u l t i m a t e l y  i n c o h e r e n t .  Given th e  endurance o f  the  d e b a te  between
L i b e r t a r i a n s  and D e te r m i n i s t s  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  one can s a f e l y  assume t h a t  
n e i t h e r  s i d e  p o s s e s s e s  a com pe l l ing  argument.  In  the  absence  of  cogency 
one must s e t t l e  f o r ,  as  P l a t o  would have i t ,  the  second b e s t  way to  s a i l
and seek  th e  s t r o n g e r  o f  the  two non -com pe l l ing  p o s i t i o n s .  [31] This
p rocedu re  has two s t e p s ;  f i r s t ,  to  show t h a t  in  h i s  e f f o r t  to  p r e s e r v e  
what he u n d e r s t a n d s  to  be mora l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  Campbell and ,  i f  the  
e x t e n s i o n  i s  p e r m i s s i b l e ,  a l l  L i b e r t a r i a n s ,  lo s e  th e  coherence  of  t h e i r  
argument and second ,  to  show t h a t  f a r  from be ing  d e s t r o y e d ,  moral 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  c l a r i f i e d  and s u p p o r te d  by the  a d o p t io n  of  a 
d e t e r m i n i s t i c  framework.  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  I  a d d r e s s  the  f i r s t  s t e p ,
t u r n i n g  t o  th e  second in  th e  fo l l o w in g  s e c t i o n .
C am p b e l l ' s  argument draws i t s  s t r n e g t h  and a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  from 
t h r e e  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  s o u r c e s .  F i r s t ,  and most g e n e r a l l y ,  I  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  Campbell t a c i t l y  u n d e r s t a n d s  p h i lo so p h y  to  be in  the  s e r v i c e  of  
ends h i g h e r  than  i t s e l f .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  the  h ig h e r  end i s  moral  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Recogniz ing  th e  c e n t r a l i t y  of  mora l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in  
ou r  l i v e s  and b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  freedom i s  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  i t ,  
Campbell a t t e m p t s  to  c l a r i f y  and suppor t  a co n c e p t io n  of  freedom which 
s e c u re s  moral  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  U nders tand ing  p h i lo sophy  to  be 
p e n u l t i m a t e  l e ad s  Campbell to  remind th e  D e t e r m i n i s t ,  c o n f id e n t  in  the  
power o f  h i s  t h e o r y ,  t h a t  any th e o ry  i f  i t  i s  to  be more than  i d l e  
s p e c u l a t i o n ,  must i l l u m i n a t e  the  world around u s .  He i s  u n w i l l i n g  to  
fo rg o  th e  world  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  in  o r d e r  to  s a t i s f y  t h e o r e t i c a l  demands.  
His argument a t t e m p t s  to  r e s u r r e c t  th e  E l e a t i c  dilemma between th e o ry
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and e x p e r i e n c e .  Although I  b e l i e v e  the  dilemma can be overcome,
C am pbe l l ' s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  th e o ry  i l l u m i n a t e  r a t h e r  than  abandon the
world  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  remains  ad m i ra b le .
This  c h a l l e n g e  i s  th e  wedge which s p l i t s  Determinism i n t o  i t s  Hard
and S o f t  v a r i e t i e s .  S o f t ,  o r  more s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y ,  r e s o u r c e f u l
d e t e r m i n i s t s  ag re e  w i th  Campbell t h a t  i d e a l s  such as freedom, m ora l
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  d i g n i t y ,  and p r i d e  a r e  a v a l u a b l e  p a r t  o f  our world and
should  n o t  be abandoned w h o le s a le  on t h e o r e t i c a l  g rounds .  While
r e s o u r c e f u l  d e te rm in i sm  r e s p e c t s  t h e s e  t r a d i t i o n a l  n o t i o n s ,  i t  a l s o
c a l l s  f o r  a r e t h i n k i n g  o f  th e se ,  i d e a l s  and s t a n d a r d s  i n  l i g h t  o f  i t s
t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  F r i t h j o f  Bergmann, r e c o g n i z in g  t h i s  need to
r e t h i n k  th e  n o t i o n  o f  freedom, s ays :
The id e a  o f  freedom has  been l i k e  a hood t h a t  kep t  the  f a l c o n
of  th ough t  on th e  l e a t h e r  g l o v e .  For i t  g iv e s  the  i l l u s i o n
t h a t  we have a g o a l ,  t h a t  i t  i s  known, t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a 
framework and t h a t  a l l  i s  f a i r l y  u n d e r s to o d  -  and so the  major 
q u e s t i o n s  a r e  n o t  even a s k e d . [32]
Hard d e t e r m i n i s t s ,  c o n v e r s e l y ,  r e j e c t  th e  c l a im  t h a t  such i d e a l s  a re
v a l u a b l e ,  a rg u in g  t h a t  t h e s e  are  mere ly  ways o f  t a l k i n g  about  the  world
which we now know to  be m i s t a k e n .  B.F.  S k in n e r ,  f o r  example,
u n d e r s t a n d s  "freedom" and " d i g n i t y "  to  be p r e s c i e n t  i f i c  ways of
u n d e r s t a n d i n g .o u r s e l v e s  and as such th e s e  terms have become impediments
to  the  development o f  a r ew ard ing  s o c i e t y . [33] According to  Hard
Determin ism what we most need to be f r e e  from i s  the  co n c e p t io n  of
freedom i t s e l f .
C am pbe l l ' s  second source  of  a p p e a l  i s  h i s  a t t e n t i v e n e s s  to  the
o r d i n a r y  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  o u r s e l v e s  and ou r  w or ld .  He i n v i t e s  us to 
c o n s i d e r  the  way we n o rm a l ly ,  p r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y , f e e l .  I  w i l l  d i s c u s s  
th e  weaknesses  o f  t h i s  approach  below, but  he re  l e t  me a d d re s s  i t s
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s t r e n g t h s .  Focusing  on s e n s a t i o n  g iv e s  C am pbel l 's  argument a sense  of  
immediacy and a c c e s s i b i l i t y  which i s  a l i e n  to  most fo rmal  d i s c u s s i o n s  of  
freedom.  By a rgu ing  f o r  freedom from the  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  s e n s a t i o n ,  
Campbell a t t e m p t s  to  p r o v id e  i t  w i th  the  a p p a re n t  i n d u b i t a b i l i t y  of  
s e n s a t i o n s .  We can no more deny t h a t  c e r t a i n  a c t s  a re  f r e e ,  i t  seems,  
th a n  we can t h a t  c e r t a i n  a c t s  a re  p a i n f u l .  The r e a d e r  f i n d s  h im se l f  
nodding in  agreement w i th  C am pbe l l ' s  a n a l y s i s  b e fo re  i t  i s  even f u l l y  
u n d e r s to o d .  I  b e l i e v e ,  however,  t h a t  the  m o r e  we u n d e r s t a n d  i t  the  l e s s  
we nod .  In  any c a s e ,  C am pbel l 's  c on tem pora r i e s  were f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  
ph i lo so p h y  and n o t  s a l e s  c a p t u r e d  h i s  a t t e n t i o n .
The two p re c e d in g  so u rces  o f  s t r e n g t h  and a p p e a l  l e ad  to  the  t h i r d ;  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  the  u n d e n i a b l e ,  bu t  o f t  d e n i e d ,  i n f l u e n c e  o f  h e r e d i t y  
and env i ronm en t .  C o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  our d a i l y  l i f e  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  Campbell 
acknowledge th e  s t a b l e  p a t t e r n  which i t  e x h i b i t s .  His argument f o r  
f reedom i s  s i t u a t e d  w i t h i n  an a lmost  com ple te ly  d e te rm ined  framework.  
His ca s e  i s  a t t r a c t i v e  because he seems to  be a b l e  t o  g iv e  the  
d e t e r m i n i s t  almost  a l l  he wants w i th o u t  l o s i n g  a L i b e r t a r i a n  co n ce p t io n  
o f  freedom. This  a l low s  him to r e t a i n  a degree  o f  s o c i a l  s t a b i l i t y ,  
p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  o f  b e h a v i o r ,  and e q u i t a b l e  judgments o f  moral  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i t h i n  h i s  t h e o r y .  Thus,  h i s  argument ap p ea r s  more 
p l a u s i b l e  than  t h a t  o f  extreme L i b e r t a r i a n s ,  S a r t r e  f o r  example,  who 
r e j e c t  de te rm in i sm  c a t e g o r i c a l l y .
S t rong  as th e  a p p ea l  o f  C a m p b e l l ' s  p o s i t i o n  i s ,  i t  p roves  to  be a 
double  edged sword. His w i l l i n g n e s s  to  acknowledge th e  l a r g e l y  
d e t e r m i n i s t i c  c o n t e x t  of  d a i l y  l i f e  bo th  s u p p o r t s  and ,  u l t i m a t e l y ,  
undermines  h i s  a rgument.  The s i t u a t i o n  i s  i r o n i c .  The more co h e re n t  
h i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  the  l e s s  i t  i l l u m i n a t e s  the  l i v e d - w o r l d  and the  more i t
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i l l u m i n a t e s  the  l i v e d -w o r ld  th e  l e s s  co h e re n t  i t  becomes. Recogniz ing  
the  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  s e t t i n g  o f  our  l i v e s  w i th o u t  c a r e f u l l y  c o n s i d e r i n g  the  
n a t u r e  o f  the  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i t s e l f  f o r c e s  Campbell to  r e t r e a t  s t e p  by 
s t e p  u n t i l  he f i n a l l y  d ig s  in  a t  the  l e v e l  o f  S e l fh o o d .  Even a t  t h i s  
murky l e v e l  he s t r u g g l e s  under  th e  weigh t  o f  Dete rmin ism.  I f  th e  f r e e  
a c t  a r i s e s  from th e  S e l f  i s  i t  caused  by the  S e l f ?  I f  i t  i s  caused  by 
the  S e l f  can i t  be f r e e ?  I f  i t  a r i s e s  from the  S e l f  b u t  i s  no t  caused 
by the  S e l f  how i s  i t  r e l a t e d  t o  the  S e l f ?  A t tem pt ing  to  c l a r i f y  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between freedom and the  S e l f ,  Campbell p o s i t s  a compound 
S e l f .  Although i t  i s  c e n t r a l  t o  h i s  argument Campbell f a i l s  to  
e x p l i c a t e  how t h i s  compound S e l f  i s  t o  be u n d e r s to o d .
Susan A n d e r s o n 's  a r t i c l e ,  "The L i b e r t a r i a n  co n c e p t io n  of  Freedom",  
h e l p s  to  c l a r i f y  C am pbe l l ' s  c o n c e p t io n  o f  S e l f h o o d . [34] She p o i n t s  out  
t h a t  as  a d u a l i s t  what m a t t e r s  most f o r  Campbell i s  the  l o c a t i o n  of  the  
S e l f .  F o l low ing  C.D. Broad she d i s t i n g u i s h e s  two s p e c i e s  o f  t h e o r i e s  
conce rn ing  m e n ta l  u n i t y :  c e n t e r  and n o n - c e n t e r .  Cen te r  t h e o r i e s  r e s t
on th e  assum pt ion  t h a t  r a t h e r  th a n  simply b e ing  the  a g g re g a te  o f  m en ta l  
e x p e r i e n c e s ,  th e  S e l f  i s  the  c e n t e r  w i t h i n  which m en ta l  e x p e r i e n c e s  a r e  
e x p e r i e n c e d .  The c e n t e r  i t s e l f  i s  n e v e r  an o b j e c t  o f  e x p e r i e n c e .  [35] 
N on-cen te r  t h e o r i e s ,  as  one might  im ag ine ,  r e s t  on the  assum pt ion  t h a t  
t h e  S e l f  i s  s imply the  a g g r e g a t e  o f  m e n ta l  e x p e r i e n c e s .  A cco rd in g ly ,  
t h e  S e l f  i s  i d e n t i c a l  w i th  i t s  "formed c h a r a c t e r " .
Campbell ,  a d o p t in g  what we can now c a l l  a c e n t e r  t h e o r y ,  a rgues  
t h a t  in  a d d i t i o n  to  i t s  c h a r a c t e r ,  formed by h e r e d i t y  and env i ronm ent ,  
th e  S e l f  c o n t a i n s  a n o th e r  e n t i t y ,  which Anderson c a l l s  the  " s u b s t a n t i v e  
c e n t e r " . [36] I t  seems p o s s i b l e ,  to  bo th  Anderson and Campbell ,  t h a t  t h i s  
s u b s t a n t i v e  c e n t e r  could  i n i t i a t e  a c t i o n  t h a t  i s  capa b le  o f  t r a n s c e n d i n g
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the  S e l f ' s  c h a r a c t e r .  Such an a c t ,  w h i le  o r i g i n a t i n g  in  the  S e l f ,  would 
n o t  be de te rm ined  by i t .
Even a f t e r  A nderson 's  e x p l i c a t i o n ,  the  f o r c e  o f  C am pbel l 's  argument 
remains  u n c l e a r .  He has c e r t a i n l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  a source  o f  freedom 
which ,  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  e scapes  the  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  nexus which su r rounds  
i t .  Yet one can h a r d ly  he lp  but  b e l i e v e  t h a t  h i s  b e s t  de fense  i s  t h a t  
he o ccup ie s  a p o s i t i o n  unworthy of  a t t a c k .  R a the r  than  c o n f r o n t i n g  the  
problem of d e te rm in ism  d i r e c t l y  he simply shaves i t  back to  a n o th e r  
l e v e l  o f  the  S e l f .  The c h a l l e n g e  f a c i n g  Campbell and ,  by e x t e n s i o n ,  
L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  can be d i s t i l l e d  i n t o  two q u e s t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  i f  Se lfhood  
i s  to  be i d e n t i f i e d  w i th  th e  S e l f ' s  c e n t e r  r a t h e r  th a n  i t s  formed 
c h a r a c t e r ,  where i s  the  c e n t e r  t o  be lo c a te d ?  Second,  what i s  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  S e l f  (however i t  may be d e f i n e d )  and i t s  a c t s ?  
The f i r s t  q u e s t i o n  c e n t e r s  around the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between mind and body 
w h i le  the  second c e n t e r s  around how a c t s  a c q u i r e  meaning.
C o ns ide r ing  the  f i r s t  q u e s t i o n  we f i n d  t h a t  a t  the  h e a r t  of  
C am pbel l 's  argument l i e s  th e  n o t i o n  of  " in n e r  e x p e r i e n c e " . [37] I f  we 
t u r n  ou r  a t t e n t i o n  inward we become aware o f  a locus  o f  c o n s c io u s n e s s ,  
th e  S e l f .  I t  i s  ^  who am w r i t i n g  t h i s  s e n t e n c e ,  d r in k i n g  t h i s  c o f f e e ,  
and t h i n k i n g  th e s e  t h o u g h t s .  We a r e  aware o f  th e  S e l f  only  by means o f  
i t s  a c t i v i t y ;  we neve r  e x p e r i e n c e  some " t h i n g "  which i s  the  S e l f .  
Campbell d i s t i n g u i s h e s  two forms o f  s e l f  a c t i v i t y :  f u n c t i o n a l  and
c r e a t i v e .  F u n c t i o n a l  a c t i v i t y  i s  the  o r d i n a r y  a c t i v i t y  of  which we a re  
normal ly  o b l i v i o u s :  w a lk ing ,  b r e a t h i n g ,  and e a t i n g  t o  name a few.
C o n s id e r a t io n  o f  th e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  r e v e a l s  t h a t  i t  i s  indeed  us who a re  
doing  them b u t ,  a c c o rd in g  t o  Campbell ,  they  a re  l a r g e l y  a p roduc t  of  
h e r e d i t y  and environment and ,  t h u s ,  cannot  s e rv e  as f r eed o m 's  lo c u s .
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C r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y  i s  p r e s e n t  in  the  r a r e  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  "moral  
t e m p t a t i o n "  w here in  we must choose whether  or  not  to  e x e r t  the  "moral  
ene rgy"  n e c e s s a r y  to  r e s i s t  d e s i r e  and fo l l o w  d u t y .  Campbell a rgues  
t h a t  we cannot  deny t h a t  we e x p e r i e n c e  o u r s e l v e s  making a gen u in e ly  f r e e  
cho ice  i n  such  a s i t u a t i o n .
This  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  f r e e  cho ice  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by immediacy and 
i n d u b i t a b i l i t y .  C am pbel l 's  argument now r e v e a l s  a f a m i l i a r  shape ,  the  
p r i v i l e g e d  s t a t u s  of  s e n s a t i o n .  Freedom i s  u n de r s tood  as a s e n s a t i o n ,  
c o n s e q u e n t ly ,  we can no more deny t h a t  we a r e  f r e e  than  we can deny t h a t  
we a re  i n  p a i n  when s t r u c k .  The ev idence  f o r  freedom i s  t h a t  we fee l .  
f r e e .  Campbell ,  l i k e  a l l  d u a l i s t s ,  wants to  d i s t i n g u i s h  s e n s a t i o n s  from 
c o n c u r r e n t  p h y s i o l o g i c a l  s t a t e s .  S e n s a t i o n  d i s c o u r s e  and p h y s i o l o g i c a l  
d i s c o u r s e  a r e  no t  s imply d i f f e r e n t  ways o f  d i s c u s s i n g  the  same 
phenomenon. This  p o s i t i o n  s u f f e r s  from t h r e e  p rob lem s .
F i r s t ,  C am pbe l l ' s  a p p e a l  to  s e n s a t i o n  i t s e l f  i s  p r o b l e m a t i c .  
Campbell i n s i s t s  t h a t  the  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  s e n s a t i o n  qua s e n s a t i o n  cannot  
be d e n i e d .  Th is  i n d u b i t a b i l i t y  would ho ld  f o r  freedom as much as  f o r  
p a i n .  He a l s o  a rgues  t h e r e  i s  an o n t o l o g i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
s e n s a t i o n  and c o n c u r r e n t  b r a i n  s t a t e s .  His r ea s o n  fo r  h o ld in g  them 
o n t o l o g i c a l l y  d i s t i n c t  i s  ob v io u s .  Reducing the  f e e l i n g  o f  f r e e  cho ice  
to  b r a i n  a c t i v i t y  o b v i a t e s  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  in de te rm inacy  -  u n l e s s  one 
i s  w i l l i n g  to  a rgue  the  b r a i n ' s  p h y s i o l o g i c a l  a c t i v i t y  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
i n d e t e r m i n a t e .  Except f o r  t h e . f a c t  t h a t  he must do so to  save h i s  
t h e o r y ,  what r ea son  does Campbell have to  c la im  t h a t  the  d i f f e r e n c e  
between s e n s a t i o n  and b r a i n  s t a t e  i s  o n t o l o g i c a l  r a t h e r  than  d i f f e r i n g  
modes of  d i s c o u r s e ?  O bv ious ly ,  one can d i s c u s s  any g iven  th i n g  in  a 
v a r i e t y  o f  ways.  My d e s c r i p t i o n  of  a bou t  o f  s eve re  d e p r e s s i o n ,  the
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l e t h a r g i c  a n x i e t y  and h o p e l e s s  gloom which c h a r a c t e r i z e d  my l i f e ,  
c e r t a i n l y  d i f f e r s  from my p h y s i c i a n ' s  a n a l y s i s  and d e s c r i p t i o n  in  terms 
o f  l i t h i u m  d e f i c i e n c y .  To say t h a t  the  p h y s i o l o g i c a l  d i s c o u r s e  i s  more 
t r u t h f u l  i s  s u r e ly  as m is taken  as denying the  c o n n e c t io n  between my 
l i t h i u m  and d e p r e s s i o n .  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  Campbell i s  c o r r e c t  when he 
a rgues  t h a t  the  d i s c o u r s e  o f  in n e r  e x p e r i e n c e  i s  more a p p r o p r i a t e  than  
t h a t  o f  e x t e r n a l  o b s e r v a t i o n  f o r  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  freedom, but  f o r  
r e a s o n s  d i f f e r e n t  from h i s  own. R eg a rd le s s  of  the  c o n n ec t io n  between 
b r a i n ,  s t a t e s  and s e n s a t i o n  I  b e l i e v e - t h a t  a d e s c r i p t i o n  of  p a i n ,  j o y ,  
lo v e ,  o r  d e s p a i r  s o l e l y  in  p h y s i o l o g i c a l  terms would f a i l  to  c a p t u r e  the 
r i c h n e s s  of  th e s e  e x p e r i e n c e s .  I f  I  want to  exp res s  my d e s p a i r  in  terms 
o f  e x p e r i e n c e ,  fo c u s in g  on blood  p r e s s u r e ,  p u l s e  r a t e ,  and l i t h i u m  l e v e l  
a lone  would f a i l  a d e q u a te ly  to  ex p re s s  my c o n d i t i o n .  C onverse ly ,  t r y i n g  
to  u n d e r s t a n d  d e s p a i r  p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y  in  terms o f  S a r t r e ' s  a n a l y s i s  of  
nausea  would be e q u a l ly  f r u i t l e s s .
R ichard  R o r ty ,  in  P h i lo sophy  and the  M ir ro r  of  N a tu re ,  a l s o  a rgues
t h a t  c l a im in g  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  d i s c o u r s e  r e f l e c t  o n t o l o g i c a l
d i f f e r e n c e s  i s  u n w ar ran ted .  He s a y s ,
As long a s  f e e l i n g  p a i n f u l  i s  a p r o p e r t y  o f  a person  or  of
b r a i n - f i b e r s , t h e r e  seems no r e a s o n  f o r  the  e p i s t e m ic
d i f f e r e n c e  between r e p o r t s  o f  how t h i n g s  f e e l  and r e p o r t s  of
a n y th in g  e l s e  to  produce  an o n t o l o g i c a l  gap .  But as soon as
t h e r e  i s  an o n t o l o g i c a l  gap ,  we a r e  no longe r  t a l k i n g  about  
s t a t e s  or  p r o p e r t i e s  but  about  d i s t i n c t  p a r t i c u l a r s ,  d i s t i n c t  
s u b j e c t s  o f  p r e d i c a t i o n , . .The n e o - d u a l i s t  i s  no lo nge r  t a l k i n g  
about  how peop le  f e e l  bu t  about  f e e l i n g s  as l i t t l e  
s e l f - s u b s i s t e n t  e n t i t i e s ,  f l o a t i n g  f r e e  o f  peop le  in  the way 
i n  which u n i v e r s a l s  f l o a t  f r e e  of  i t s  i n s t a n t i a t i o n s . [38]
The move from the  i n d u b i t a b i l i t y  o f  the  f e e l i n g  o f  f r e e  cho ice  to the
i n d u b i t a b i l i t y  o f  freedom i s  as  unw arran ted  as the  move from the
i n d u b i t a b i l i t y  of  th e  e x p e r i e n c e  of  p a i n  to  the  i n d u b i t a b i l i t y  of
p a i n f u l n e s s  because  bo th  depend upon a dubious h y p o s t a t i z a t i o n  of
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i n d i v i d u a l  p r o p e r t i e s .
Second,  even i f  we ac c e p t  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  s e c u r in g  freedom by 
a p p e a l in g  to  t h e  p r i v i l e g e d  s t a t u s  o f  s e n s a t i o n  a problem rem a ins .  
Campbell c l a im s  t h a t  freedom i s  ex p e r i e n c e d  as f r e e  c h o i c e .  The 
overwhelming m a j o r i t y  o f  ou r  c h o i c e s ,  99% of  them acc o rd in g  to  Campbell ,  
a r e  no t  f r e e  because  they  a re  s u b j e c t  to  the  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of  h e r e d i t y  
and env i ronm en t .  There i s ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h a t  r a r e  s i t u a t i o n  of  genuine  
moral  t e m p ta t i o n  where in  f r e e  cho ice  i s  p o s s i b l e .  In  such a s i t u a t i o n  
t h e  cho ice  t h a t  we make i s  exp e r i e n c e d  as f r e e l y  made. From the  
p e r s p e c t i v e  of  in n e r  e x p e r i e n c e ,  however,  what i s  the  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
t h e  way I  f e e l  when I  choose R a i n i e r  over  Budweiser and when I  choose to  
obey d u ty  r a t h e r  than  succumb to  d e s i r e ?  C e r t a i n l y  t h e r e  i s  a 
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  degree  but  i s  t h e r e  a d i f f e r e n c e  in  kind? I do not  t h i n k  
so .  Campbell must a rgue  t h a t  my cho ice  o f  R a i n i e r  was not  f r e e  whereas
my d e c i s i o n  to  s t a y  home and w r i t e  r a t h e r  than  go s k i i n g  was. From h i s
own p e r s p e c t i v e ,  we see t h a t  w h i l e  we u s u a l l y  f e e l  a b s o l u t e l y  u n f e t t e r e d  
d e c i d in g  which b ee r  to  d r i n k ,  d e c i d in g  to  obey du ty  i s  o f t e n  ex p e r i en ced  
as c o n f i n i n g .  C am pbe l l ' s  re sponse  i s  t h a t  because  the  l a t t e r  d e c i s i o n
i s  c o n t r a r y  to  d e s i r e  (which i s  a p roduc t  o f  ou r  c h a r a c t e r ) t h e  d e c i s i o n
i s  f r e e .  This  d i s t i n c t i o n  can be m a in ta in e d  on t h e o r e t i c a l  grounds 
pe rhaps  bu t  no t  from the  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  how th e  cho ices  " f e e l " .  From 
t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  Campbell cannot  do what he mus t-  d i s t i n g u i s h  the 
u n f r e e  ch o ices  o f  d a i l y  l i f e  from the  f r e e  ch o ice s  of  moral  d e c i s i o n  
making.
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T h i r d ,  C am pbe l l 's  a p p ea l  to  s e n s a t i o n  l e av es  him in  a p o s i t i o n  
where S e l fhood  and freedom a re  fo r c e d  to  f l o a t  above the  c o n t i n g e n c i e s  
o f  everyday l i f e .  Freedom i s  exc luded  from 99% of  our  l i v e s  and 100% of 
ou r  b o d i e s .  Freedom, l i k e  the  God o f  the  P h i lo s o p h e r s  compared to  the 
God o f  Abraham, I s a a c  and J a c o b ,  i s  reduced  from occupying a v i t a l  p a r t  
o f  ou r  l i v e s  to  a mere ly t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s i t i o n :  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n
f o r  mora l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Although the  s e p a r a t i o n  of  freedom from most 
of  t h e  l i v e d  world and the  s e p a r a t i o n  of  the S e l f  from the  body i s  
in t e n d e d  to  secu re  bo th  freedom and S e l fh o o d ,  i t  r e s u l t s  in  t h e i r  mutual  
e m a s c u la t io n .
Turning  to  the  second q u e s t i o n  c o n f r o n t i n g  Campbell ,  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  S e l f  and i t s  a c t s ,  we f i n d  o t h e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  
He c la im s  t h a t  D e t e r m i n i s t s  r e spond ing  to  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  c r e a t e  a f a l s e  
di lemma. The dilemma i s  t h a t  " e i t h e r  the  a c t  fo l lo w s  n e c e s s a r i l y  upon 
p r e c e d e n t  s t a t e s  or  i t  i s  a mere m a t t e r  o f  c h a n c e . [39]  In  o t h e r  
words,  i f  an a c t  i s  to  be m ean ingfu l  i t  must be l o c a t e d  w i t h i n  a c a u s a l  
o r d e r .  Campbell b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h i s  dilemma i s  f a l s e  and thus  innocuous 
because  a t h i r d  a l t e r n a t i v e  e x i s t s ,  c r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y .  An a c t  
o r i g i n a t i n g  th rough  the  S e l f ' s  c r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y  i s  n e i t h e r  c a u s a l l y  
de te rm ined  nor random. R a th e r  than  c l a r i f y i n g  what he means by c r e a t i v e  
a c t i v i t y  Campbell s imply p o i n t s  to  our  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  i t .  C onsequen t ly ,  
he n e v e r  d i s c u s s e s  how a f r e e  a c t  a c q u i r e s  meaning excep t  to  a s s u r e  us 
t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  th rough  c a u s a l i t y .  He u ses  the  d e t e r m i n i s t ' s  dilemma to  
h i s  advan tage  by c o n s i d e r i n g  only  two p o s s i b i l i t i e s :  c a u s a l i t y  and
chaos . ’ C e r t a i n l y  a c t s  or  even ts  can be m ean ingfu l  w i th o u t  be ing  
subsumed to  a s t r i c t l y  c a u s a l  o r d e r .  Few peop le  to d a y ,  a f t e r  the  
d i s c o v e r i e s  o f  quantum mechanics and r e c e n t  work i n  m o le c u la r  b i o l o g y ,
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b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  world can be a d e q u a te ly  e x p l a in e d  in  terms o f  l i n e a r  
c a u s a l i t y .  I f  t h i s  was a l l  the  D e te r m in i s t  had to  go on,  Campbell would 
c e r t a i n l y  win th e  day .  However, h i s  c o n c e p t io n  of  freedom exc ludes  f a r  
more than  s t r i c t  c a u s a l i t y .  The inadequacy o f  C am pbe l l ' s  p o s i t i o n  i s
d i s c l o s e d  when, fo l l o w in g  h i s  a d v i c e ,  we c i rcumvent the  di lemma. To do 
s o ,  we do not  need  to  add a n o th e r  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  we simply b roaden  the
n o t i o n  o f  c a u s a l i t y  t o  l a w f u l n e s s .
To say t h a t  an even t  or  a c t  i s  m ean ingfu l  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  ( i n
p r i n c i p l e )  some r e a s o n ,  or  r ea so n s  can be g iven  f o r  i t s  o c c u r r e n c e .
U nders tand ing  always o c c u r s  w i t h i n  a g iven  c o n t e x t .  Take,  f o r  example,  
t h e  wprd " dog" .  O u ts id e  the  c o n t e x t  of  th e  E n g l i s h  language ,  which i s  
in  t u r n  u n d e r s to o d  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  our  w or ld ,  "dog" has  no 
mean ing .  To u n d e r s t a n d  "dog" one must l o c a t e  i t  w i t h i n  the  a p p r o p r i a t e  
c o n t e x t .  Any g iven  a c t  or  even t  may f i t  w i t h i n  a v a r i e t y  o f  c o n tex ts ' ,  
o r  pe rhaps  more simply p u t ,  any a c t  or  even t  can be u n d e r s to o d  from 
v a r i o u s  p e r s p e c t i v e s .  Cons ide r  my bou t  w i th  d e p r e s s i o n .  Depending upon 
who I  tu r n e d  to  f o r  a s s i s t a n c e  my s i t u a t i o n  would be u n d e r s to o d  in  
d i f f e r e n t  ways.  Turn ing  to  my p h y s i c i a n  would r e s u l t  in  my d e p r e s s i o n  
b e in g  u n d e r s to o d  and t r e a t e d  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y .  Roughly speak ing  
s c i e n t i f i c  e x p l a n a t i o n  p roceeds  by subsuming the  even t  to  be e x p l a in e d  
under  a s e t  o f  laws and s p e c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  so t h a t  we a r e  ab l e  to  deduce 
why the  event  had to  have happened in  the  way t h a t  i t  d i d .  To e x p l a i n  
my d e p r e s s i o n  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  would be t o  show how g iven  the d e f i c i e n c y  
o f  l i t h i u m  and g iven  th e  b o d y ' s  r e a c t i o n  to  t h i s  d e f i c i e n c y ,  the  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  d e p r e s s i o n  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e s u l t s .  I f  I  tu rn e d  to  a f r i e n d  
the  d e p r e s s i o n  would be u n d e r s to o d  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t l y .  From t h i s  
p e r s p e c t i v e ,  my d e p r e s s i o n  might  be u n d e r s to o d  in  terms of  some f a i l u r e
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on my p a r t ,  s t r e s s  or  a n x i e t y .  A p s y c h o a n a ly s t  might approach  my
d e p r e s s i o n  i n  a way s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  o f  a f r i e n d  but  w i th  a more
s y s t e m a t i c  and i n t e r p r e t i v e  method.  Perhaps  i t  would be d i s c o v e r e d  t h a t  
t h e  r e c e n t  remembrance o f  a p r e v i o u s l y  r e p r e s s e d  e x p e r i e n c e  has r e s u l t e d
in  my d e p r e s s i o n .  I n  former  t im es  my d e p r e s s i o n  might  have been
u n d e r s to o d  i n  te rm s  of  demonic p o s s e s s i o n  or  a l i e n a t i o n  from the  d i v i n e .
A l l  t h r e e  methods ,  d i s p a r a t e  as th e y  a r e ,  share  the  n o t i o n  of
l a w f u l n e s s .  Meaningful  t h i n g s  do n o t  j u s t  o c c u r ,  they  f i t  i n t o  the
world  in  some way, in  our c a s e ,  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ,  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y ,  o r  
m y t h i c a l l y .  C am pbe l l ' s  co n c e p t io n  o f  the  f r e e  a c t  n o t  only exc ludes
s c i e n t i f i c  o r  c a u s a l  e x p l a n a t i o n ;  i t  exc ludes  a l l  o t h e r s  as w e l l  
because  no reason  can be g iven  f o r  a f r e e  a c t .  To ask  why or  how o f  a 
" f r e e  a c t "  i s  s imply i n a p p r o p r i a t e .  In  t r i v i a l  m a t t e r s ,  choos ing  which 
brand  o f  b e e r  to  d r i n k ,  f o r  example,  we a r e  c o n t e n t  to  say t h a t  we 
" d o n ' t  know why we chose as we d i d ,  we j u s t  d i d ! " .  However, in  m a t t e r s  
of  im p o r t ,  q u e s t i o n s  o f  moral  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  f o r  example,  we would 
ne v e r  be s a t i s f i e d  w i th  such a non-answ er .  I f  we, in  p r i n c i p l e ,  can 
g iv e  no r e sponse  to  th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  why we d id  something ,  how can we be 
h e ld  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i t ?  Thus,  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  the  L i b e r t a r i a n ' s  " f r e e "  
a c t  i s  u n i n t e l l i g i b l e  in  th e  second s e n s e — no meaning can be a t t a c h e d  
to  i t .
Even i f ' we ac c e p t  C am pbe l l ' s  t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  the  c o n c e p t io n  of 
freedom w i t h i n  i t  i s  p lagued  w i th  p rob lem s .  The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  h i s  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  moral  d e c i s i o n  making d r i v e s  a wedge between d e s i r e  and 
d u t y .  His argument assumes bo th  t h a t  one does no t  d e s i r e  to  do h i s  duty  
and t h a t  the  f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  du ty  i s  independen t  from d e s i r e .  Both 
assum pt ions  a r e  d u b io u s .  C e r t a i n l y  we o f t e n  e x p e r i e n c e  o u r s e l v e s  t o r n
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between doing what we b e l i e v e  we should  do and doing what we want to  do. 
Moral dilemmas a r e  indeed  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by such c o n f l i c t .  In  th e s e  
s i t u a t i o n s  we s t r u g g l e  to  de te rm ine  what in  f a c t  we should  do or  we 
s t r u g g l e  to  f i n d  the  w h e rew i th a l  to  do what we know we s h o u ld .  However, 
does i t  make sense to  say t h a t  we can do o t h e r  than  what we most 
s t r o n g l y  d e s i r e ?  I s  no t  our d e c i s i o n  to  fo l l o w  du ty  dependent  upon our 
d e s i r i n g  t o  fo l l o w  duty? C am pbe l l 's  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  s e n s i b l e  only  i f  we 
u n d e r s t a n d  " d e s i r e "  and "d u ty "  as  th e y  have been t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
u n d e r s to o d .  "D e s i r e "  r e f e r r i n g  to  the  e m o t io n a l ,  a p p e t i t i v e  s i d e  of  
man, and "du ty"  r e f e r r i n g  to  the  i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  r a t i o n a l  s i d e  of  man. 
C am pbe l l ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  th e  f r e e  a c t  g iv e s  t h i s  t r a d i t i o n a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  
a new t w i s t  because  h i s  f r e e  man i s  n e i t h e r  governed  by r ea s o n  nor 
i n s t i n c t ;  he i s  n e i t h e r  a S to i c  nor  a H e d o n i s t .  I f  he i s  a n y th ing  
C am pbe l l ' s  f r e e  man i s  an Underground m an . [40] Every new s i t u a t i o n  
i n s o f a r  as  i t  might  i n f l u e n c e  o r  c o n s t r a i n  him i s  a t h r e a t  to  h i s  
f reedom. I f  Campbell had used  P l a t o ' s  ana logy  o f  the  c h a r i o t  to 
e x p l i c a t e  h i s  new use o f  t h i s  c l a s s i c  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  we would f i n d  i t  
r a c i n g  a c r o s s  the  p l a i n ,  gu ided  by n e i t h e r  the  h o r s e s  nor the  
c h a r i o t e e r .
Th is  leads  us to  the  second prob lem: h i s  r e l i a n c e  on c h o i c e .  A
c h o ice  must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from bo th  randomness and c o e r c i o n .  
T r i p p in g  o ver  a c rack  in  the  s idew alk  i s  no more a m a t t e r  of  cho ice  than 
" d e c id i n g "  to  g iv e  your w a l l e t  to  an armed th u g .  Choice a l s o  r e q u i r e s  a 
f a i r l y  w e l l  d e l i n e a t e d  c o n t e x t .  I f  t h e  o p t i o n s  a r e  u n c l e a r ,  choosing  
one o f  them i s  im p o s s ib l e .  The s im p l e s t  c o n t e x t  f o r  a cho ice  and the 
one adopted  by Campbell i s  two c l e a r  a l t e r n a t i v e s :  A and B. Campbell
a rgues  t h a t  a f r e e  cho ice  o f  A o r  B i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n d e t e r m i n a t e .  I f
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t h i s  i s  t r u e ,  can we c a l l  i t  a cho ice?  I f  we can ,  how i s  cho ice  
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from randomness? Presumably because  in  ch o o s in g , .w e  
e x p e r i e n c e  o u r s e l v e s  d e l i b e r a t i n g ,  weighing the  o p t i o n s  and f i n a l l y  
choos ing  one or the  o t h e r .  But i f  t h i s  was th e  case  our  c h o ice  would be 
i n f l u e n c e d  by our  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  and c o n s eq u en t ly  would no t  be f r e e .  
Thus,  a f r e e  c h o ice  i s  one t h a t  i s  f r e e  from a l l  i n f l u e n c e ,  in  o t h e r  
words,  a random a c t .  Campbell c l a im s  t h a t  moral  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r e q u i r e s  
f r e e  c h o i c e .  I f  n o t ,  how cou ld  we hold  someone r e s p o n s i b l e  fo r  h i s  
a c t i o n ?  Y e t ,  can we hold  someone r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the  consequence o f  a
cho ice  which he or  she t r u l y  can g iv e  no r ea s o n  f o r  making? Even i f  we
co u ld ,  does such  an a c t  r e f l e c t  our  d e e p e s t  conce rns  about  human 
freedom? I  t h i n k  n o t .
The t h i r d  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h a t  C am pbe l l ' s  co n c e p t io n  o f  freedom 
r e s u l t s  i n  a d i s t u r b i n g  p a ra d o x .  Accord ing  to  Campbell humans, v i a  the 
s e l f ' s  c r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y ,  a r e  f r e e .  Yet t h i s  freedom can only  be 
a c t u a l i z e d  th rough  mora l  d e c i s i o n s .  Moral d e c i s i o n s  occur  only  in  those  
s i t u a t i o n s  where in  we a r e  t o r n  between du ty  and d e s i r e .  Without  th e s e  
s i t u a t i o n s ,  which com prises  only  1% of  ou r  l i v e s ,  we would be u n f r e e .  
C e r t a i n l y  we a l l  know p eop le  who a r e  s l a v e s  to  t h e i r  d e s i r e  or  d u ty .
But does i t  make sense to  say t h a t  a pe rson  who i s  n a t u r a l l y  d i s p o s ed
toward obey ing  d u ty  i s  l e s s  f r e e  than  one who i s  c o n s t a n t l y  t o r n  between
du ty  and d e s i r e ?  I s  a man who i s  c o n s t a n t l y  t o r n  between honor ing  h i s
m a r r i a g e  and having  an a f f a i r  more f r e e  than  one who has come to  l i v e  in
harmony w i th  h i s  commitment? Far  from c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  a f r e e  l i f e ,
C am pbe l l ' s  s c e n a r i o  d e p i c t s  a b j e c t  bondage.
Page 28
The f o u r t h ,  and f i n a l ,  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h a t  C am pbe l l ' s  co n c e p t io n  o f  
freedom cannot be s t a t e d  in  such  a way t h a t  i t  f i t s  our  most cogent  
d e s c r i p t i o n  of  p h y s i c a l  r e a l i t y ,  t h a t  o f f e r e d  by p h y s ic s  and c h e m is t r y .  
C l e a r ly  t h i s  i n a b i l i t y  a lone  does no t  c o n s t i t u t e  a r e f u t a t i o n  of  
l i b e r t a r i a n i s m .  Yet i n s o f a r  as  th e  L i b e r t a r i a n  cannot  o f f e r  an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  r e a l i t y  which en joys  the  cogency of  modern 
s c i e n c e ,  he i s  f o r c e d  to  do one o f  two t h i n g s .  E i t h e r  r e j e c t  the  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f f e r e d  by s c i e n c e  on the  grounds  t h a t  i f  i t  were t r u e ,  
freedom would be l o s t ,  o r  a rgue  t h a t  f r e e  w i l l  does no t  f a l l  under  the  
purv iew o f  s c i e n c e  and t h e r e f o r e  i s  no t  t h r e a t e n e d  by i t .  The f i r s t  
r e sponse  a rgues  t h a t  x cannot  be th e  case  because  x must no t  be the  
c a s e .  Th is  i s  as  i n v a l i d  as i t  i s  f a i n t h e a r t e d !  The second re sponse  
has  more go ing  f o r  i t  than  the  f i r s t ,  b u t  j u s t  b a r e l y .  One can 
c e r t a i n l y  e scape  the  f i n d i n g s  o f  n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e  by c l a im in g  de f a c t o  
t h a t  h i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  e x t r a s c i e n t i f i c .  Examples o f  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  abound: 
p a ra p s y c h o lo g y ,  a s t r o l o g y ,  palm r e a d i n g ,  t e a  l e a f  r e a d i n g  and so on ad 
i n f i n i t u m  ( ad nauseum) . [4 1 ]  But th e  L i b e r t a r i a n ,  l i k e  t h e  s u r v i v a l i s t ,  
i s  s a f e  on ly  as  long as he remains  i n  h i s  own camp. When he v e n t u re s  
ou t  and makes, a s t a t e m e n t  about  the  way t h i n g s  a r e ,  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i th  
s c i e n c e  i s  u n a v o i d a b le .  I f  th e  L i b e r t a r i a n  remains  i n  camp h i s  account  
o f  freedom l o s e s  touch  w i th  the  l i v e d - w o r l d .  Freedom, l i k e  Omarr 's  
h o ro s c o p e ,  s imply does n o t  much m a t t e r  one way or  th e  o t h e r .
In  summary, I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  C am pbe l l ' s  t h e o ry  i s  i n c o h e r e n t  and,  
moreover,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  i t s  t h e o r e t i c a l  s t a t u s ,  h i s  c o n c e p t io n  of 
freedom f a i l s  to  c l a r i f y  and secu re  moral  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
d i s p r o v i n g  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  does n o t ,  i n  i t s e l f ,  prove  Dete rmin ism.  
Perhaps  bo th  t h e o r i e s  a re  i n c o h e r e n t .  To win the  day the  D e te r m in i s t
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must show t h a t  h i s  th e o ry  i s  bo th  l o g i c a l l y  co h e re n t  and com ple te .  He 
must a l s o  show, i f  h i s  th e o ry  i s  to  be i l l u m i n a t i n g ,  t h a t  i t  i s
c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  ou r  b e s t  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  r e a l i t y .  The r e s o u r c e f u l  
D e te r m in i s t  must f i n a l l y  show t h a t  Determinism i s  com pat ib le  w i th  a 
b e l i e f  in  s t a n d a r d s  and v a l u e s  such as freedom, d i g n i t y  and mora l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  J . J . C . S m a r t  in  "Free W i l l ,  P r a i s e  and Blame" a t t e m p t s  
to  show a l l  t h r e e . [42]
6 .0  DETERMINIST FORMALISM: J . J . C .  SMART
Smart d e l i n e a t e s  two f r u i t f u l  c r i t i q u e s  o f  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m .  The 
f i r s t ,  a rg u es  t h a t  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  cannot be s t a t e d  c o n s i s t e n t l y .  The 
second,  which he mentions  bu t  does n o t  d ev e lo p ,  a rgues  t h a t
L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  cannot  be s t a t e d  in  such a way t h a t  i t  f i t s  i n  w i th  our 
most cogent  and w ide ly  a c c e p te d  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  p h y s i c a l  r e a l i t y ,  t h a t  
o f f e r e d  by p h y s i c s  and c h e m is t r y .  S ince  th e  l a t t e r  c r i t i q u e  has been 
d i s c u s s e d  in  th e  p r e c e d in g  s e c t i o n  I  w i l l  t u r n  d i r e c t l y  to  S m a r t ' s  
a n a l y s i s .
From th e  o u t s e t ,  Smart e n c o u n te r s  a d i f f i c u l t y .  I f  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  
i s  s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,  as  he c l a i m s ,  and i f  any p r o p o s i t i o n  w hatever  can 
be drawn from a c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  as  l o g i c  g u a r a n t e e s ,  then  i t  would seem
t h a t  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  should  r e s u l t  i n  a c h a o t i c  c o l l e c t i o n  of
c o n c l u s i o n s .  However, in  a c t u a l i t y  t h e r e  i s  a f a i r l y  d e f i n i t e  s e t  o f  
c o n c l u s i o n s  and a t t i t u d e s  t h a t  a r e  w ide ly  s h a red  by peop le  p r o f e s s i n g  to  
be L i b e r t a r i a n s .  The r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  unexpec ted  agreement i s  t h a t  the  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i s  no t  r e c o g n iz e d  by those  who s u b s c r ib e  to  the p o s i t i o n .  
[43] Hence,  even a m e ta p h y s i c a l  c o n fu s io n  can have s i g n i f i c a n t  p r a c t i c a l  
r e s u l t s .  C onve r se ly ,  Smart c l a im s  t h a t  c l e a r i n g  up t h i s  m e ta p h y s i c a l
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c o n fu s io n  can r e s u l t  i n  e q u a l ly  im por tan t  consequences .  Smart wants to 
c l a r i f y  th e  co n fu s io n  f i r s t  and then  sugges t  what p r a c t i c a l  consequences  
might  r e s u l t .
S m a r t ' s  f i r s t  t a s k  i s  to  c l a r i f y  the  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  he wishes  to
a t t a c k .  Turning  to  Campbell as  a spokesman f o r  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m ,  Smart
c l a im s  t h a t  L i b e r t a r i a n s  u n d e r s t a n d  a f r e e  a c t  to  be one which i s
n e i t h e r  de te rm in e d  no r  produced  by pure  chance .  C am pbe l l ' s  co n ce p t io n
o f  " c r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y "  and h i s  c l a im  t h a t  f r e e  a c t s  a r e  i n s t a n c e s  o f
" c o n t r a - c a u s a l  freedom" exem pl i fy  t h i s  p o s i t i o n .  S ince  " de te rm ined"  and
"pure chance"  a r e  r a r e l y  d e f i n e d  by L i b e r t a r i a n s ,  Smart o f f e r s  a
d e f i n i t i o n  f o r  b o t h ,  which he b e l i e v e s  i s  a c c e p t a b l e  to  the  L i b e r t a r i a n .
( D l ) .  I  s h a l l  s t a t e  t h e  view t h a t  t h e r e  i s  "unbroken c a u s a l  
c o n t i n u i t y "  i n  th e  u n i v e r s e  as f o l l o w s .  I t  i s  i n  p r i n c i p l e  
p o s s i b l e  to  make a s u f f i c i e n t l y  p r e c i s e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  the  
s t a t e  o f  a s u f f i c i e n t l y  wide r e g io n  of  th e  u n i v e r s e  a t  t ime 
t o ,  and s u f f i c i e n t  laws o f  n a t u r e  a re  in  p r i n c i p l e  
a s c e r t a i n a b l e  to  e n a b l e  a superhuman c a l c u l a t o r  to  be a b l e  to  
p r e d i c t  any even t  o c c u r r i n g  w i t h i n  t h a t  r e g io n  a t  an a l r e a d y  
g ive n  t ime t l .
(D2).  I s h a l l  d e f i n e  the  view t h a t  "pure chance"  r e i g n s  to  
some e x t e n t  w i t h i n  th e  u n i v e r s e  as f o l l o w s .  There  a r e  some 
e ven t s  t h a t  even a superhuman c a l c u l a t o r  could  n o t  p r e d i c t ,  
however p r e c i s e  h i s  knowledge o f  however wide a r e g io n  o f  the  
u n i v e r s e  a t  some p r e v io u s  t i m e . [44]
Campbell would c l a im  t h a t  i f  Dl i s  an a c c u r a t e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the  
u n i v e r s e  then  moral  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  l o s t .  Because f o r  any g iv e n  ac t  
in  such a u n i v e r s e  i t  could n o t  be c o r r e c t l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  th e  a c t  "could  
have been o th e rw i s e "  a c c o rd in g  to  Campbell ,  t h i s  i n a b i l i t y  ab s o lv e s  the 
agen t  from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  I t  i s  e q u a l ly  c l e a r  t h a t  Campbell must 
r e j e c t  D2.'  I f  an a c t  o c c u r s  by "pure c h an c e" ,  how can one be 
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i t ?  Hence the  L i b e r t a r i a n  must i n s i s t  on an a l t e r n a t i v e  
to  bo th  Dl and D2. Smart a rgues  t h a t  the  l o g i c  of  th e  s i t u a t i o n  leaves
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no room f o r  such an a l t e r n a t i v e .  O b v ious ly ,  the  p e r s u a s i v e n e s s  of  t h i s  
a n a l y s i s  depends upon the  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  S m a r t ' s  d e f i n i t i o n s .  He i s  
aware t h a t  some may contend w i th  Dl and D2, b u t  he i s  c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  the  
c r i t i c i s m s  can be met,  w i th o u t  hav ing  to  e s t a b l i s h  a middle  p o s i t i o n ,  by 
s imply a d j u s t i n g  t h e  b o unda r ie s  o f  Dl and D2. Thus,  a c c o rd in g  t o  Smart ,  
t h e  L i b e r t a r i a n  i s  caught  between a rock  and a hard  p l a c e .  Both o f  the  
on ly  two p o s i t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e  to  him a r e  u n a c c e p t a b l e .  He i s  l e f t  
h o ld in g  a l o g i c a l l y  i n c o h e r e n t  t h e o ry  w i th  no p l a c e  to  go.
Smart now t u r n s  to  h i s  f i n a l  t a s k :  showing t h a t  Determinism i s
com pa t ib le  w i th  the  c e n t r a l  i n t u i t i o n s  and v a l u e s  o f  everyday l i f e ,  
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  p r a i s e  and blame.  U nder ly ing  our  o r d i n a r y  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
o f  bo th  p r a i s e  and blame i s  the  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  P r a i s i n g  
and blaming t a c i t l y  acknowledge t h a t  th e  p e r son  in  q u e s t i o n  i s
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the  p r a i s e w o r th y  o r  blameworthy a c t .  C am pbe l l ' s
i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  one can be r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  an a c t  i f  and on ly  i f  one 
could  have done o th e rw i s e  seems i n t u i t i v e l y  sound.  I f  we could  n o t  have 
he lp ed  b u t  do i t ,  how can we be r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i t ?
Smart a g re e s  w i th  Campbell t h a t  th e  "cou ld  have done o t h e r w i s e "  i s  
an e s s e n t i a l  i n g r e d i e n t  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  bu t  he does no t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  
Dl exc ludes  t h i s .  Ye t ,  as  a D e t e r m i n i s t ,  he b e l i e v e s  t h a t  f o r  any a c t  
or  even t  a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  can ( in
p r i n c i p l e )  be g iven  f o r  i t s  o c c u r r e n c e .  I f  t h i s  i s  the  c a s e ,  how can we
say t h a t  th e  a c t  or  even t  "could  have been o th e rw is e " ?  Suppose ,  he 
s a y s ,  t h a t  one even ing w h i le  you a r e  washing  the  d i s h e s  a p l a t e  suddenly  
s l i p s  from your sudsy f i n g e r s  and f a l l s  to  the  f l o o r .  C r in g i n g ,  you 
watch the  p l a t e  f a l l  b u t ,  to  your r e l i e f  and s u r p r i s e ,  i t  does not  
b r e a k .  You a r e  r e l i e v e d  because  you know t h a t  th e  p l a t e  cou ld  have
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broken .  You a r e  s u r p r i s e d  because  u s u a l l y  p l a t e s  b r e a k  when dropped to  
the  f l o o r .
I ex p e r i e n c e d  a s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n  d a i l y  i n  th e  U n i v e r s i t y
c a f e t e r i a .  Without  f a i l ,  a t  l e a s t  once a m ea l ,  someone would drop a
g l a s s .  U sua l ly  they  bounced t h r e e  t imes  and then  broke  on the  f o u r t h .
However, o c c a s i o n a l l y ,  one would manage to  come to  a s top  b e f o r e  i t
b ro k e .  Such o c c a s io n s  ' would b r i n g  us to  our  f e e t ,  c l a p p in g  and 
c h e e r i n g ,  as  few o t h e r s  c o u l d .  We chee red  no t  only  because  we loved 
d i s t u r b a n c e s ,  bu t  because  t h e  g l a s s  had b e a t e n  the  odds ,  i t  could  have 
b roken ,  most do,  bu t  i t  d id  n o t .
I f ,  however,  the  p l a t e  had been made o f  aluminum o r  the  cup of
p l a s t i c ,  we would have been n e i t h e r  r e l i e v e d  no r  s u r p r i s e d  when they  d id
no t  b r e a k .  We know, th rough  our  everyday h a n d l in g  o f  aluminum and
p l a s t i c ,  o r  pe rhaps  th ro u g h  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  th e  p r o p e r t i e s  of
aluminum and p l a s t i c ,  t h a t  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  the  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  ( w i t h i n  a 
wide ran g e )  n e i t h e r  could have b r o k e n . [45] Thus we a r e  n o t  r e l i e v e d  and
would be s u r p r i s e d  only  i f  th e y  d id  b reak !  What a l low s  us to  a s s e r t  the
"cou ld  have"  o r  the  "cou ld  have n o t "  in  each  case?
I n f o r m a l l y ,  we can say t h a t  Smart a p p e a l s  to  our  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of
what t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  p l a t e s  a re  capa b le  of  u n d e rg o in g .  To say t h a t  a 
ch ina  p l a t e  can b re a k  i s  to  say t h a t  b reak in g  l i e s  w i t h i n  the  rea lm  of  
the  p o s s i b l e  f o r  p l a t e s  whereas unaided  f l i g h t ,  f o r  example,  does n o t .  
A ccord ing ly  we say t h a t  p l a t e s  can b reak  but  th e y  cannot  f l y .
Page 33
F o rm a l ly ,  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  d i s c u s s e d  in  terms o f  t h r e e  frameworks:  
l o g i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  p h y s i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  and e m p i r i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y .  
The t h r e e  frameworks a r e  r e l a t e d  to  each  o t h e r  by way o f  i n c l u s i o n .  
Because l o g i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  d e l i m i t s  the  b r o a d e s t  a r e a ,  bo th  p h y s i c a l  
and e m p i r i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  a r e  s u b s e t s  o f  i t .  E m p ir ica l  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s ,  
i n  t u r n ,  a s u b s e t  o f  p h y s i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y .  L o g ic a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  by the  r u l e s  o f  l o g i c ,  p h y s i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
by th e  laws o f  p h y s i c s ,  and e m p i r i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by the  
f r e q u e n t l y  p r e v a i l i n g  c o n d i t i o n s .  From th e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  l o g i c a l  
p o s s i b i l i t y ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  th e  p l a t e  to  v a p o r i z e  the  i n s t a n t  i t  
l e a v e s  your  f i n g e r s ,  b u t  i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  i t  to. bo th  v a p o r i z e  and 
n o t  v a p o r i z e .  From th e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  p h y s i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  bo th  the  
p l a t e  b re a k in g  and n o t  b r e a k i n g  a r e  e q u a l ly  p o s s i b l e ,  bu t  i t  i s  no t  
p o s s i b l e  f o r  th e  p l a t e  to  f a l l  t o  the  c e i l i n g  r a t h e r  than  to  the  f l o o r .  
Depending on the  p r e v a i l i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  bo th  th e  p l a t e  b re a k in g  and i t  
no t  b r e a k i n g  a r e  e q u a l ly  p o s s i b l e .  We can d i s t i n g u i s h  two s c e n a r i o s .  
F i r s t ,  under  normal h a n d l in g  t h e r e  i s  no b r e a k a g e .  Second,  in  th e  
s i t u a t i o n  where a p l a t e  i s  d ropped ,  i t  e i t h e r  b reaks  o r ,  g iven  r a r e  
c o n d i t i o n s ,  i t  does n o t .  For an a c t  o r  even t  a c t u a l l y  to  occur  i t  must 
be l o g i c a l l y ,  p h y s i c a l l y  and e m p i r i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e .
R e tu rn in g  to  Smart ,  we can now s a y ,  t h a t  he uses  "cou ld  have"  and 
"could  not  have"  depending upon what i s  l o g i c a l l y  and p h y s i c a l l y  
p o s s i b l e .
Thus such cases  i n  which we e i t h e r  cannot  o r  can use a law or  
a l a w - l i k e  p r o p o s i t i o n  to  r u l e  o u t  a c e r t a i n  p o s s i b i l i t y  
d e s p i t e  our  u n c e r t a i n t y  as to  the p r e c i s e  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  
B r i e f l y :  E could not  have happened i f  t h e r e  a r e  laws or
l a w - l i k e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  which r u l e  out  E . [46]
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Campbell ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  concerned  w i th  freedom no t  p l a t e s .  An 
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h i n g s  ( p l a t e s ,  g l a s s e s )  i s  u n a c c e p ta b l e  when a p p l i e d  to
humans p r e c i s e l y  because  humans a re  f r e e  and p l a t e s  a re  n o t .  To say
t h a t  Smith could  have done o th e rw is e  i s  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  from say ing  t h a t  
th e  p l a t e  cou ld  have b roken .  Campbell might  w e l l  a rgue  t h a t  S m a r t ' s  
a n a l y s i s  o f  "cou ld  have"  f a i l s  t o  a d d r e s s  the  c r u c i a l  i s s u e .  What 
conce rns  Campbell i s  w h e th e r ,  g ive n  e x a c t l v  th e  same s i t u a t i o n ,  Smith 
could  have done o t h e r w i s e .  Campbell c l a im s  t h a t  because  we a re  f r e e  we 
could  have choosen A r a t h e r  than  B, even i f  the s i t u a t i o n  was 
d u p l i c a t e d . [47] I n  o t h e r  words,  even a superhuman c a l c u l a t o r  w i th  acc ess  
to  a l l  o f  th e  r e l e v a n t  in f o r m a t io n  w i l l  be u nab le  to  p r e d i c t  what Smith 
w i l l  do .  Th is  s i t u a t i o n  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by what Campbell c a l l s  
" g enu ine ly  open p o s s i b i l i t y " .  This  s i t u a t i o n  i s  open in  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
more than  one cou rse  o f  a c t i o n ,  and t h i s  openness  i s  genuine  i n s o f a r  as  
th e  agen t  i s  f r e e  to  choose which course  to  f o l l o w .
Smart i s  q u ic k  to  p o i n t  out  t h a t  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  i d e n t i c a l  to  D2. 
C am pbe l l ' s  f r e e  a c t  cannot  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from a random a c t .
F u r th e rm o re ,  Smart c l a im s  t h a t  s i n c e  he has  shown t h a t  Dl does no t
exc lude  th e  o r d i n a r y  meaning o f  "can"  and "canno t"  i t  fo l lo w s  t h a t  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  in  the  u n i v e r s e  d e s c r i b e d  by Dl.  He 
seems to  have the  b e s t  o f  bo th  p o s i t i o n s :  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  prowess of
Determinism and th e  i n t u i t i v e  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m .
However, h i s  use o f  "can"  i s  m i s l e a d i n g .  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  Smart 
b e l i e v e s  t h a t  w i th  s u f f i c i e n t  i n f o r m a t io n  "can"  i s  always r e p l a c e a b l e  by 
" w i l l " .  The D e t e r m i n i s t ' s  use of  "can"  a s s e r t s  two t h i n g s .  F i r s t ,  i t  
i s  a s t a t e m e n t  o f  ign o ran c e  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  the  p r e v a i l i n g  c o n d i t i o n s .  
Second,  i t  i s  an e s t i m a t i o n  o f  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  and f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  the
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a c t i o n  i n  q u e s t i o n .  Thus,  u s in g  "can"  r a t h e r  than  " w i l l "  r e v e a l s  
something about  th e  e x t e n t  o f  our  knowledge bu t  i t  r e v e a l s  n o th i n g  about  
S m i t h ' s  e s s e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r .  "Smith could have done o th e r w i s e "  i s  no
more s i g n i f i c a n t  than  the  " p l a t e  could  have b ro k e n " .  Obvious ly t h i s
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  "can"  i s  in c o m p a t ib le  w i th  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m .  From 
C am pbe l l ' s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  Dl does in deed  r u l e  ou t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  
c o r r e c t l y  s t a t i n g  t h a t  Smith "cou ld  have done o t h e r w i s e " .
In  o r d e r  to  e x p l i c a t e  how r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  • p o s s i b l e  w i t h i n  the 
u n i v e r s e  d e s c r i b e d  by D l ,  Smart c o n s i d e r s  a schoo lboy ,  Tommy, who has 
f a i l e d  to  do h i s  homework a s s ig n m e n t .  I f  Tommy was m e n ta l l y  r e t a r d e d  or  
s u f f e r e d  from some o t h e r  d e b i l i t y  which p re v e n te d  him from comple t ing  
th e  ass ignment no one would blame him. In  t h i s  c a s e ,  Tommy d id  n o t  do 
h i s  homework because  he could  n o t  do i t .  He i s  n o t  blamed because  he i s  
n o t  r e s p o n s i b l e .  I f ,  however,  Tommy f a i l e d  to  do h i s  as s ignment  because  
he sp en t  th e  evening  t r e e - c l i m b i n g  o r  w atch ing  t e l e v i s i o n ,  we would
blame him because  he could have done i t .  There was n o th i n g  which
p re v e n te d  him from com ple t ing  i t .  He i s  blamed because  he i s  
r e s p o n s i b l e .  A s c r ib in g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  Tommy does no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
mean t h a t  h i s  behav io r  was no t  d e te rm ined  by h e r e d i t y  and env i ronm en t .  
I t  s imply means t h a t  l o g i c a l l y ,  p h y s i c a l l y  and,  g iven  th e  n e c e s s a r y
i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  Tommy to  do h i s  work.  The ch ina
p l a t e  could have broken and Tommy could  have done h i s  work.  Smart 
c o n c l u d e s - t h a t ,
T h re a t s  and p ro m ise s ,  punishments  and r ew ard s ,  the  a s c r i p t i o n  
o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and th e  n o n a s c r i p t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  
have t h e r e f o r e  a c l e a r  p rag m a t ic  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  which i s  q u i t e  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  a w h o le - h e a r t e d  b e l i e f  in  m e ta p h y s i c a l  
d e t e rm in i sm .  Indeed  i t  im p l i e s  a b e l i e f  t h a t  our  a c t i o n s  a r e  
v e r y  l a r g e l y  d e t e rm in e d :  i f  e v e r y t h in g  anyone d id  depended
only  on pure chance ( i . e .  i f  i t  depended on n o th i n g )  then
t h r e a t s  and punishments  would be q u i t e  i n e f f e c t i v e . [48]
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B e l i e v i n g  he has r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f i rm ly  in  hand,  Smart t u r n s  to  the
more d i f f i c u l t  concep ts  o f  p r a i s e  and b l a m e . [49] He b e g in s  by
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  two ways i n  which we o r d i n a r i l y  use " p r a i s e " .  F i r s t ,
p r a i s e  i s  th e  o p p o s i t e  o f  blame.  We p r a i s e  Tommy (second c a s e )  f o r
do ing  h i s  homework and blame him f o r  f a i l i n g  t o  do so .  Second,  p r a i s e
i s  used  in  such a way t h a t  i t s  o p p o s i t e  i s  d i s p r a i s e  r a t h e r  than  blame.
We p r a i s e  an a c t o r ' s  s k i l l ,  a m o d e l ' s  f e a t u r e s  o r  an a t h l e t e ' s  a b i l i t y
b u t  we c e r t a i n l y  would n o t  blame them i f  th e y  lacked  th e s e  a t t r i b u t e s .
We m igh t ,  however,  d i s p r a i s e  them, d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  the  a c t o r  has no
s k i l l ,  t h e  model i s  too  s h o r t  o r  th e  a t h l e t e  has poor c o o r d i n a t i o n .  In
t h i s  s e n s e ,  p r a i s e  and d i s p r a i s e  a r e  simply ways to  g rade  a p e r s o n ' s
s k i l l ,  f e a t u r e s  o r  b e h a v i o r .  This  g r a d in g  has  a p r im ary  and secondary
f u n c t i o n .  [50] P r i m a r i l y ,  i t  t e l l s  us what a c e r t a i n  p e r son  i s  l i k e :
s k i l l f u l ,  b e a u t i f u l ,  k ind  o r  u n k ind .  S e c o n d a r i l y ,  i t  encourages  or
d i s c o u r a g e s  p eop le  to  a c t  i n  a c e r t a i n  way. To p r a i s e  h o n e s ty  i s  to
encourage o t h e r s  to  be h o n e s t .  To d i s p r a i s e  s l o t h f u l n e s s  i s  to
d i s c o u r a g e  peop le  from behaving  l i k e  s l o t h s .  Smart d i s t i n g u i s h e s  blame
and d i s p r a i s e  on the  b a s i s  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  He s u g g e s t s ,
t h a t  a c l e a r - h e a d e d  man w i l l  use th e  word " p r a i s e "  j u s t  as  
b e f o r e ,  and th e  word "blame" j u s t  l i k e  th e  p r e v io u s  
" d i s p r a i s e " ,  w i th  one p r o v i s o .  That  i s  t h a t  to  p r a i s e  ( i n  
t h i s  s e n s e )  o r  to  blame a pe rson  f o r  an a c t i o n  i s  no t  only  to  
g rade  i t  (m o ra l ly )  bu t  t o  imply t h a t  i t  i s  something f o r  which 
the  p e r son  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e ,  i n  the  p e r f e c t l y  o r d i n a r y  and 
n onm e taphys ica l  sense  o f  " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y "  which we have 
a n a lyzed  e a r l i e r  in  t h i s  a r t i c l e . [51]
N o n e th e l e s s ,  th e  o r d i n a r y  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  p r a i s e  and blame i s  
bound up w i th  a b e l i e f  in  f r e e  w i l l .  Smart conc ludes  h i s  a r t i c l e  by 
c la im ing  t h a t  t h i s  un fo rm u la ted  and confused  m e ta p h y s i c a l  b e l i e f  o f t e n  
r e s u l t s  i n  a tendency n o t  to  only  blame o t h e r s  bu t  to  judge  them as 
w e l l .  R a the r  than  g r a d in g  th e  p e r s o n ' s  b eh a v io r  we condemn the  p e r s o n .
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Judging  a n o t h e r  person  im p l i e s  bo th  t h a t  we ho ld  him u l t i m a t e l y  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  h i s  b e h a v i o r ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n ,  and,  pe rhaps  
more s u b t l y ,  we assume t h a t  we a r e  in  a m o ra l ly  s u p e r i o r  p o s i t i o n .  
Given the  same s i t u a t i o n  we would have done o t h e r w i s e . [52] Smart hopes 
t h a t  the  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  L i b e r t a r i a n ' s  m e ta p h y s i c a l  c o n fu s io n  and 
th e  subsequen t  abandonment o f  th e  p o s i t i o n ,  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  our  be ing  
w i l l i n g  to  blame b u t ,  because  we a r e  no longe r  ab le  to  j u s t i f y  i t ,  l e s s  
i n c l i n e d  to  judge .
7 .0  CRITIQUE OF DETERMINISM
S m a r t ' s  a n a l y s i s ,  w h i le  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  co h e re n t  and more f o r c e f u l  
than  C am pbe l l ' s  s u f f e r s  from th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  r e l i e s  upon s t a n d a r d s  o f  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  which a re  unacknowledged and w i th o u t  which h i s  argument 
would be i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l . [53] These s t a n d a r d s  a r e  unacknowledged because 
they  a r e  a s u b s t a n t i v e  r a t h e r  th a n  fo rm al  c o n c e rn .  In  o t h e r  words,  
s t a n d a r d s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a r i s e  from the  s i t u a t i o n  in  q u e s t i o n  r a t h e r  
than  th e  th e o ry  be ing  employed.  Thus,  S m a r t ' s  f a i l u r e  to  acknowledge 
(o r  r e c o g n i z e )  h i s  dependency on th e s e  s u b s t a n t i v e  concerns  i s
symptomatic o f  fo rm al  d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  g e n e r a l .  Were i t  n o t  f o r  i m p l i c i t  
s u b s t a n t i v e  m a t e r i a l ,  fo rm a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  freedom would f a i l  to
a d d re s s  the  human c o n d i t i o n  f r u i t f u l l y .  This  i m p l i c i t  dependency on
s u b s t a n t i v e  m a t e r i a l  can be seen more c l e a r l y  i f  we reexamine S m a r t ' s  
ana l y s i s .
He u ses  two examples to  i l l u s t r a t e  h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  " can" :  the
d ropp ing  o f  a p l a t e ,  and Tommy's f a i l u r e  to  complete h i s  homework 
a s s ig n m e n t .  Although  n e i t h e r  s i t u a t i o n  bowls you over  w i th  t r o u b l i n g  
and c o n s e q u e n t i a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  th e y  r e v e a l  S m a r t ' s  dependency on
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s t a n d a rd s  of  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  The mundanity and f a m i l i a r i t y  o f  th e s e  
s i t u a t i o n s  t e nds  to  mask t h e i r  p r o b le m a t i c  c h a r a c t e r .  T h i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
i s  p robab ly  why Smart u s e s  them.
Cons ider  the  dropped p l a t e .  Smart c l a im s  t h a t  we a r e  r e l i e v e d  
b e c a u se ,  much to  our s u r p r i s e ,  th e  p l a t e  d id  n o t  b r e a k .  We f e e l  
f o r t u n a t e  because  we know the  p l a t e  could  have b roken .  But what e l s e
could the  p l a t e  'have done? I t  could  have landed on edge and r o l l e d
away, smashed your toe  or  den ted  your f l o o r  to  name bu t  a few. The 
p o i n t  i s  t h a t  "cou ld  have"  u n d e r s to o d  in  te rms o f  p o s s i b i l i t y  a lone  i s  
too  i n c l u s i v e  to  be h e l p f u l .  An i n d e f i n i t e l y  l a rg e  number of  t h i n g s  a r e  
p o s s i b l e ,  bu t  we a re  concerned  w i th  only  a few. What r e s t r i c t s  the  s e t  
o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  to  the  few t h a t  m a t t e r ?  Our theo ry?  C e r t a i n l y  t h i s  
w i l l  n o t  work because  t h e o r i e s ,  l i k e  a l l  formal  sys tem s ,  d e s c r i b e  a
p o s s i b i l i t y  s p a c e ,  bu t  they  do n o t  r e s t r i c t  i t  t o  the  a c t u a l .  
P o s s i b i l i t y  was d i s c u s s e d  above i n  te rm s  o f  l o g i c a l ,  p h y s i c a l  and 
e m p i r i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y .  Moving from l o g i c a l  to  e m p i r i c a l  we have a 
d e c r e a s i n g  range  o f  p o s s i b i l i t y .  The l a s t  i s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  the  
f r e q u e n t l y  p r e v a i l i n g  c o n d i t i o n s .  Al though the  range  o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
d e s c r i b e d  by e m p i r i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  more narrow than
l o g i c a l  o r  p h y s i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  i t  remains  too wide.  However, we a re  
on the  r i g h t  t r a c k .  Examining the  e m p i r i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  e n t a i l s  a 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  the  p r e v a i l i n g  c o n d i t i o n s .  I n  any g iven  s i t u a t i o n  
c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  o u t s t a n d i n g  -  they  p r e v a i l .  I t  i s  th e s e  
p r e v a i l i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  which g iv e  shape to  the  s i t u a t i o n ,  r e s t r i c t i n g  the 
mere ly  ' p o s s i b l e  to  the  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  p o s s i b l e .
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Thus, S m a r t ' s  example of  the  dropped p l a t e  i s  i n t e l l i g i b l e  only
because  i t  p r e supposes  th e  f a m i l i a r  c o n t e x t  o f  the  home; w i t h i n  t h i s
s e t t i n g  p l a t e s  a c q u i r e  a s i g n i f i c a n c e  which i s  d e s t r o y e d  when they  a r e  
b roken .  A c c o rd in g ly ,  when th e  p l a t e  i s  d ropped ,  b reakage  i s  the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  conce rns  u s .  His example o f  th e  a n t i q u e  ch ina  p l a t e  
s imply e n r i c h e s  th e  c o n t e x t .  Whereas b e f o r e  t h e  p l a t e  was v a lu e d  
because  o f  i t s  f u n c t i o n  i n  the  ho u seh o ld ,  now new c o n d i t i o n s  p r e v a i l :  
t h e  h i s t o r i c a l ,  c u l t u r a l  and pe rhaps  s e n t i m e n t a l  v a l u e  o f  the  p l a t e .  In  
both  c a s e s  the  c o n t e x t ,  r a t h e r  than  the  t h e o r y ,  p ro v id e s  the  c r i t e r i a  by
which the  range o f  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  r e s t r i c t e d .
Turning to  S m a r t ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the  n e g l i g e n t  s choo lboy ,  we f i n d  
th e  same i m p l i c i t  r e l i a n c e  on c o n t e x t u a l  s t a n d a r d s .  Tommy f a i l s  to  do 
h i s  homework, and,  s i n c e  he could  have done i t ,  he i s  b lameworthy.  
C e r t a i n l y  Tommy could  have done h i s  homework, bu t  he could a l s o  have 
done any number of  t h i n g s :  w r i t t e n  a b e s t s e l l e r ,  s e t  a world r e c o r d  in
th e  h igh  jump or  murdered  h i s  f a m i l y .  The p o i n t  i s  the  same as b e f o r e .  
The p r e v a i l i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  r e s t r i c t  the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  to  the  ones t h a t  
m a t t e r .  Homework i s  an im por tan t  t a s k  only  w i th  an e d u c a t i o n a l  s e t t i n g .  
Th is  s e t t i n g  i s  p resupposed  by S m a r t ' s  a n a l y s i s .
Th is  r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  S m a r t ' s  a n a l y s i s  has shown t h a t  h i s  
t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  i s  weakened by i t s  unacknowledged r e l i a n c e  upon 
c r i t e r i a  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  which i t  does no t  j u s t i f y .  Without  such 
c r i t e r i a  h i s  p o s i t i o n  would be h o p e l e s s l y  vague and in c o n c l u s i v e  because 
i t  would be in c a p a b le  o f  f o c u s in g  on th o s e  even ts  which m a t t e r  to  u s .  
Without  t h i s  o r i e n t a t i o n  p rov ided  by the  im por ted s u b s t a n t i v e  m a t e r i a l ,  
S m a r t ' s  p o s i t i o n  would founder  in  a sea of  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  Turning  to  
th e  more c o n t r o v e r s i a l  s e c t i o n  of  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n ,  the  a n a l y s i s  o f  p r a i s e
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and blame,  r e v e a l s  a n o th e r  problem as w e l l .
S m a r t ' s  a n a l y s i s  i s  h e l p f u l  because  i t  s u g g es t s  t h a t  p r a i s e  and 
blame a r e  fundam en ta l ly  a p p e a l s  to  s t a n d a r d s  which c la im  our  r e s p e c t ,  
lo v e ,  o r  d r e a d .  We are  s t r u c k  by a p e r s o n ' s  b eau ty  o r  s k i l l ,  h e a r t e n e d  
by a d i s p l a y  o f  l o y a l t y ,  and a p p a l l e d  by the  abuse of  something we 
c h e r i s h .  In  each  case  our  a s c r i p t i o n  of  p r a i s e  o r  blame e n t a i l s  an 
i m p l i c i t  r e f e r e n c e  to  bo th  s t a n d a r d s  ( b e a u t y ,  s k i l l ,  l o y a l t y )  and the  
p a r t i c u l a r  even t  or  t h i n g  which embodies th e s e  s t a n d a r d s .  This  
c o n ce p t io n  of  p r a i s e  and . blame obv io u s ly  d o v e t a i l s ,  w i th  d e te rm in i sm .  
However, a L i b e r t a r i a n  could ag re e  w i th  Smart w h o l e h e a r t e d l y . [54 ]  Such a 
L i b e r t a r i a n  would argue  t h a t  we c e r t a i n l y  appea l  to  s t a n d a rd s  in  our 
a s c r i p t i o n  o f  p r a i s e  o f  blame,  bu t  b e f o r e  we can appea l  t o  them we must 
choose them. This  c h o i c e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  f r e e l y  made. Once chosen the
s ta n d a r d s  can be employed to  he lp  de te rm ine  b e h a v i o r .  Th is  seems to
sugges t  t h a t  u n d e r ly i n g  S m a r t ' s  r e s o u r c e f u l  de te rm in ism  i s  
l i b e r t a r i a n i s m .  Thus,  S m a r t ' s  account  s u f f e r s  from two pro b lem s .  
F i r s t ,  the  o r i e n t a t i o n  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  an i l l u m i n a t i n g  co n c e p t io n  of  
freedom i s  n o t  p rov ided  by h i s  t h e o r y .  Second,  h i s  account  seems to  
imply an u n d e r ly i n g  l i b e r t a r i a n i s m .
From the  p re c e d in g  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  Campbell and Smart we see  t h a t  
p u r e ly  fo rm al  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  freedom f a i l  a d e q u a te ly  to  i l l u m i n a t e  our  
ex p e r i e n c e  o f  freedom and bondage.  On the  one hand,  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m ' s  
a p p ea l  to  ou r  i n t u i t i o n s  o f  freedom i s  a t t r a c t i v e  but  i t  p roves  to  be 
i n c o h e r e n t .  On the  o t h e r  hand,  Determinism i s  cohe re n t  and f o r c e f u l ,  
but  w i th o u t  gu idance  from s u b s t a n t i v e  m a t e r i a l  i t  becomes d i s o r i e n t e d
and a i m l e s s .  What i s  c a l l e d  f o r  i s  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  freedom which i s
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  c o h e re n t  but  which moves beyond the  s t r i c t l y  formal
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c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
8 .0  THE EARLY HEIDEGGER'S PATH TO FREEDOM
I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  H e id e g g e r ' s  th ough t  p ro v id e s  a h e l p f u l  framework fo r
t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n .  Although  freedom i s  no t  h i s  c e n t r a l  conce rn ,  f o l l o w in g
h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  i t  th rough  th e  course  o f  h i s  work i s  bo th  h e l p f u l  and,
a c c o rd in g  to  J .R .  R ic h a rd so n ,  w a r r a n te d .
To be s u r e ,  the q u e s t i o n  o f  freedom i s  no t  the  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
H e id eg g e r ian  q u e s t i o n .  R a t h e r ,  as  we a l l  know, h i s  q u e s t i o n  
i s  the  q u e s t i o n  o f  Being.  But th e  B e i n g - q u e s t io n  i t s e l f  
b r i n g s  Heidegger to  g r i p s  w i th  the  n o t i o n  o f  freedom time and 
a g a i n  a long  th e  way, so t h a t  i t  i s  no t  a d i s t o r t i o n  f o r  us  to  
examine h i s  th ough t  under  t h i s  a s p e c t . [55]
The H e id eg g e r ian  framework i s  h e l p f u l  f o r  two r e a s o n s .  F i r s t ,  h i s  
e a r l y  work ( p r i n c i p a l l y  Being and Time) i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by bo th  the 
r a d i c a l i t y  o f  i t s  q u e s t i o n i n g  and the  am b igu i ty  o f  i t s  methodology .  
T h i s  am bigu i ty  a r i s e s  p r i m a r i l y  from h i s  r e l u c t a n c e  to  d iv o r c e  h im s e l f  
from the  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  ( f o rm a l )  approach  of  Western m e ta p h y s i c s .  [56] 
I n  Being and Time. f o r  example ,  he a t t e m p t s  to  e s t a b l i s h  once and f o r
a l l  t h e  o n t o l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  of  human e x i s t e n c e .  Yet f o r  most the
l a s t i n g  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  Being and Time has no t  been i t s  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  
o n to lo g y  bu t  i t s  n ove l  and p e n e t r a t i n g  a n a l y s i s  o f  o r d i n a r y ,  day to  day 
e x i s t e n c e .  I t  i s  t h i s  l a t t e r  ap p roach ,  the  s u b s t a n t i v e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  
everyday e x i s t e n c e ,  which c h a r a c t e r i z e s  h i s  work a f t e r  the  Turn (Kehre)  
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  Heidegger  I  from Heidegger I I . [57] However, a c c o rd in g  to  
Heidegger  bo th  the  n e c e s s i t y  and d i r e c t i o n  of  t h i s  Turn were i n h e r e n t  in  
Being and Time. Thus,  f o l l o w in g  H e i d e g g e r ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  of  freedom from 
Being and Time to  h i s  l a t e r  work i l l u m i n a t e s  the  t e n s i o n  between formal 
and s u b s t a n t i v e  a n a l y s i s  w h i le  p o i n t i n g  the  way toward i t s  r e s o l u t i o n .
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Second,  w h i l e  Being and Time i s  a cong lom era t ion  of  L i b e r t a r i a n  and 
D e t e r m i n i s t i c  e lements  h i s  l a t t e r  work has a d e c i s i v e  D e t e r m i n i s t i c  
c h a r a c t e r .  Although  Heidegger  h im s e l f  n e v e r  e x p l i c i t l y  adop ts  a 
D e t e r m i n i s t i c  framework ( f o r  r e a s o n s  t o  be d i s c u s s e d )  h i s  l a t e r  work 
r e v e a l s  bo th  th e  way in  which r e s o u r c e f u l  Determinism should p roceed  and 
the  g r e a t e s t  t h r e a t  f a c i n g  freedom in  the  modern world -  the  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  dom ina t ion  of  human e x i s t e n c e .
I n  1927 Heidegger  p u b l i s h e d  (w i th  H u s s e r l ' s  a s s i s t a n c e )  the  
incomple te  and p r e v i o u s l y  r e j e c t e d  t r e a t i s e  Being and Time. [58] Though 
neve r  com ple ted ,  i t  has  become one o f  the  most i n f l u e n t i a l ,  works o f  
contemporary  p h i l o s o p h y .  The c e n t r a l  concern  of  Being and Time i s  the  
meaning o f  b e i n g . [59] According to  Heidegger  the  source  o f  t h i s  
q u e s t i o n i n g  i s  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  b e i n g ' s  o b l i v i o n . [60] Consequent ly  
b e f o r e  we can u n d e r s t a n d  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  freedom we must c l a r i f y  the  
n a t u r e  o f  th e  q u e s t i o n  conce rn ing  the  meaning o f  be ing  and i t s  f u n c t i o n  
in  H e i d e g g e r ' s  t h o u g h t .  I t  i s  w i t h i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  t h a t  Heidegger  
c o n s i d e r s  the  q u e s t i o n  o f  freedom.
He a rg u es  t h a t  th e  o b l i v i o n  o f  b e i n g ,  i t s  w i th d raw a l  from th e  
c e n t e r  o f  ou r  a t t e n t i o n ,  i s  the  i n e v i t a b l e  r e s u l t  o f  w e s te rn  
m e ta p h y s i c s .  Consequent ly  he a t t e m p t s  to  r e t h i n k  ( r a t h e r  than  r e j e c t )  
me taphys ics  by u ncover ing  where and why i t  went a s t r a y .  The purpose of  
t h i s  r e t h i n k i n g  i s  a r e c o v e ry  o f  what has been obscured  th rough  the  
development o f  ou r  t r a d i t i o n ,  namely,  th e  meaning o f  b e i n g .  He t r a c e s  
t h e  o b l i v i o n  o f  be ing  back to  two e s s e n t i a l  el emen ts  o f  m e ta p h y s ic s .  
F i r s t ,  s i n c e  P l a t o ,  be ing  has been u n d e r s to o d  in  terms of  b e i n g s .  
Unders tood as  th e  common denominator  o f  a l l  b e i n g s ,  be ing  has  been 
e x p re s s ed  i n  a v a r i e t y  o f  ways,  f o r  example,  w ha tness ,  t h a t n e s s  and
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s u b s t a n c e .  Heidegger  a rgues  t h a t  f o c u s in g  on b e i n g s ,  which cu lm in a t e s  
i n  s c i e n c e  (which u n d e r s t a n d s  b e in g s  as  o b j e c t s )  and t e chno logy  (which 
u n d e r s t a n d s  b e in g s  as r e s o u r c e s ) ,  r e s u l t s  in  the  o b l i v i o n  of  B e i n g . [61]
Second,  m e taphys ics  f a i l e d  to  e x p l i c i t l y  acknowledge the 
t e m p o r a l / h i s t o r i c a l  d im ens ion  o f  b e i n g .  S ince  b e i n g ,  a c c o rd in g  t o  
H e idegge r ,  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  t e m p o ra l ,  m e taphys ics  i n e v i t a b l y  f a i l e d  
a d e q u a te ly  to  comprehend i t .  He a rgues  t h a t  a l l  b e i n g s ,  i n s o f a r  as  they  
a r e ,  sha re  p r e s e n c e .  E x i s t e n t  t h i n g s  a r e  e i t h e r  p r e s e n t  b e f o r e  us or  
they  a r e  b rough t  " b e fo re  u s "  in  r e f l e c t i o n .  Mt. R a i n i e r  and th e  pen in  
my hand sha re  a t  l e a s t  one t h i n g ,  p r e s e n c e .  Th is  a l s o  ho lds  t r u e  f o r  
t h i n g s  which no lo n g e r  e x i s t  and those  which have n o t  y e t  e x i s t e d .  To
th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  th e y  a r e  a t  a l l ,  they  a r e  p r e s e n t  t o  us in  our
r e f l e c t i o n s  about  them. Of co u r s e  something i s  p r e s e n t  on ly  in  r e l a t i o n  
t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  o b s e rv e r  or  t h i n k e r  a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  t im e ,  th e  p r e s e n t .  
Thus,  at .  t h e  v e r y  h e a r t  o f  th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  Being l i e s  the  q u e s t i o n  of  
t im e .  However, r a t h e r  than  c a r e f u l l y  c o n s i d e r i n g  t im e ,  me taphys ics  
s imply p o s i t e d  i t  as  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  b e i n g . [62] What i s  c a l l e d  
f o r ,  a c c o rd in g  to  H eidegger ,  i s  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  b e in g  w i t h i n  th e  
h o r i z o n  e s t a b l i s h e d  by t i m e . [63]
B e i n g ' s  t e m p o r a l i t y  a l s o  has a h i s t o r i c a l  d im ens ion .  A l l  be ings  
a r e  p r e s e n t  to  us b u t  ou r  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  the  p r e s e n t  i s ,  in  p a r t , ,
d e te rm ined  by i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  s e t t i n g .  Heidegger  c la im s  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  
c o n c e p t io n s  o f  b e in g  and t h e i r  h i s t o r i c a l  s e t t i n g  m u tu a l ly  i n f l u e n c e  
each o t h e r .
I n  t h e  cou rse  o f  t h i s  h i s t o r y [ B e i n g ' s  h i s t o r y ]  c e r t a i n
d i s t i n c t i v e  domains o f  Being have come in t o  view and have
s e rved  as th e  p r im ary  g u id e s  f o r  subsequen t  p r o b l e m a t i c s :  th e
ego c o g i t o  of  D e s c a r t e s ,  the  s u b j e c t ,  the  " I " ,  r e a s o n ,  s p i r i t ,  
p e r s o n . [64]
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The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  b e i n g ' s  h i s t o r y  i s  no t  com ple te ly  de te rm in e d  by u s .  
Th is  i s  seen more c l e a r l y  i f  we ask why c e r t a i n  h i s t o r i c a l  concep ts  and 
even ts  developed  as they  d i d .  Why d id  the  Greeks u n d e r s t a n d  moi r a  the  
way th e y  d id?  Why d id  Medieva ls  u n d e r s t a n d  God the  way th e y  did?  Why 
d id  i t  t a k e  so long f o r  t e chno logy  to  ta k e  ho ld  in  Europe? In  re sponse  
to  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  we can p o i n t  to  i n d i v i d u a l  t h i n k e r s ,  c u l t u r a l  
movements and the  l i k e ,  bu t  an i n e x p l i c a b l e  r e s i d u e  always r e m a i n s . [65] 
U l t i m a t e l y ,  the  q u e s t i o n  of  why runs  aground on the  s t a t e m e n t  of  t h a t .
•Accord ing ly ,  the  q u e s t i o n  of  be ing  must be asked in  terms of  be ing  
r a t h e r  than  b e in g s  and w i t h i n  i t s  t e m p o r a l / h i s t o r i c a l  h o r i z o n .  This  
l a t t . e r  c r i t e r i o n  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  an exam ina t ion  of  be ing  must c o n s id e r  the 
h i s t o r i c a l  c o n t e x t  w i t h i n  which th e  q u e s t i o n  i s  r a i s e d .  Consequen t ly ,  
Being and Time i s  an a t t e m p t  to  r e t h i n k  be ing  in  re sponse  to  the  modern 
w o r Id .
Before we can r e t h i n k  th e  q u e s t i o n  of  be ing  i t  must be r a i s e d  anew. 
This  p r e s e n t s  a prob lem because  our t ime i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by the  
o b l i v i o n  of  b e i n g .  The q u e s t i o n  o f  be ing  i s  no longe r  asked  because  we 
u n d e r s t a n d  i t  to  be the  most u n i v e r s a l ,  s e l f - e v i d e n t  o r  u n d e f i n a b l e  of  
a l l  t e rm s .  [66] The o b l i v i o n  o f  be ing  i s  t h a t  o f  the  o v e r - g e n e r a l i z e d ,  
the  f a m i l i a r  and th e  im p en e t ra b ly  opaque.  Yet f o r  Heidegger  the 
o b l i v i o n  of  be ing  i s  no t  s imply n u l l  and v o i d .  Being i s  ex p e r i en ced  but  
i t  i s  e x p e r i e n c e d  as a b s e n t .  "Absence",  in  i t s  r o o t  meaning ,  s a y s ,  to 
be-away ( a b - e s s e ) [ 6 7 ]  What i s  ab s e n t  i £  b u t  n o t  h e re  and now. Take 
homesickness  f o r  e x a m p le . [68] When homesick we long f o r  what i s  no t  
b e f o r e  u s ,  home. Far from be ing  f o r g o t t e n  in  such a s i t u a t i o n ,  home i s  
remembered,  t h a t  i s ,  p r e s e n t  i n  r e f l e c t i o n ,  in  a pow er fu l  way. To be 
homesick i s  to  e x p e r i e n c e  home and a l l  t h a t  i t  means f o r  us as  a b s e n t ,
Page 45
as  away. Thus,  homesickness  can d e c i s i v e l y  r e v e a l  home and our  p r e s e n t  
s i t u a t i o n .  We come to  s e e ,  pe rhaps  more c l e a r l y  than  b e f o r e ,  bo th  what 
i t  means to  have a home and what i t  means to  be hom e les s .  We may come 
to  e x p l i c i t l y  u n d e r s t a n d  what we on ly  t a c i t l y  and p r e - r e f l e c t i v e l y  
u n d e r s to o d  b e f o r e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  Heidegger  a rgues  t h a t  th e  e x p e r i e n c e  of  
th e  o b l i v i o n  of  be ing  i l l u m i n a t e s  our  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  and i n v i t e s  us 
to  ask what "be ing"  means.
O bvious ly ,  homesickness  im p l ie s  a p r i o r  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  home and,
l i k e w i s e ,  e x p e r i e n c i n g  th e  o b l i v i o n  o f  b e in g  im p l ie s  a p r i o r
a c q u a in ta n c e  w i th  b e i n g .  In  o t h e r  words th e  q u e s t i o n i n g  o f  be ing  i s
fundam en ta l ly  c i r c u l a r .  But ,  Heidegger a rgues  t h a t  r a t h e r  th a n  be ing
v i c i o u s ,  t h i s  c i r c u l a r i t y  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  the  t a s k  o f  t h i n k i n g .
I n q u i r y ,  as  a k ind  o f  s e e k i n g ,  must be gu ided  be fo rehand  by 
what i s  s o u g h t .  So th e  meaning o f  Being must a l r e a d y  be
a v a i l a b l e  to  us i n  some way. As we have i n t i m a t e d ,  we always
conduct  ou r  a c t i v i t i e s  in  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  Being .  Out of  
t h i s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a r i s e  bo th  the  e x p l i c i t  q u e s t i o n  o f  meaning 
o f  Being and th e  tendency  t h a t  l e a d s  us towards  i t s
c o n c e p t io n .  We do n o t  know what "Being" means.  But even i f  
we a s k ,  'What is_ "Being"? ;  we keep w i t h i n  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  
th e  ' i s ' ,  though we a r e  un ab le  to  f i x  c o n c e p tu a l ly  what t h a t  
' i s '  s i g n i f i e s . [69 ]
He c a l l s  t h i s  c i r c u l a r i t y  " h e rm e n e u t i c a l  c i r c u l a r i t y " .  At the  h e a r t  of
h i s  n o t i o n  o f  h e rm e neu t i c s  i s  the  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  t h i n k i n g ,  i f  i t  i s  to
be e s s e n t i a l ,  must a t t e m p t  to  re spond  t o  what has been g ive n  to  i t  as.
th ough t  p r o v o k i n g . [70]
9 .0  THE THRUST OF THE QUESTION OF BEING
With t h i s  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  how we q u e s t i o n  be ing  in  mind we must
s t i l l  ask  why we should  q u e s t i o n  b e i n g .  What i s  to be ga ined  by
r e t u r n i n g  to  the  quagmire o f  m e taphys ics?  This i s  an im por tan t  q u e s t i o n
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and one t h a t  i s  too o f t e n  ig n o red  by H e id eg g e r ian s  ( a l t h o u g h  Heidegger 
h im s e l f  was keenly  aware o f  i t ) .  "Being" ,  as  Heidegger  acknowledges ,  i s  
to  a l a r g e  e x t e n t  a "worn-ou t"  w o r d . [71] I t  h a s ,  p e rh a p s ,  the  r i c h e s t  
h i s t o r y  of  any p h i l o s o p h i c  te rm ,  bu t  i t  has become fo r  many of  us e i t h e r  
a buzz word which we u n c r i t i c a l l y  bandy about  o r  a su re  s ig n  of  
m e ta p h y s i c a l  c l a p t r a p .  So why r a i s e  the  be ing  q u e s t i o n ?  When we ask 
t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  we seek  the  f u n c t i o n  of  "be ing"  in  H e id e g g e r ' s  th o u g h t .  
A s imple  answer to  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s  confounded by the  f a c t  t h a t  
H e i d e g g e r ' s  use o f  "b e in g "  i s  h ig h ly  ambiguous.  As we s h a l l  s e e ,  the  
am bigu i ty  o f  "be ing"  r e f l e c t s  the  am bigu ity  between Heidegger I  and 
Heidegger  I I .
Heidegger r e p e a t e d l y  c l a im s  t h a t  e v e r  s in c e  h i s  enco u n te r  w i th  
B r e n t a n o ' s  On th e  Manifold  Meaning o f  Being Accord ing t o  A r i s t o t l e  the  
q u e s t i o n  o f  b e ing  has  gu ided  h i s  t h o u g h t . [72] Perhaps  th e  f i r s t  e x p l i c i t  
acknowledgement o f  the  c e n t r a l i t y  o f  be ing  t o  h i s  thought  came when he 
a t t e m p t e d  to  a s s i s t  H u s s e r l  i n  th e  w r i t i n g  o f  an a r t i c l e  on 
Phenomenology f o r  th e  Encyc loped ia  B r i t a n n i c a . [73] H e id e g g e r ' s  d r a f t  of  
th e  a r t i c l e ,  which was com ple te ly  d i s c a r d e d  by H u s s e r l ,  c la ims  t h a t  the  
p r im ary  conce rn  o f  a l l  p h i lo so p h y  i s  ' b e i n g  qua b e i n g " . [74] I t  i s  easy  
to  s e e ,  g iven  H u s s e r l ' s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  phenomenology,  where in  the  
q u e s t i o n  o f  e x i s t e n c e  i s  e x p l i c i t l y  avoided  ( b r a c k e t e d )  and the  u l t i m a t e  
concern  i s  the  T ra n s c e n d e n ta l  Ego; why he r e j e c t e d  H e id e g g e r ' s  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  and c la imed t h a t  Heidegger had f a i l e d  to  "g rasp  the  whole 
meaning o f  the  phenomenologica l  r e d u c t i o n " . [75] I t  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  
see what the  a c t u a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e i r  d i sag reem en t  i s .
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On the  one hand t h e i r  d isag reem ent  seems to  be simply the r e s u l t  o f  
two t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s t s  t r y i n g  t o  outdo each  o t h e r .  H u ss e r l  c la im s  t h a t  
a f t e r  th e  f i n a l  r e d u c t i o n  a l l  t h a t  remains  i s  th e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  Ego. 
But,  c o u n t e r s  H e idegge r ,  what s o r t  o f  be ing  does i t  e x h i b i t ?  T he i r  
d i sag reem en t  seen in  t h i s  l i g h t  i s  i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l  because  i t  i s  
o b v ia t e d  by what th e y  s h a r e ;  th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  the  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  
p h i lo so p h y  i s  v i a b l e .  "Being"  m i r r o r s  the  f u n c t i o n  of  the  
T r a n s c e n d e n ta l  Ego, bo th  a r e  a t t e m p t s  to  e s t a b l i s h  the  b ro a d e s t  c o n te x t  
w i t h i n  which p h i l o s o p h i c  i n q u i r y  can o c c u r .  By e s t a b l i s h i n g  such a 
c o n t e x t  H u ss e r l  and Heidegger hoped to  avoid unexamined p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s ,  
t h e re b y  making t h e i r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  " t r a n s p a r e n t "  and c e r t a i n . [76]
On the  o t h e r  hand,  t h e i r  d i s ag reem en t  r e f l e c t s  a r a d i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e  
between t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  ap p ro a c h e s .  Here,  " b e in g "  r e f l e c t s  H e id e g g e r ' s  
commitment to  h e r m e n e u t i c s .  R a the r  than  t r y i n g  to  e s t a b l i s h  a framework 
which g u a r a n t e e s  c e r t a i n t y ,  a s k in g  th e  meaning o f  b e ing  i s  an a t tem p t  to  
respond  to  the  world around u s .  In  t h i s  s e n s e ,  " b e in g "  r e f l e c t s  a way 
of  t h i n k i n g  more than  an o b j e c t  o f  t h o u g h t .
"Being" i s  an a p p r o p r i a t e  t i t l e  f o r  t h i s  e n t e r p r i s e  because  of  i t s  
e ty m o lo g ic a l  c o n n e c t io n  w i th  " e x i s t e n c e " .  In  th e  t h i n k in g  t h a t  responds  
to  b e i n g ,  the  q u e s t i o n  o f  e x i s t e n c e  i s  paramount .  "Being" i s  a l s o
a p p r o p r i a t e  because  i t  a t t e s t s  to  the  u n s u r p a s s a b l e  g iv e n n ess  of  
r e a l i t y .  Behind H e id e g g e r ' s  a p p e a l  to  "be ing"  i s  the  b e l i e f  t h a t
u l t i m a t e l y  we a re  n o t  m a s t e r s  and p o s s e s s o r s  o f  our  l i v e s .  R a ther  than  
a sk ing  why, th ough t  must respond  to  t h a t . [77] However, as  - p r e v io u s ly  
n o t e d ,  Heidegger was aware o f  th e  excess  baggage t h a t  accompanied 
" b e in g " .  Consequen t ly ,  a f t e r  the  Turn he s u b s t i t u t e d  v a r i o u s  words fo r
" b e in g " ,  i n c l u d i n g ,  seyn f o r  s e i n ,  p h y s i s ,  a l e t h e i a ,  event  and
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w o r l d . [78] Cons tan t  th roughou t  the  s u b s t i t u t i o n s  i s  the  a t tem p t  to  open
o u r s e l v e s  to  those  t h i n g s  and ev en t s  which d i s c l o s e  and o r i e n t  our
w o r ld .  I t  i s  t h i s  s u b s t a n t i v e  r a t h e r  th a n  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  u n d e r s t a n d i n g
o f  " b e in g "  which i n c r e a s i n g l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  h i s  l a t e r  work.  J .D .
Caputo o f f e r s  a s u c c i n c t  account  o f  t h i s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  be ing  i n  th e
f o l l o w i n g  p a s s a g e .
In  f a c t  h i s  most i l l u m i n a t i n g  accoun ts  o f  what "Being" means,  
and hence  of  what he wants to  r e t r i e v e ,  a re  to  be found in
th o s e  l a t e r  es says  which speak  o f  the  e a r t h  and the  heavens ,
gods and m o r t a l s .  Here as nowhere e l s e  i t  becomes plain-  t h a t
Being f o r  him means th e  world in. which m o r t a l s  -  i n  which man
as  homo, humus -  d w e l l .  World i s  the p l a c e  o f  b i r t h  and 
d e a t h ,  growth and d e c l i n e ,  joy  and p a i n ,  o f  the  movement of  
th e  s e a s o n s ,  of  th e  m y s te r io u s  rhythm o f  human t im e .  I t  i s  
t h e  s i l e n c e  of  t h a t  p r i m o r d i a l  rhythm which has been s h a t t e r e d
by metaphys ics  -  by th e  on to lo g y  whose n a t u r a l  outcome i s
t e chno logy  -  and which Heidegger  in  p a r t i c u l a r  wants to  
r e s t o r e .  [79]
Thus the  o b l i v i o n  o f  b e ing  i s  th e  l e v e l i n g  o f  r e a l i t y .  The t h i n g s  
and e v e n t s  which once d i s c l o s e d  and o r d e r e d  our  world no lo n g e r  do so .  
And most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  th e y  have n o t  been- r e p l a c e d  by new t h i n g s  and 
e v e n t s  which have the  same power.  I t  i s  w i t h i n  the  c o n t e x t  o f  t h i s  
thought,  t h a t  we f i n d  H e i d e g g e r ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  freedom. With t h i s  
c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  and f u n c t i o n  o f  "be ing"  in  H e id e g g e r ' s  
though t  beh ind  us we can r e t u r n  to  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  of  freedom i n  Being 
and T i m e . .
10.0  THE EXPLICATION OF HUMAN BEING
In  Being and Time Heidegger  p roposes  to  reawaken and r e f o r m u l a t e  
the  q u e s t i o n i n g  o f  b e in g  i n d i r e c t l y .  He proceeds  by examining the  be ing  
of  the  c r e a t u r e  t h a t  i s  un ique  among a l l  o t h e r s  because  f o r  i t  a lone  i s  
be ing  an i s s u e .  This  c r e a t u r e  i s  man.
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Dasein  i s  an e n t i t y  which does n o t  j u s t  occu r  among o t h e r  
e n t i t i e s .  R a the r  i t  i s  o n t i c a l l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  by the  f a c t  
t h a t  in  i t s  v e ry  Being ,  t h a t  Being i s  an i s s u e  f o r  i t . . . I t  i s  
p e c u l i a r  to  t h i s  e n t i t y  t h a t  w i th  and th rough  i t s  Being,  t h i s  
Being i s  d i s c l o s e d  t o  i t  . .  Dase in  i s  o n t i c a l l y  d i s t i n c t i v e  
i n  t h a t  i t  i s  o n t o l o g i c a l . [80]
I n  keep ing  w i th  th e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s m  o f  Being and Time H e id e g g e r ' s
approach  t o  man 's  b e in g  i s  by way o f  d i s c l o s i n g  i t s  fundamenta l
o n t o l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  i t s  e x i s t e n t i a l e . [81] The e x i s t e n t i a l e  has t h r e e
s t r u c t u r a l  e l e m e n t s :  F a c t i c i t y ,  E X i s t e n t i a l i t y , and F a l l e n n e s s .  The
q u e s t i o n  o f  man 's  f reedom , j u s t  what "freedom" means and whether  or  not
i t  a c c u r a t e l y  d e s c r i b e s  th e  human c o n d i t i o n ,  o b v io u s ly  f a l l s  under  the
purv iew o f  t h i s  s t r u c t u r e .
T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  man has  been u n d e r s to o d  i n  terms o f  some 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  e s s e n c e .  I n  p h i l o s o p h i c  c i r c l e s  t h i s ,  e s sence  i s  u s u a l l y  
Reason.  Man i s  a ,  pe rhaps  t h e ,  r a t i o n a l  a n im a l .  A cco rd in g ly ,  an 
exam ina t ion  of  man i s  p r i m a r i l y  an exam ina t ion  o f  Reason.  H e idegge r ,  in  
a f r e s h  and c o n s e q u e n t i a l  move, d e c l a r e s  t h a t  what i s  most s t r i k i n g  
about  man i s  t h a t  he has  no e s s e n c e .  Man i s  n o - t h i n g ,  n o t  r a t i o n a l ,  no t  
s p i r i t u a l ,  n o t  a n y - t h i n g .  Th is  openness w i th  r e s p e c t  to  our  e x i s t e n c e  
i s  a t  once ou r  g r e a t  s t r e n g t h  and: ou r  g r e a t  weakness .  On the one hand,  
hav ing  n e i t h e r  a d e f i n i t e  n ic h e  nor  a c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  e s s e n c e  r e f l e c t s  
our  c a p a c i t y  to  comprehend th e  world  as  a whole and u n d e r s t a n d  ou r  p l a c e  
w i t h i n  i t .  Only f o r  man i s  t h e o r i a . an a r t i c u l a t e d  v i s i o n  o f  the  
w o r l d ' s  t o t a l i t y ,  p o s s i b l e . [82] On th e  o t h e r  hand,  t h i s  openness 
r e f l e c t s  the  f a c t  t h a t  we a r e  v u l n e r a b l e ,  f o r e v e r  incom ple te  and 
s u s c e p t i b l e  to  a p rofound i n s e c u r i t y . [83]
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This  tw o - fo ld  openness  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  in  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  below,  
b u t  l e t  me make an a d d i t i o n a l  comment h e r e .  We can d i s c u s s  human 
"openness"  in  terms o f  t r a n s i t i v i t y  and i n t r a n s i t i v i t y .  Borrowing from 
t h e i r  g ram m at ica l  meaning we can say t h a t  t r a n s i t i v e  openness has an
o b j e c t  whereas  i n t r a n s i t i v e  openness does n o t .  T r a n s i t i v e  openness  i s
d i r e c t e d  toward the  world a t  l a r g e .  We a re  open to and thus  ab l e  to  
respond  to  the  world around u s . [84] I n t r a n s i t i v e  openness r e f l e c t s  the  
f a c t  t h a t  we a re  n o - t h i n g ;  t h a t  what o u r s e l v e s  and our  world means i s  
p a r t  o f  a ..never f i n i s h e d ,  ongoing p r o j e c t .  That i s ,  our  be ing  i s  an 
i s s u e  f o r  u s . [85]
With r e s p e c t  to  man, t h e r e f o r e ,  we f i n d  t h a t  what c h a r a c t e r i z e s  him 
most p ro fo u n d ly  i s  t h i s  open,  q u e s t i o n i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  h i s
e x i s t e n c e .  What we a re  cannot  be d iv o rc e d  from where and how we a r e .  
Consequen t ly ,  H e id e g g e r ' s  te rm f o r  man i s  D ase in ,  l i t e r a l l y ,  
t h e r e - b e i n g .  To say t h a t  man's  be ing  i s  Dase in  i s  to  say t h a t  i n  o r d e r  
to  u n d e r s t a n d  man we must f i r s t  u n d e r s t a n d  h i s  world and the  c h a r a c t e r  
o f  h i s  e x i s t e n c e  w i t h i n  t h a t  w or ld .
Whenever we come upon o u r s e l v e s ,  so to  speak ,  we f i n d  t h a t  we a r e  
a l r e a d y  enworlded .  We a re  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  p l a c e  a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  t im e ,  
w i th  a c e r t a i n  h e r i t a g e ,  v a r i o u s  b e l i e f s ,  d e s i r e s ,  moods, f e a r s ,
involvements  and commitments. Our u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  S e l f  and world i s  
i n e x t r i c a b l y  bound up w i th  the  o b j e c t s ,  even t s  and people  around u s .  
S ince  Heidegger b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  human e x i s t e n c e  i s  a f a c t ,  
one t h a t  we cannot  g e t  a round ,  he c a l l s  i t  F a c t i c i t y . [86 ]  F a c t i c i t y  i s  
no t  an e v a l u a t i v e  te rm .  R a ther  i t  should  be un d e r s to o d  as a 
c o u n t e r - t e r m  to  the  C a r t e s i a n  ego.  There i s  no I  f r e e  from th e  world 
around u s .  Dase in  i s  th us  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by what Heidegger c a l l s
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B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r I d . [8 7 ]  The u n i f i c a t i o n  of  th e s e  terms r e f l e c t s  the  f a c t  
t h a t ,  f o r  human b e i n g ,  th e y  cannot  be u n d e r s to o d  in  i s o l a t i o n .  Of 
Course e v e ry t h in g  t h a t  e x i s t s  i s  in  the  world i n  some s e n s e .  What i s  
un ique  about  D a s e i n ' s  enworldment?
Heidegger  c l a r i f i e s  t h i s  by c o n t r a s t i n g  th e  way i n  which Dasein  i s  
i n  th e  world w i th  the  way in  which w a te r  i s  i n  a g l a s s .  The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  w a te r  'and the  g l a s s  i s  one o f  co n ta in m e n t .  The 
s id e s  o f  the  g l a s s  c o n t a i n s  the w a te r ,  p r e v e n t i n g  i t  from flowing  away. 
Containment i s  fundam e n ta l ly  a s p a t i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p ;  the  wate r  i s  
w i t h i n  the  g l a s s .  O bv ious ly ,  man i s  not  s imply in  the  world as  wate r  i s  
in  a g la s s . .  We a re  c e r t a i n l y  r e l a t e d  s p a t i a l l y  to  the  world around u s ;  
I  am upon my c h a i r ,  b e f o r e  my d e s k ,  in  my o f f i c e  and above the  ground.  
However, the  im por tan t  d i f f e r e n c e  between man 's  e x i s t e n c e  and w a t e r ' s  
con ta inment i s  t h a t  f o r  man s p a t i a l i t y  i s  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  which i s  
a b s t r a c t e d  from a p r i o r  and r i c h e r  one .
O r i g i n a l l y  and t y p i c a l l y  man i s  in vo lved  w i th  th e  world in  an 
e x c e ed in g ly  r i c h  and complex way. The world  i s  n o t  s imply a c o l l e c t i o n  
o f  n e u t r a l  o b j e c t s  to  which we a t t a c h  meaning.  R a t h e r ,  t h i n g s  m a t t e r  to  
u s ,  we a r e  in vo lved  w i th  them and concerned about  them. I t  i s  th rough  
ou r  c o n c e r n fu l  d e a l i n g s  w i th  t h i n g s  t h a t  the  world i s  ' d i s c l o s e d  as 
m e a n in g fu l .  To c l a r i f y  t h i s  Heidegger o f f e r s  an a n a l y s i s  o f  t o o l s . [88] 
We u n d e r s t a n d  a hammer, f o r  example,  n o t  by c o g n i t i v e l y  a n a ly z in g  i t ,  
l i s t i n g  i t s  f e a t u r e s ,  d i s c u s s i n g  i t s  p r o p e r t i e s ,  bu t  by u s in g  i t  to  
d r i v e  n a i l s .  O bv ious ly ,  we can d i s c u s s  the  hammer's f e a t u r e s  w i thou t  
u s in g  i t .  But t h i s  l a t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  c a l l e d  knowing by Heidegger ,  
i s  founded upon the  r i c h e r  and o r i g i n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  u s e .  Using 
"equipment" ( H e id e g g e r ' s  term fo r  th e  o b j e c t s  o f  everyday e x i s t e n c e )
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p o i n t s  to  the  c o n t e x t  w i t h i n  which an i n d i v i d u a l  o b j e c t  i s  m e a n in g fu l .  
A hammer i m p l i c i t l y  p o i n t s  to  the  c o n t e x t  of  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  h o u s in g ,  and 
so on.  Thus,  we encoun te r  equipment as the  "means by which" something 
can be done " in  o r d e r  t o "  accompl i sh  t h i s  or  t h a t  " f o r  the  sake o f "  our 
v a r i o u s  p r o j e c t s . [8 9 ]  The u l t i m a t e  " f o r  th e  sake o f  which" i s  Dase in  
i t s e l f .  I n  o t h e r  words,  what gu ides  and shapes  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which 
form our  world i s  u l t i m a t e l y  D a s e i n ' s  d e s i r e s ,  p l a n s ,  and p r o j e c t s .  
Th is  b r i n g s  us to  a n o t h e r  f e a t u r e  o f  D a s e i n ' s  o n t o l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  
E x i s t e n t i a l i t v .
E x i s t e n t i a l i t y  r e f l e c t s  the  f a c t  t h a t  D ase in  u n d e r s t a n d s  i t s e l f  and 
i t s  world  i n  terms o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  Dase in  i s  n o - t h i n g  and i t s  world 
i s  no n i c h e .  C onsequen t ly ,  who we a r e ,  what we c o n s i d e r  p o s s i b l e  and 
im p o s s ib l e ,  what we a c t  upon and what we fo rgo  a re  de te rm ined  by our  
p r o j e c t s .  The dream o f  becoming an a s t r o n a u t ,  f o r  example,  shapes  the  
c h i l d ' s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  what i s  p o s s i b l e  and what s t e p s  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  
to  a c t u a l i z e  t h e s e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  D a s e i n ' s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a r e  
a c c o r d in g ly  p r o j e c t e d  i n t o  the  f u t u r e .  Once p r o j e c t e d  th e s e  p l a n s  shape 
our  p r e s e n t  c o n c e rn s .  Hence,  Dase in  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by no t  s imply what 
i t  i s ,  bu t  by what i t  i s  coming t o  be .
The p r o j e c t i o n  o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  to  which we then  re s p o n d ,  i s  o f  
course  l i m i t e d .  Heidegger d i s c u s s e s  two l i m i t a t i o n s ,  F a c t i c i t y  and 
F a l l e n n e s s .  F a c t i c i t y  l i m i t s  p o s s i b i l i t y  in  t h a t  Dasein  e x i s t s  in  a 
world where c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  are  p o s s i b l e  and o t h e r s  a r e  n o t .  Not only  
a r e  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  p h y s i c a l l y  im p o ss ib l e  bu t  o t h e r s  a re  p r a c t i c a l l y  
im p o s s ib l e ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  h i g h l y  im probab le .  My d e s i r e  to  become an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  renowned p i a n i s t ,  w h i le  c e r t a i n l y  a p h y s i c a l  
p o s s i b i l i t y ,  would en c o u n te r  a v a s t  number o f  o b s t a c l e s  in  i t s  p a t h .
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The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  s i n c e  our  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a re  p r o j e c t e d  i n t o  a world and 
n o t  a vacuum, t h e i r  a c t u a l i z a t i o n  i s  n o t  com ple te ly  in  our  c o n t r o l .
The p r o j e c t i o n  of  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i s  a l s o  l i m i t e d  by F a l l e n n e s s . [9 0 ]
F a l l e n n e s s ,  which'  i s  th e  f i n a l ,  element i n  D a s e i n ' s  o n t o l o g i c a l
s t r u c t u r e ,  i s  r e v e a l e d  th ro u g h  an a n a l y s i s  o f  D a s e i n ' s  " e v e ry d a y n e s s " ;
t h e  way i n  which D ase in  i s  o r i g i n a l l y  and t y p i c a l l y .  What Heidegger
d i s c o v e r s  i s  t h a t  o r i g i n a l l y  and t y p i c a l l y  D ase in  i s  i n a u t h e n t i c .
Rather  than  d i s c l o s i n g  i t s  own p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  Dase in  u n d e r s t a n d s  i t s e l f
and i t s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  in  te rms o f  o t h e r s ,  t h e  anonymous T h e y . [91]
This  B e i n g - w i th - o n e - a n o t h e r  d i s s o l v e s  o n e ' s  own Dasein  
com ple te ly  i n t o  th e  k ind  o f  Being o f  ' t h e  o t h e r s ' ,  i n  such a 
way, inde ed ,  t h a t  th e  o t h e r s ,  as  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  and e x p l i c i t ,  
v a n i s h  more and more.  I n  t h i s  i n  co n sp icu o u sn ess  and 
u n a s c e r t a i n a b i l i t y , th e  r e a l  d i c t a t o r s h i p  o f  th e  ' t h e y '  i s  
u n f o l d e d .  We t a k e  p l e a s u r e  and en joy  o u r s e l v e s  as they  [man] 
ta k e  p l e a s u r e ;  we r e a d ,  s e e ,  and judge  l i t e r a t u r e  and a r t  as  
th e y  see  and judge ;  l i k e w i s e  we s h r i n k  back from the  ' g r e a t  
m a s s '  as  th e y  s h r i n k  b a c k ; . . . T h e  ' t h e y ' ,  which i s  n o th i n g  
d e f i n i t e ,  and which a l l  a r e ,  though n o t  as  the  sum, p r e s c r i b e s  
th e  k ind  o f  Being o f  e v e r y d a y n e s s . [9 2 ]
Everyday ,  i n a u t h e n t i c  e x i s t e n c e  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by av e ra g en ess  and
d i s b u rd e n m e n t . The v a r i o u s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  o n e ' s  l i f e  a r e  " l e v e l e d
down" by the  a v e ra g en es s  o f  the  t h e y .  No p o s s i b i l i t i e s  s t a n d  ou t  as
s i g n i f i c a n t ,  un ique  o r  d e c i s i v e .
I n  t h i s  av e ra g en ess  w i th  which i t  p r e s c r i b e s ' w h a t  can and may 
be v e n t u r e d ,  i t  keeps  watch over  e v e r y t h in g  e x c e p t i o n a l  t h a t  
t h r u s t s  i t s e l f  to  the  f o r e .  Every k ind  o f  p r i o r i t y  g e t s  
n o i s e l e s s l y  s u p p r e s s e d .  O v e rn ig h t ,  e v e r y t h in g  t h a t  i s  
p r i m o r d i a l  g e t s  g l o s s e d  over  as  something t h a t  has long been 
w e l l  known. E ve ry th ing  g a in e d  by a s t r u g g l e  becomes j u s t  
something to  be m a n i p u l a t e d . [93]
D a s e i n ' s  fundamenta l  o n t o l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  c o n s i s t i n g  of  
F a c t i c i t y ,  E x i s t e n t i a l i t y , and F a l l e n n e s s  i s  u n i f i e d  in  the  concep t  of  
C a r e . ( S o r g e )  [94] "Care"  n o t  only  s e rv e s  as the  u n i f y i n g  concep t  of  the
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t h r e e  s t r u c t u r a l  e l e m e n t s ,  bu t  i t  a l s o  d e s c r i b e s  D a s e i n ' s  e x i s t e n c e .  
Th is  l a t t e r  f u n c t i o n  i s  somewhat obscu red  by t r a n s l a t i n g  "Sorge"  w i th  
" c a r e " .  "Sorge"  bespeaks  bo th  what we o r d i n a r i l y  u n d e r s t a n d  by " c a r e " ,  
t h a t  i s ,  an a t t i t u d e  or  r e l a t i o n  o f  conce rn  and ,  more c l e a r l y  th a n  
" c a r e " ,  a worry ing  about  t h i n g s . [95]
11 .0  IMPLICATIONS OF EARLY HEIDEGGER
I f  man i s  fundam e n ta l ly  i n - t h e - w o r l d  and i f  t h i s  enworldment i s
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by c a r e ,  how a r e  -we f r e e ?  O b v ious ly ,  H e id e g g e r ' s  p o s i t i o n  
r u l e s  o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  freedom u n d e r s to o d  as  th e  r a d i c a l  
s e p a r a t i o n  from th e  c o n t i n g e n c i e s  o f  e x i s t e n c e .  Man's freedom,  i f  i t  i s  
to  be found a t  a l l ,  w i l l  n o t  be found f l o a t i n g  above everyday
r e a l i t y . [96] S ince  man 's  e s s e n c e ,  t h a t  which c h a r a c t e r i z e s  him most 
p ro found ly  i s ,  i r o n i c a l l y ,  to  have no e s s e n c e  bu t  only  a un ique  form o f  
e x i s t e n c e ,  freedom can n o t  be u n d e r s to o d  as  s imply a p r o p e r t y  which we 
e i t h e r  p o s s e s s  or  n o t .  I f  man i s  f r e e  h i s  freedom must be un d e r s to o d  in  
te rm s  o f  h i s  invo lvement w i th  th e  w o r ld .  Thus,  an extreme 
L i b e r t a r i a n i s m  i s  r u l e d  o u t  from the  s t a r t .  However, the  g r e a t  m a j o r i t y  
o f  L i b e r t a r i a n s  a r e  no t  concerned  w i th  t r a n s c e n d i n g  e x i s t e n c e  bu t  w i th  
p r e s e r v i n g  th e  n o t i o n  o f  f r e e  cho ice  w i t h i n  e x i s t e n c e .
I t  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  c l e a r  t h a t  Being and Time exc ludes  t h i s  co n c e p t io n
of  f reedom. I n  f a c t ,  as  we s h a l l  s e e ,  Heidegger f i n d s  t h i s  co n c e p t io n
a t t r a c t i v e .  Yet our  f r e e  cho ice  always e n c o u n te r s  F a c t i c i t y .  Who we 
a r e  and how we a r e  can n e v e r  be seve red  from our  involvement w i th  the 
w o r ld .  Th is  l a t t e r  r e a l i z a t i o n  i s  o b v io u s ly  c l o s e r  to  Determinism than  
i t  i s  to  L i b e r t a r i a n i s m .  Thus,  we see  t h a t  H e id e g g e r ' s  p o s i t i o n  
c o n t a i n s  both  L i b e r t a r i a n  and D e t e r m i n i s t i c  e l e m e n t s .  Not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,
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h i s  c o n ce p t io n  of  freedom i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  ambiguous.  But ,  as  p r e v io u s l y  
m en t ioned ,  the  seeds o f  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  of  t h i s  am bigu i ty  a re  a l s o  
c o n t a in e d  in  h i s  a n a l y s i s .
F o rm al ly ,  Heidegger  d i s c u s s e s  freedom from t h r e e  p e r s p e c t i v e s ,
f reedom- f o r  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  f reed o m -fo r  a n x i e t y  and f r eedom -fo r  d e a t h .  In
h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  of  a l l  t h r e e  he a t t e m p t s  to  show t h a t  freedom i s  no t
something a c c i d e n t a l  to  man but  i s  p a r t  o f  man 's  b e i n g .  U l t i m a t e ly  the
t h r e e  approaches  to freedom a r r i v e  a t  the  same p o i n t ,  f reedom -fo r
a u t h e n t i c i t y .  D i s c u s s in g  f r eed o m -fo r  d e a t h ,  f o r  example,  he say s ,
When, by a n t i c i p a t i o n ,  one becomes f r e e  f o r  o n e ' s  own d e a t h ,  
one i s  l i b e r a t e d  from o n e ' s  l o s t n e s s  i n  th ose  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
which may a c c i d e n t a l l y  t h r u s t  themse lves  upon one;  and one i s  
l i b e r a t e d  in  such a way t h a t  f o r  the  f i r s t  t ime one can 
a u t h e n t i c a l l y  u n d e r s t a n d  and choose among the  f a c t u a l  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  l y i n g  a h e a d . . . [97]
and more s p e c i f i c a l l y ,
. . b y  t h e  a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  d e a th  i s  every  a c c i d e n t a l  and 
' p r o v i s i o n a l '  p o s s i b i l i t y  d r i v e n  o u t . . . o n c e  one has grasped
th e  f i n i t u d e  o f  o n e ' s  e x i s t e n c e ,  i t  s n a tch e s  one back from the 
e n d l e s s  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  which o f f e r  themselves  
a s  c l o s e s t  to one— those  o f  c o m fo r t a b l e n e s s ,  s h i r k i n g ,  and 
t a k i n g  t h i n g s  l i g h t l y — and b r i n g s  Dasein  i n t o  the  s i m p l i c i t y  
o f  i t s  f a t e . . . [ 9 8 ]
I t  seems somewhat c o n t r i v e d  to  say t h a t  we a r e  f r e e - f o r  d e a t h .  How 
can a c r e a t u r e  "born to  d i e "  be f r e e  f o r  i t s  i n e v i t a b l e  d e a t h ? [99] 
U sua l ly  d ea th  i s  u n d e r s to o d  as the  l a s t  t h i n g  we do,  so to  speak ,  in  our 
l i f e .  Death i s  somewhere out  t h e r e ,  pe rhaps  c l o s e r  than  we t h i n k ,  but  
n o n e t h e l e s s  i t  remains a f u t u r e  e v e n t .  However, man i s  c a p a b le  of
b r i n g i n g  th e  meaning o f  h i s  d e a th  out  o f  the  f u t u r e  and i n t o  the
p r e s e n t .  To say t h a t  man i s  f r e e - f o r  d ea th  i s  to  say t h a t  man has the 
c a p a c i t y  to  l i v e  and no t  j u s t  d ie .  l i k e  a m o r t a l . [100] According to  
H e idegge r ,  g r a s p in g  our  d e a t h  as  a d e f i n i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  our
Page 56
humanity a l low s  us to  see our  l i f e  as  a whole .  Becoming f r e e - f o r  d e a th  
l i b e r a t e s  us from th e  o b l i v i o n  o f  the  p r e s e n t  which c h a r a c t e r i z e s
i n a u t h e n t i c  e x i s t e n c e .  R a ther  than  f i l l i n g  our  l i v e s  w i th  m ean ing le ss
t a s k s  and u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o u r s e l v e s  in  te rms of  the  s t a n d a rd s  o f  o t h e r s ,  
we come t o  see who we r e a l l y  a r e .  I n s t e a d  o f  f l e e i n g  in  the  f a c e  o f  our  
b e i n g ,  which i s  s i t u a t e d  between th e  n o th i n g n e s s  o f  b e f o r e - b i r t h  and 
a f t e r - d e a t h ,  we come to  u n d e r s t a n d  o u r s e l v e s  in  te rms o f  the  open 
f i n i t u d e  of  our  b e i n g .  Thus ,  u l t i m a t e l y  f r eed o m -fo r  d ea th  r e s u l t s  in  
f r eedom -fo r  a u t h e n t i c i t y .  (F reedom-for  p o s s i b i l i t y  and f r eed o m -fo r  
a n x i e t y  have e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same f u n c t i o n . )
H e idegge r ,  as  we s h a l l  s e e ,  i s  ex t rem ely  vague in  h i s  e x p l i c a t i o n  
o f  a u t h e n t i c i t y .  Though i t  seems i n c o n c e i v a b l e ,  he i n s i s t s  t h a t  
" i n a u t h e n t i c "  and " a u t h e n t i c "  a r e  d e s c r i p t i v e  r a t h e r  than  e v a l u a t i v e  
t e rm s .  An i n a u t h e n t i c  l i f e  i s  no worse than  an a u t h e n t i c  one— i t  i s
mere ly  d i f f e r e n t .  We. can d i s t i n g u i s h ,  bu t  n o t  f u l l y  s e p a r a t e ,  two 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  " a u t h e n t i c i t y "  w i t h i n  h i s  fo rm a l  d i s c u s s i o n .  F i r s t ,  
i t  i s  an a c t  o r  way o f  l i f e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by the  d i s c l o s u r e  of  o n e ' s  own 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  Second,  i t  i s  an a c t  o r  way of  l i f e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 
s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g  and m a n i f e s t  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  The fo rmer  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
fo c u s e s  on D a s e i n ' s  E x i s t e n t i a l i t y  and the  l a t t e r  on i t s  F a c t i c i t y .
Heidegger  d i s c u s s e s  E x i s t e n t i a l i t y  i n  te rms o f  p o s s i b i l i t y .  Dasein  
u n d e r s t a n d s  i t s e l f  and i t s  world th rough  the  d i s c l o s u r e  of  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  Yet o r i g i n a l l y  and t y p i c a l l y  D ase in  i s  F a l l e n .  With 
r e s p e c t  to  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h i s  means t h a t  Dase in  p r o j e c t s  and responds  to
th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  o t h e r s  r a t h e r  than  i t s  own. However, Dasein i s  not  
com ple te ly  en s la v e d  to  the  i n a u t h e n t i c i t y  of  the  They.  Because i t  i s  
c a p a b le  o f  e x p e r i e n c in g  A nx ie ty  and u n d e r s t a n d i n g  i t s  m o r t a l i t y ,  Dase in
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i s  a b l e  to  see i t s e l f  as  i t  t r u l y  i s .  That  i s ,  as  a c r e a t u r e  whose 
e s s en ce  i s  e x i s t e n c e  and whose e x i s t e n c e  i s  an i s s u e .  Because Dasein 
never  s imply i s ,  i t  must c o n s t a n t l y  choose what t o  become. When
l i b e r a t e d  from the  bondage o f  the  They,  Dase in  i s  f aced  w i th  the  cho ice
o f  e i t h e r  remain ing  i n a u t h e n t i c  o r ,  a c c e p t i n g  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  
p r o j e c t i n g  i t s  own p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  becoming a u t h e n t i c .  Thus,  our freedom 
i s  t w o - f o l d :  the  a b i l i t y  to  escape  the  o b l i v i o n  of  i n a u t h e n t i c
e x i s t e n c e  and the c a p a c i t y  to  p r o j e c t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t h a t  a re  de te rm ined
by n o th i n g  but  o u r s e l v e s .
This  c o n c e p t io n  o f  freedom i s  a f a m i l i a r  one ,  the  L i b e r t a r i a n
c o n c e p t io n  of  f r ^ e - c h o i c e .
P r o j e c t i o n ,  o r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  ( E x i s t e n t i a l i t y )  t h e n ,  i s  f r e e  
l i k e  a d e c i s i o n  i s  f r e e ;  n o th i n g  p r i o r  to  the  d e c i s i o n  — 
p r i o r  to  p r o j e c t i o n  — can l i m i t  t h a t  d e c i s i o n  and so 
de te rm ine  i t .  Nothing can l i m i t  t h a t  d e c i s i o n  because  p r i o r  
to  i t  n o th i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  e x i s t s ;  p r o j e c t i o n  i t s e l f  d ec id es  
what s i g n i f i c a n c e  w i l l  be g iven  to  t h i n g s . [101]
Because t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  a u t h e n t i c i t y  r e s t s  upon a L i b e r t a r i a n
c o n c e p t io n  of  freedom' i t  i s  v u l n e r a b l e  to  the  same problems which p lague
C am pbe l l ' s  p o s i t i o n .  »
Although bo th  Heidegger  and Campbell acknowledge the  D e t e r m i n i s t i c  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  d a i l y  e x i s t e n c e ,  they ,  b e l i e v e  t h a t  freedom c o n s i s t s  in  
t r a n s c e n d i n g  t h i s  everyday d e t e r m i n a t i o n . [102] Campbell d i s c u s s e s  t h i s  
t r a n s c e n d e n c e  i n  te rm s  o f  "moral  d e c i s i o n s "  and Heidegger  in  te rm s  of  
" a u t h e n t i c i t y " .  Both a r e  led  to  p o s i t  the  S e l f  as  the  locus  of  freedom.
As p r e v i o u s l y  d i s c u s s e d  in  s e c t i o n  4 ,  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  t u r n  to
Selfhood  i s  r e p l e t e  w i th  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  The end r e s u l t  i s  a S e l f  which
i s  i s o l a t e d  from e v e r y t h i n g  o u t s i d e  i t s e l f ,  i n c l u d i n g  i t s  own, 
supposed ly  f r e e ,  a c t i o n . [103] Even i f  th e  t u r n  to  the  S e l f  could  be
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s u c c e s s f u l l y  n e g o t i a t e d  two c r i t i c a l  problems would remain .  F i r s t ,  the 
n o t i o n  of  f r e e  c h o i c e ,  which u n d e r l i e s  b o th  "moral  d e c i s i o n s "  and 
" a u t h e n t i c i t y "  i s  u l t i m a t e l y  i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  from randomness.  
Obviously n e i t h e r  Campbell nor  Heidegger  could  a c c e p t  randomness as a 
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  freedom. Yet t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  o f f e r  no o t h e r  c h o i c e .  
Second,  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  cannot  be s t a t e d  i n  such  a way t h a t  i t  i s  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  f i n d i n g s  o f  modern s c i e n c e .  Although t h i s  alone 
does n o t  r e f u t e  t h e i r  c l a im s ,  i t  does remove them from a secu re  and 
f r u i t f u l  p o s i t i o n  i n  the  everyday w o r ld .  Thus,  in  the  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  
t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  a u t h e n t i c i t y  i s  undermined by a t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
in c o h e re n t  c o n c e p t io n  o f  freedom.
This  b r i n g s  us to  the  second i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  " a u t h e n t i c i t y "  found 
i n  Being and Time. Whereas the  f i r s t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  focused  on D a s e i n ' s  
E x i s t e n t i a l i t y ,  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  fo c u s e s  on D a s e i n ' s  F a c t i c i t y .  
" F a c t i c i t y "  r e f l e c t s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  Dase in  i s  always i n - t h e - w o r I d . 
C onsequen t ly ,  we are  neve r  f r e e  from th e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of  everyday 
r e a l i t y .  Of c o u r s e ,  f o r  H eidegger ,  t h i s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  a complex 
m ix tu re  of  D a s e i n ' s  p r o j e c t e d  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  t hose  o f  o t h e r s ,  and th e  
f e a t u r e s  o f  the  p h y s i c a l  w o r ld .  The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  a l l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a re  
thrown,  t h a t  i s ,  p r o j e c t e d  o u t  o f  and i n t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  w or ld .  
Consequen t ly ,  Dase in  can neve r  com ple te ly  c o n t r o l  e i t h e r  the  p r o j e c t i o n  
o r  a c t u a l i z a t i o n  o f  i t s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  I f  t h i s  i s  the  c a s e ,  how can we 
become a u t h e n t i c ?
A u t h e n t i c i t y  i s  no t  f reedom -from everyday e x i s t e n c e ,  bu t  a c e r t a i n  
type  of  everyday e x i s t e n c e .  Heidegger  approaches  t h i s  n o t i o n  i n d i r e c t l y  
by c o n t r a s t i n g  i t  w i th  what i t  i s  n o t ;  th e  l i f e  of  the  They.  The l i f e  
o f  the  They i s  i n a u t h e n t i c  n o t  j u s t  because  our  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a re
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d i s c l o s e d  and l i m i t e d  by o t h e r s ,  bu t  because  i t  obscu res  and d i s s i p a t e s  
th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  and o r d e r  o f  r e a l i t y .  Nothing s tan d s  out  as  d e c i s i v e .  
Nothing p ro v id e s  our  l i f e  w i th  o r i e n t a t i o n .  Ra ther  than  remain ing  open 
to  th o s e  t h i n g s  and even ts  which d i s c l o s e  and o r i e n t  our w o r ld ,  we f i l l
o u r s e l v e s  with  p e t t y  conce rns  and f r e n z i e d  a c t i v i t i e s .  I n  o t h e r  words ,
an i n a u t h e n t i c  e x i s t e n c e  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by the  o b l i v i o n  of  Being.
However, Heidegger a rgues  t h a t  man i s  not  com ple te ly  e n s la v e d  to  
i n a u t h e n t i c i t y .  At l e a s t  no t  y e t .  In  h i s  l a t e  work he comes to see 
t h i s  as  the  g r e a t e s t  danger  f a c i n g  mankind.  N o n e th e l e s s ,  a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  
man remains  c a p a b le  o f  a u t h e n t i c i t y .  This  c a p a b i l i t y  i s  fundam en ta l ly  
our  a b i l i t y  to  comprehend and respond  to  Being ,  or  i t s  ab sence .  We a re  
f r e e d - f r o m  i n a u t h e n t i c  e x i s t e n c e  i n s o f a r  as  we a r e  ab l e  to  respond to  
t h e  world  i n  i t s  c r u c i a l  d im en s io n s .  Thus,  to  say t h a t  Dase in  i s
f r e e - f o r  a u t h e n t i c i t y  i s  to  say t h a t  we a re  c a p a b le  o f  re spond ing  t o ,
r a t h e r  than  c hoos ing ,  th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  our  w or ld .  A cc o rd in g ly ,  
a u t h e n t i c i t y  would be a n ' a c t  o r  event  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by those  t h i n g s  and 
e ven t s  which concern  us most d e e p l y .
This  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  a u t h e n t i c i t y  and the  co n c e p t io n  o f  freedom 
upon which i t  r e s t s  a r e  o b v io u s ly  consonan t  w i th  r e s o u r c e f u l  
Dete rm in ism.  Freedom i s  no t  r e j e c t e d  ou t  o f  hand b u t  i t  i s  un d e r s to o d  
as re s p o n d in g  r a t h e r  than  choos ing  and i t  i s  f u l l y  l o c a t e d  w i t h i n  a 
d e t e r m i n i s t i c  nexus .  Because o f  t h i s ,  i t  s h a re s  bo th  the  s t r e n g t h s  and 
weakness of  Determinism d i s c u s s e d  i n  s e c t i o n  6.  Like S m a r t ' s  p o s i t i o n ,  
t h i s  second i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  a u t h e n t i c i t y  and freedom i s  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
c o h e r e n t ,  avo ids  the  randomness of  f r e e  c h o i c e ,  and can be s t a t e d  in  
acco rdance  w i th  the  f i n d i n g s  o f  modern s c i e n c e .  Also l i k e  S m a r t ' s  
p o s i t i o n ,  H e id e g g e r ' s  account  s u f f e r s  from a la ck  o f  focus  and
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d i r e c t i o n .  Both Smart and Heidegger  seem to  assume t h a t  fo rmal ism i s  
paramount in  the  d i s c u s s i o n  of  freedom.  Once th e  framework i s  e r e c t e d  
e v e r y t h in g  e l s e  w i l l  f a l l  i n t o  p l a c e .  However, in  bo th  a c c o u n t s ,  what 
focus  they  have i s  d e r i v e d  from im por ted  s u b s t a n t i v e  m a t e r i a l .  
H e id e g g e r ' s  account  o f  a u t h e n t i c i t y  i s  pow er fu l  n o t  because  of  i t s  
t h e o r e t i c a l  m e r i t s  b u t  because o f  i t s  t r e n c h a n t  a n a l y s i s  of  d a i l y  l i f e .  
I f  we a r e  to  develop H e id e g g e r ' s  s u g g e s t i v e  remarks about  our  a b i l i t y  to  
respond to  eminent  r e a l i t y ,  we must t u r n  to  t h a t  eminence i t s e l f .
Hence,, we see  t h a t  H e id e g g e r ' s  fo rmal  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  freedom i s  
fundam en ta l ly  ambiguous,  c o n t a i n i n g  both  L i b e r t a r i a n  and D e t e r m i n i s t i c  
e l e m e n t s .  C onsequen t ly ,  h i s  p o s i t i o n  s u f f e r s  no t  only  from am bigu i ty  
but  from the  problems found in  both  S m a r t ' s  and C am pbel l 's  p o s i t i o n s  as 
w e l l .  N o n e th e l e s s ,  h i s  s u b s t a n t i v e '  a n a l y s i s  o f  everyday e x i s t e n c e  
p o i n t s  the  way t h a t  a f r u i t f u l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  freedom should  go.  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  h e l p f u l  s u g g e s t io n s  i n  h i s  s u b s t a n t i v e  
d i s c u s s i o n .
F i r s t ,  he s u g g e s t s ,  c o r r e c t l y  I  t h i n k ,  t h a t  freedom should  be 
u n d e r s to o d  as  th e  c a p a c i t y  to  respond to  s i g n i f i c a n c e  r a t h e r  than  the  
a b i l i t y  to  f r e e l y  c hoose .  As we s h a l l  s e e ,  grounding  freedom in  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r a t h e r  than  cho ice  a l low s  us bo th  to  f r u i t f u l l y  a d d re s s  
our  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  freedom and to  do so i n  a t h e o r e t i c a l l y  co h e re n t  vray.
Second,  he s u g g es t s  t h a t  freedom i s  an achievement o f ,  r a t h e r  than  
a p r o p e r t y  o f ,  the  human s p e c i e s .  This  i s  no t  to  say t h a t  freedom i s  a 
m a t t e r  of  w i l l ,  something we s e t  ou t  to " a c h i e v e " .  "Achievement" should 
be un d e r s to o d  in  c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n  w i th  " p r o p e r t y " .  I f  freedom i s  a 
p r o p e r t y  of  man, as  w i th  Campbell f o r  example,  he i s  obv io u s ly  not
Page 61
i n v o lv ed  w i th  i t .  He, as  a man, i s  born  f r e e .  However, i f  f reedom i s  
an ach ievem en t ,  the  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  in v o lv ed  i n  h i s  freedom. We can be 
more o r  l e s s  f r e e .  I m p l i c i t  i n  the  id e a  of  a L i b e r a l  e d u c a t i o n ,  f o r  
example,  i s  t h a t  i t  makes one more f r e e .  A c c o rd in g ly ,  the  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  u n d e r l y i n g  freedom i s  p a r t i c i p a t o r y  i n  n a t u r e .  We a re  
in v o l v e d ,  t a k e  p a r t  i n ,  our  freedom. Our i m p l i c a t i o n  i n  freedom can be 
bo th  e x h i l a r a t i n g  and,  as  Heidegger  and S a r t r e  p o i n t  o u t ,  d r e a d f u l .
T h i r d ,  Heidegger s u g g e s t s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  ways o f  l i f e  a r e  u n f r e e .  
U s u a l l y ,  t h i s  c l a im  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  te rms o f  c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s ,  economic 
c o n d i t i o n s ,  and p o l i t i c a l  sy s tem s .  To a l a r g e  e x t e n t  t h i s  i s  th e  most
im p o r ta n t  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  human freedom. One would have to  be n a i v e  and
c a l l o u s  to  t a l k  about  " re sp o n d in g  to  s i g n i f i c a n c e "  to  a p e r son  who does 
n o t  know when he w i l l  e a t  a g a i n ,  where he w i l l  s l e e p ,  and where he w i l l  
f i n d  work.  However, t h i s  l a c k  o f  freedom i s  obvious  and i t  r e c e i v e s
p l e n t y  o f  d i s c u s s i o n  — i f  too  l i t t l e  a c t i o n .  Heidegger  s u g g e s t s  t h a t
t h e r e  i s  a n o t h e r ,  more s u b t l e ,  way in  which man can be u n f r e e .  In  h i s  
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  They,  which in  h i s  l a t e r  work i s  u n d e r s to o d  as 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  e x i s t e n c e ,  we f i n d  a way o f  l i f e  t h a t  i s  a p p a r e n t l y  q u i t e  
f r e e  b u t  in  a c t u a l i t y  i s  p ro fo u n d ly  u n f r e e . [104]
I t  was n o t  u n t i l  h i s  matu re  work,  f o l l o w in g  the  Turn,  t h a t  
H eidegger  was a b l e  to  f l e s h  ou t  t h e s e  s u g g e s t i o n s .  As e a r l y  as 1930,  
however,  in  an e s say  e n t i t l e d  "on the  Essence  of  T r u t h " ,  Heidegger  t a k e s  
an im por tan t  s t e p  in  h i s  a t t e m p t  to  r e s o l v e  the  am bigu ity  of  Being and 
Time.
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1 2 .0  TRUTH AND FREEDOM
The e s s ay  a t t e m p t s  to  t h i n k  the  e s sence  o f  t r u t h .  A cc o rd in g ly ,  i t  
i s  n o t  concerned  w i th  t h i s  and t h a t  t r u t h  but  w i th  what a l l  t r u t h s  
share. .  U sua l ly  we u n d e r s t a n d  t r u t h  in  terms o f  c o r re s p o n d en ce .  True 
s t a t e m e n t s  co r respond  to  the  way t h i n g s  a c t u a l l y  a r e  and t r u e  t h i n g s  a re  
th o s e  which prove to be as we b e l i e v e d  them to  be .  "The p lane  w i l l  be 
l a t e "  i s  t r u e  i n s o f a r  as  the  p la n e  r e a l l y  i s  l a t e .  Gold i s  t r u l y  gold 
and n o t  j u s t  f o o l s '  go ld  when, a f t e r  a n a l y s i s ,  we f i n d  t h a t  i t  r e a l l y  i s  
g o l d .  Th is  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  so obvious  and a c c e p t a b l e  t h a t  i t  t ends  to 
o b v i a t e  f u r t h e r  q u e s t i o n i n g .  Y e t ,  a c c o rd in g  to  H e idegge r ,  t h i s  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  " t r u t h " ,  w h i l e  c o r r e c t ,  f a i l s  to  be t r u e .  C o r r e c t n e s s  
i s  mere ly  accordance  w i th  th e  f a c t s  of  the  m a t t e r ,  w h i l e  t r u t h  r e v e a l s  
th e  h e a r t  o f  th e  m a t t e r .  R e tu rn in g  to  the  co r respondence  th e o ry  of  
t r u t h  Heidegger  f i n d s  t h a t  p r i o r  t o  co r respondence  t h e r e  must be 
d i s c l o s u r e .  That i s ,  b e f o r e  we can judge  whether  or  no t  our  s ta t e m e n t  
a c c u r a t e l y  c o r re sponds  to  th e  m a t t e r  a t  hand,  we must comprehend the
m a t t e r  a t  hand.  He su p p o r t s  t h i s  c l a im  by examining "A l e t h e i a " .
"A l e t h e i a " i s  u s u a l l y  t r a n s l a t e d  " t r u t h " . -  L i t e r a l l y ,  however,  i t
means unconcea lm ent ,  the  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  what was h id d e n .  E l a b o r a t i n g  the
meaning o f  " a l e t h e i a " i n  a l a t e r  e s s ay  he s a y s ,
T ru th  means t o d a y . and has  long meant the  agreement or
co n fo rm i ty  o f  knowledge w i th  f a c t .  However, the  f a c t  must 
show i t s e l f  to  be f a c t  i f  knowledge and the  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  
forms and e x p r e s s e s  knowledge a r e  to  be a b l e  to  conform to  the  
f a c t ;  o th e rw is e  the  f a c t  canno t  become b in d i n g  on the
p r o p o s i t i o n .  How can f a c t  show i t s e l f  i f  i t  cannot  i t s e l f
s t a n d  f o r t h  out  of  c o n c e a l e d n e s s ,  i f  i t  does n o t  i t s e l f  s tand  
f o r t h  out  o f  c o n c e a l e d n e s s ,  i f  i t  does n o t  i t s e l f  s t a n d  in  the  
u n c o n c e a l e d ? [105]
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At a g la n c e  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  e s sence  of  t r u t h  s t r i k e s  one
as  simply a p l a t i t u d e  o b f u s c a t e d  by e x o t i c  t e rm in o lo g y .  I t  i s  q u i t e
obvious  t h a t  " co r respondence  w i th  the  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s "  p resupposes  a
s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  to  which i t  c o r r e s p o n d s .  Can t h i s  be a l l  t h a t
Heidegger  has in  mind? Yes and no .  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  i s  what he has
in  mind bu t  t h e r e  i s  more h e re  than  meets  the  eye .  Q u i te  o f t e n  what
we p re s u p p o s e ,  and f a i l  to  m en t ion ,  i s  more r e v e a l i n g  than  what i s
s a i d . [106] The co r respondence  th e o ry  o f  t r u t h  p resupposes  a meaningful
w o r ld ,  a c o n t e x t  w i t h i n  which s t a t e m e n t s  make s e n s e .  In  o t h e r  words ,
those  of  Being and Time, th e  n o t i o n  o f  t r u t h  p re supposes  the  f a c t  t h a t
we a re  always and a l r e a d y  i n  the  w o r ld .  R e a l i t y  has always and a l r e a d y
come to  p a s s .  Thus,  t r u t h  i s  th e  d i s c l o s u r e  of  the  g iv e n n ess  o f  r e a l i t y
and n o t  s imply  a p r o p e r t y  of  s t a t e m e n t s .  I s  then  th e  d i s c l o s u r e  o f
r e a l i t y  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  t r u t h ?  One might  t h i n k  so ,  bu t  t h e r e  i s  a
f u r t h e r  s t e p  to  be t a k e n .  To say t h a t  unconcea ledness  i s  the  e s s en ce  o f
t r u t h  p re supposes  ou r  c a p a c i t y  to  comprehend and respond to  t h i s
d i s c l o s u r e .  This  c a p a c i t y ,  a c c o rd in g  to  H e idegge r ,  i s  freedom.
Freedom i s  no t  merely what common sense  i s  c o n t e n t  to  l e t  pass  
under  t h i s  name: t h e  c a p r i c e ,  t u r n i n g  up o c c a s i o n a l l y  in  our
c h o o s in g ,  o f  i n c l i n i n g  i n  t h i s  o r  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n .  Freedom i s  
n o t  mere absence  o f  c o n s t r a i n t  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  what we can or  
cannot  do.  Nor i s  i t  on th e  o t h e r  hand mere r e a d i n e s s  f o r  
what i s  r e q u i r e d  and n e c e s s a r y  ( a s  so somehow a b e i n g ) . P r i o r  
to  a l l  t h i s  ( " n e g a t i v e "  and " p o s i t i v e "  f r eedom ) ,  freedom i s  
engagement i n  the  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  b e in g s  as s u c h . [107]
Freedom, a s  the  es sence  o f  t r u t h ,  i s  our  a c t i v e  involvement i n  the  
d i s c l o s u r e  o f  r e a l i t y .  This  co n c e p t io n  o f  freedom, opaque as i t  i s ,  
s i g n a l s  a b re a k  w i th  the  d i s c u s s i o n  of  freedom in  Being and Time. There 
th e  d i s c u s s i o n  was confounded by the  admix tu re  of  l i b e r t a r i a n  and 
d e t e r m i n i s t i c  e l e m e n t s .  Here Heidegger c l e a r l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  the  two 
and ,  f u r t h e r m o r e ,  r e c o g n i z in g  t h a t  the  former  r e s u l t s  in  c a p r i c i o u s n e s s ,
he makes h i s  s tand  w i th  the  l a t e r .
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Yet h i s  account  f a i l s  to  r e s o l v e  the  o v e r - a r c h i n g  am bigu i ty  o f  
Being and Time, th e  d i s p a r i t y  between i t s  fo rmal  p r o c e s s  and i t s
s u b s t a n t i v e  t i m i d i t y .  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  in  "On th e  Essence  o f  T ru th "  
Heidegger  t a k e s  " e s se n ce"  to  mean " formal c o n d i t i o n " .  Freedom i s  the 
e s s e n c e  of  t r u t h  i n s o f a r  a s  i t  i s  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  i t .
O bv ious ly ,  i f  we were no t  open to  the  d i s c l o s u r e  of  r e a l i t y  t h e r e  would 
be no s i t u a t i o n  about  which to  make judgments .  But t h i s  f a i l s
H e id e g g e r ' s  own s t a n d a r d ;  i t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  c o r r e c t  bu t  j u s t  as  c e r t a i n l y
i t  i s  u n t r u e .  That  i s ,  i t  f a i l s  t o  r e a c h  to  th e  h e a r t  o f  our concern
w i th  t r u t h  and freedom.
The problem i s  t h a t  h i s  account  r e v e a l s  too much. For any g iven  
s i t u a t i o n  an i n d e f i n i t e  number o f  t r u e  s t a t e m e n t s  can be made about  i t .  
The problem w i th  t r u t h  i s  n o t  f i n d i n g  a t r u e  s t a t e m e n t  b u t
d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  among them. What conce rns  us a re  th o s e  s t a t e m e n t s  which 
a r e  n o t  j u s t  t r u e  b u t  im p o r t a n t ly  t r u e .  D i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between t r u e  and 
i m p o r t a n t ly  t r u e  i s  no t  a m a t t e r  of  e s t a b l i s h i n g  fo rmal  c o n d i t i o n s .
Ra ther  one must r e f e r  t o  s t a n d a r d s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  A p h y s i c i a n  
examining h i s  p a t i e n t ,  f o r  example,  i s  c e r t a i n l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t r u e  
s t a t e m e n t s  about  the  p a t i e n t ' s  c o n d i t i o n .  But n o t  a l l  o f  the  t r u e  
s t a t e m e n t s  concern  him, n o t  even most o f  them. Good d i a g n o s i s  r e q u i r e s  
th e  a b i l i t y  to  s i f t  th rough  the  c o u n t l e s s  t r u e  s t a t e m e n t s  d i s c a r d i n g  a l l  
but  th e  r e l a t i v e l y  few which a r e  im p o r ta n t ly  t r u e .  This  p ro c e s s  i s  
gu ided  by the  p h y s i c i a n ' s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  what i s  p robab ly  wrong.  This  
f i r s t  a pp rox im a t ion  of  the  problem e s t a b l i s h e s  what w i l l  count as  
s i g n i f i c a n t  i n f o r m a t i o n .  A cco rd ing ly  the  l e s s  the  p h y s i c i a n  has to  go 
on to  beg in  w i th  the  more d i f f i c u l t  the  d i a g n o s i s  w i l l  be .
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S i m i l a r l y ,  s ay ing  t h a t  freedom i s  no t  f r e e - c h o i c e  but  "engagement 
i n  th e  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  b e in g s  as  such" may s t r e n g t h e n  our t h e o r e t i c a l  
p o s i t i o n  but  i t  f a i l s  to  a d d re s s  our  d e e p e s t  concerns  w i th  human 
freedom. I t  f a i l s ,  l i k e  a l l  p u r e ly  fo rmal  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  freedom 
because  i t  cannot  d i s t i n g u i s h  between l e v e l s  of  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Freedom, 
f o rm a l ly  u n d e r s to o d  as  th e  " e s se n c e  o f  t r u t h " ,  i s  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  
f o r  a l l  a c t s ,  t h e  most b a r b a r i c  as w e l l  a s  the  most n o b le .  
Mer leau-Ponty  could  have e a s i l y  been t a l k i n g  about  H e i d e g g e r ' s ,  r a t h e r  
than  S a r t r e ' s ,  c o n c e p t io n  o f  freedom when he s a id  t h a t  freedom " i s  
everywhere ,  bu t  e q u a l ly  n o w h e r e " . [108]
Thus,  "On th e  Essence o f  T ru th "  r e f l e c t s  an im por tan t  s t e p  in  
H e i d e g g e r ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  freedom.  For th e  f i r s t  t ime he c l e a r l y  
d i s a s s o c i a t e s  h im s e l f  from th e  l i b e r t a r i a n  n o t i o n  o f  f r e e - c h o i c e .  I t  
a l s o  b r i n g s ,  pe rhaps  more c l e a r l y  than  Being and Time, the  shor tcomings  
o f  a p u r e ly  fo rmal  account  i n t o  the  open.
A f t e r  t h i s  e s s ay  H e id e g g e r ' s  work took  a d e c i s i v e  t u r n  toward 
s u b s t a n t i v e  a n a l y s i s .  He r e p e a t e d l y  c l a im s  t h a t  i t  i s  the  method and 
no t  the  g o a l  of  h i s  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  changed.  The s u b j e c t  o f  h i s  mature 
work remains  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  Being .  But now, r a t h e r  than  t r y i n g  to  
e s t a b l i s h  the  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  ou r  e x p e r i e n c e  of  Being,  
he t u r n s  to  bur e x p e r i e n c e  i t s e l f .  This  t u r n  b r i n g s  w i th  i t  a v i g o r  and 
c l a r i t y  ab s e n t  i n  h i s  e a r l y  fo rmal  work.  But because  he abandons the  
a t t e m p t  to  e s t a b l i s h  c o g e n t ly  the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e ,  i t  a l s o  
b r i n g s  a degree  of  t e n t a t i v e n e s s .  U nlike  fo rm al  t h o u g h t ,  s u b s t a n t i v e  
a n a l y s i s  can n e v e r  p ro v id e  cogent  r e s p o n s e s  to  the  q u e s t i o n s  t h a t  gu ide  
i t .  In  re sponse  to  a l e t t e r  from a young s t u d e n t ,  Heidegger  says t h i s  
about  s u b s t a n t i v e  th o u g h t :
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To t h i n k  "Being" means: to  respond to  the  a p p e a l  o f  i t s
p r e s e n c i n g .  The r e s p o n s e  stems from th e  a p p ea l  and r e l e a s e s  
i t s e l f  toward t h a t  a p p e a l .  . . I  can p r o v id e  no c r e d e n t i a l s  f o r  
what I  have s a i d . . . t h a t  would p e rm i t  a con v en ien t  check in  
each  case  whether  what I  say a g re e s  w i th  " r e a l i t y " . . .  
E ve ry th ing  he re  i s  th e  p a th  of  a r e spond ing  t h a t  examines as 
i t  l i s t e n s .  Any p a t h  always r i s k s  go ing  a s t r a y ,  l e a d in g  
a s t r a y .  To fo l l o w  such  p a th s  t a k e s  p r a c t i c e  i n  g o in g .  
P r a c t i c e  needs c r a f t .  S tay  on the  p a t h ,  i n  genu ine  need ,  and 
l e a r n  th e  c r a f t  o f  t h i n k i n g ,  unsw erv ing ,  y e t  e r r i n g . [109]
In  h i s  mature  work "Being"  and "a l e t h e i a " a r e  d i s c u s s e d  from a 
s u b s t a n t i v e  p e r s p e c t i v e .  R a the r  than  f o c u s in g  on the  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  the  
d i s c l o s u r e  o f  a l l  r e a l i t y ,  he fo c u s e s  on what i s  d i s c l o s e d  as d e c i s i v e .  
Both "Being" and " a l e t h e i a " p o i n t  to  the  f a c t  t h a t  r e a l i t y  i s  always and 
a l r e a d y  g iv e n .  Our world  i s  o rd e re d  i n  such a way t h a t  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  
and e ven t s  s t a n d  ou t  as  s i g n i f i c a n t  w h i l e  o t h e r s  do n o t .
To say t h a t  r e a l i t y  i s  g iven  i s  no t  to  say t h a t  i t  n e v e r  changes ,
b u t  t h a t  u l t i m a t e l y  i t  i s  a m a t t e r  of  c o n d i t i o n s  r a t h e r  than  laws .  The
o r d e r  o f  ou r  w o r ld ,  what s t a n d s  ou t  and what does n o t ,  could  be v a s t l y
d i f f e r e n t  w i th o u t  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  th e  laws o f  p h y s i c s .  Consequen t ly ,  our
q u e s t i o n i n g  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  must f i n a l l y  come to  r e s t  w i th  t h a t  r a t h e r
than  why. There a r e  no laws o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  though s i g n i f i c a n c e  i s
th o ro u g h ly  l a w f u l .  To say t h a t  r e a l i t y  i s  g iven  i s  a l s o  to  say t h a t  we
do n o t  c r e a t e  or  f u l l y  c o n t r o l  i t .  We f i n d  o u r s e l v e s  in  a p a r t i c u l a r
world  w here in  p a r t i c u l a r  t h i n g s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  or  h o t .  Of c o u r s e ,  as
we s h a l l  s e e ,  t h i s  does n o t  mean t h a t  we a r e  no t  im p l i c a t e d  i n  t h i s
s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  j u s t  t h a t  we do n o t  c r e a t e  or  f u l l y  c o n t r o l  i t .  I t  i s  in
acknowledgment of  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  Odysseus says  to  Amphinomos:
Of m o r t a l  c r e a t u r e s ,  a l l  t h a t  b r e a t h e  and move, E a r th  b e a r s  
none f r a i l e r  than  m a n k i n d . . .  So I ,  t o o ,  in  my t ime thought to  
be happy;  b u t  f a r  and r a s h  I  v e n t u r e d ,  c o u n t in g  on my own 
r i g h t  arm, my f a t h e r ,  and my k i n ;  behold  me now.. .No man 
should  f l o u t  the  law b u t  keep in  peace  what g i f t s  the  gods may 
g i v e . [110]
Page 67
The etymology o f  " s i g n i f i c a n c e "  p ro v id e s  i n i t i a l  a c c e s s  to  the  
concep t  i t s e l f .  T rac ing  " s i g n i f i c a n c e "  th rough  Middle E n g l i s h  and Old 
French  we come to  i t s  r o o t  i n  L a t i n ,  Signum; which means "a d i s t i n c t i v e  
mark,  f i g u r e  or  s e a l " .  "Signum" i n  t u r n  i s  the  s u f f i x e d  form of  sekw 
which means " to  f o l l o w " . [ 111] Thus,  we can say t h a t  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h i n g s  
and e ven t s  a r e  th ose  which we fo l l o w  — th o s e  which c l a im  and gu ide  u s .  
F u r t h e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  r e q u i r e s  a t u r n  to  s i g n i f i c a n t  
t h i n g s  th e m s e lv e s .  H e id e g g e r ' s  e s s ay  "The Thing" i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of  
t h i s  t u r n .
13 .0  FREEDOM AND SIGNIFICANT THINGS
In  "The Thing"  Heidegger  o f f e r s  an a n a l y s i s  of  the  t h i n g s  which 
comprise  h i s  everyday w or ld .  He c o n c e n t r a t e s  h i s  a n a l y s i s  on one t h i n g ,  
a j u g .  What fo l lo w s  i s  an e l a b o r a t e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  i t s  p r o p e r t i e s  and 
f u n c t i o n .  R e j e c t i n g  th e  formal d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the  jug  in  terms of  i t s  
p h y s i c a l  f e a t u r e s  a lone  he a t t e m p t s  to  d i s c l o s e  the  f u n c t i o n  o f  the  jug  
i n  h i s  everyday w o r ld .  The jug  i s  made from th e  e a r t h ' s  c l a y  by a
p o t t e r .  Man and e a r t h  j o i n  in  the  c r e a t i o n  of  the  j u g .  ‘But th e  j u g ' s  
c h a r a c t e r  cannot  be un d e r s to o d  in  i s o l a t i o n  from the  c o n t e x t  in  which i t  
f i t s .  The jug  i s  a wine j u g .  W ith in  i t s  s i d e s  and the  vo id  between 
them i t  ho ld s  the  w ine .  But ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  a jug as opposed to  a keg ,  
ho ld s  only  to  g iv e  up,  to  pou r .  Thus,  the  jug  ho lds  the wine so t h a t  i t  
may be s e rv ed  r a t h e r  th a n  h o ld i n g  i t  so t h a t  i t  may be aged ,  f o r  
example.  The s e r v in g  o f  wine in  t u r n  p o i n t s  to  the  c o n t e x t  of  meals  and 
c e l e b r a t i o n .  As m o r t a l s  we need the  s u s ten an ce  p rov ided  by food and 
d r i n k .  Hence the  wine poured from the  jug  quenches our  t h i r s t  and 
e n l i v e n s  our  c o n v i v i a l i t y .  But a t  t i m e s ,  wine i s  s e rved  no t  as  a d r i n k
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but as a l i b a t i o n .  Wine thus  s e rved  bespeaks  man 's  r e l a t i o n s h i p  to
d i v i n i t y .  Heidegger conc ludes  t h a t  the  jug  p o i n t s  to  and g a t h e r s  the
f o u r - f o l d :  e a r t h ,  sky ,  m o r t a l s  and th e  d i v i n i t i e s ,  [112] This
g a t h e r i n g  and fo c u s in g  o f  t h i n g s  i s  what d i s t i n g u i s h e s  them, from the
more numerous o b j e c t s .  He s a y s ,
I n c o n s p ic u o u s ly  com pl ian t  i s  the  t h i n g ;  th e  jug  and the  
bench ,  t h e  f o o t b r i d g e  and the  plow. But t r e e  and pond., t o o ,  
brook and h i l l ,  a r e  t h i n g s ,  each i n  i t s  own way. Things ,  each 
t h i n g i n g  from t ime to  t ime in  i t s  own way, a re  he ron  and ro e ,  
d e e r ,  ho r s e  and b u l l .  T h ings ,  each  t h i n g i n g  and each s t a y i n g  
i n  i t s  own way, a r e  m i r r o r  and c l a s p ,  book and p i c t u r e ,  crown 
and c r o s s .  B u t . t h i n g s  a r e  a l s o  modest i n  number,  compared 
w i th  th e  m e a s u re le s s  mass o f  men as l i v i n g  b e i n g s .  Men alorte,  
a s  m o r t a l s ,  by d w e l l in g  a t t a i n  to  the world as w o r ld .  Only 
what c o n j o in s  i t s e l f  out  o f  world becomes a t h i n g . [113]
H e i d e g g e r ' s  a n a l y s i s  i s  bo th  f a m i l i a r  and a l i e n .  I t  i s  a l i e n  
i n s o f a r  as  t h e  t h i n g s  he d e s c r i b e s  a re  p e c u l i a r  t o  h i s  a g r a r i a n  and 
l a r g e l y  p r e -  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  s e t t i n g .  Yet h i s  appea l  t o  the  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
o f  t h e s e  t h i n g s  s t r i k e s  a r e s p o n s i v e  chord w i t h i n  u s .  In  h i s  a n a l y s i s  
we h e a r  the  echo o f  s i m i l a r  e x p e r i e n c e s  in  our  own l i v e s .  But how do we 
b e s t  c a p t u r e  the  k i n s h i p  between our  own e x p e r i e n c e s  and H e id e g g e r ' s  
ana l y s i s ?
Retu rn ing  to  fo rmal ism and t r y i n g  to  e s t a b l i s h  the  c o n d i t i o n s  fo r  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f a i l s  because  o f  th e  f a i l u r e  of  
fo rm a l ism  g e n e r a l l y .  The c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
c i r c u m s c r ib e s  a p o s s i b i l i t y  space ,  bu t  t h a t  space  accomodates 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  and d i s t r a c t i n g  o r  d e s t r u c t i v e  t h i n g s  as w e l l  as  
s i g n i f i c a n c e .  We must i n s t e a d  p roceed  by r e f e r r i n g  to  v ocab le s  which 
p o i n t  to  the  v a r i o u s  g e n e r i c  f e a t u r e s  of  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Such v o cab le s  
a r e :  "engagement",  " c o n t e x t u a l i t y " , " f o c a l " ,  " em inen t" ,  and the
" f o u r - f o l d " .  These v o c a b l e s ,  w h i le  h e l p f u l ,  can s e rv e  only  as a b r id g e
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between o u r s e l v e s  and the  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h i n g  i t s e l f .  Appea ling  to  the 
g e n e r i c  t r a i t s  works on ly  i f  they  a re  e n r i c h e d  and i n v i g o r a t e d  by our  
own e x p e r i e n c e s  and r e c o l l e c t i o n s  o f  the  t h i n g s  th e m s e lv e s .  Th is  i s  
p o s s i b l e  because  th e  k i n s h i p  between s i g n i f i c a n t  t h i n g s  i s  a p a r t  o f  
t h e i r  g i v e n n e s s .  Thus,  our  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the  g e n e r i c  f e a t u r e s  of  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  must remain  s u f f i c i e n t l y  t r a n s p a r e n t  to  a l lo w  us to  see 
th rough  them, what they  p r e s e r v e  and a n t i c i p a t e .
The p a r t i c u l a r i t y  o f  H e id e g g e r ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  i n v i t e s  us to  examine 
our  own l i f e  to  see whether  or  n o t  " t h i n g s "  e x i s t ’. [114] S ure ly  most of  
us have t h i n g s  which s tand  ou t  as  d e c i s i v e l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  The p l a c e  I  
l i v e ,  my f a m i ly  and f r i e n d s ,  th e  r i n g  which g a t h e r s  and p r e s e r v e s  my 
m a r r i a g e  commitment, my v o c a t i o n ,  a l l  s e rv e  to  focus and o r i e n t  my l i f e .  
With r e s p e c t  to  t h e s e  " t h i n g s "  and th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  they  embody, freedom 
i s  no t  the  a b i l i t y  to  ac c e p t  or  r e j e c t  them w i th o u t  c a u s a l  c o n s t r a i n t  
b u t  th e  c a p a c i t y  to  comprehend and respond to  them i n  t h e i r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Am I  f r e e  to  abandon my w i f e ,  d i shono r  my f a m i ly ,  f a i l  my 
f r i e n d s ?  I f  I  was no t  bound to  th e s e  peop le  and t h i s  way o f  l i f e  would 
I  c a l l  my c o n d i t i o n  freedom o r  d e s t i t u t i o n ?  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  would be 
th e  l a t t e r .
Turning  to  the  etymology of  " f r e e "  h e l p s  i l l u m i n a t e  t h i s  sense o f  
freedom. The Welsh r o o t  of  " f r e e "  i s  r h y d a d . which means to  lo v e .  
Rhvdad. in  t u r n ,  can be t r a c e d  back to  the  S a n s k r i t  p r i y a . meaning d e a r .  
The r o o t  o f  p r i y a . p r i . i s  found i n  th e  Old S lavon ic  p r i y a t e l l  and ,  
a f t e r  some m o d i f i c a t i o n ,  in  the  Old E n g l i s h  f r e o n , bo th  o f  which mean 
f r i e n d .  The Old German senses  o f  " f r e e "  come from i t s  having been 
" a p p l i e d  as the  d i s t i n c t i v e  e p i t h e t  o f  those  members of  a household who 
a r e  connec ted  by t i e s  o f  k i n s h i p  w i th  th e  head ,  as  opposed to  the
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s l a v e s . M[115] Hence, we see  t h a t  o r i g i n a l l y  freedom was more than  the  
o p p o s i t e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  s l a v e r y .  To be f r e e ,  and n o t  s imply
u n c o n s t r a i n e d ,  was t o  be bound by o t h e r s  in  k i n s h i p ,  f r i e n d s h i p ,  and 
l o v e .  C l e a r l y  i t  r e q u i r e s  more than  i r o n  to  e n s la v e  a man and more than  
i t s  removal  to  f r e e  him.
O bv ious ly ,  t h i s  i s  a s u b s t a n t i v e  co n c e p t io n  of  f reedom. As such no 
cogen t  argument can be g ive n  f o r  i t .  A t tem p t ing  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h i s  
c o n c e p t io n  as  v a l i d ,  p r i o r  to  our ex p e r i e n c e  o f  freedom would be to  
r e t u r n  t o  fo rmal  d i s c u s s i o n .  Yet th e  t e m p t a t i o n  to  do so i s  g r e a t ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  when we a r e  d i s c u s s i n g  something t h a t  conce rns  u s .  We would 
l i k e  to  be a b l e  to  n a i l  down, once and f o r  a l l ,  j u s t  what freedom means.  
However, a s  we have s e e n ,  th e  a t tem p t  to  do so i s  r i g o r o u s  bu t  a i m l e s s .  
We must p ro cee d ,  as  Heidegger  d i d ,  by t u r n i n g  to  our  e x p e r i e n c e  i t s e l f  
to  see  whether  or  n o t  our  c o n c e p t io n  o f  freedom i s  adequa te  to  i t .  
S a i n t  E xupe ry ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  h i s  f r i e n d ' s  d e s p e r a t e  s t r u g g l e  to  escape  
d e a t h  i n  th e  Andes o f f e r s  an o p p o r t u n i t y  to  ground t h i s  n o t i o n  of
freedom in  a c o n c r e t e  s i t u a t i o n .
G u i l l au m e t ,  l i k e  many of  th e  e a r l y  a v i a t o r s ,  found h im s e l f  caught  
i n  t h e  g r i p  o f  a v i o l e n t  s to rm .  F i g h t i n g  t o  r e t a i n  c o n t r o l  o f  h i s  
l u r c h i n g  p l a n e ,  he sea rch ed  in  v a i n  f o r  an open ing i n  the  s to rm .
Nowhere was escape  p o s s i b l e .  F i n a l l y ,  a f t e r  hours  o f  b a t t l i n g  down
d r a f t s  and dodging the  mounta ins  which r e a r e d  up out  of  the  c l o u d s ,  h i s  
f u e l  supply was exhaus te d  and he c r a s h  landed on a f ro z e n  l a k e .  I t  was 
t h e  dead of  w i n t e r ,  h ig h  in  the  Andes.
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A f t e r  a week o f  lo ok ing  f o r  t h e i r  f r i e n d ,  Exupery and h i s .
companions abandoned hope .  No one ,  the  l o c a l s  a s s u re d  them, could  
s u r v i v e  a s i n g l e  n i g h t ,  much l e s s  an e n t i r e  week, out  i n  the  Andean 
w i n t e r .  But s u r v iv e  he d id  and a f t e r  more than  a week he s t a g g e r e d ,  
more dead than  a l i v e ,  i n t o  a mountain  v i l l a g e .  His f i r s t  words to  
Exupery were "What I  went th rough  no an imal  would have gone
th ro u g h " .  [116] A f t e r  r e c o v e r i n g  from the  w ors t  o f  i t  and w h i le  he w a i t ed
to  see  i f  he would lo s e  the  t o o l s  o f  h i s  p r o f e s s i o n  to  f r o s t b i t e ,  he
t o l d  h i s  t a l e .
For th e  f i r s t  two days and two n i g h t s  he was co n f in e d  t o  the
wreckage o f  h i s  p la n e  by the  s to rm .  When i t  f i n a l l y  a b a t e d  he began to
walk o u t .  He was no t  t o  s top  walk ing  f o r  the  n e x t  f i v e  days and f o u r
n i g h t s .  He knew t h a t  to  s top  in  t h a t  w ea the r  was to  d i e .  Y e t ,  in
ex t reme c o l d ,  a f t e r  one becomes hypo the rm ic ,  n o th i n g  f e e l s  b e t t e r ,
warmer and more s e n s i b l e  than  to  l i e  down in  the  snow and g iv e  y o u r s e l f
to  s l e e p .  Longing to  s top  Guil laumet  would say to  h i m s e l f ,
I f  my w i fe  s t i l l  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  I  am a l i v e ,  she must b e l i e v e
t h a t  I  am on my f e e t .  The boys a l l  t h i n k  I  am on my f e e t .
They have f a i t h  in  me. And I  am a skunk i f  I  d o n ' t  go
o n . [117]
F i n a l l y ,  however,  he could  go no f u r t h e r .  D e fe a t e d ,  he succumbed to  the  
warmth of  th e  f ro z e n  snow and sank i n t o  the  o b l i v i o n  o f  h i s  p a i n .  But 
even as  he f e l l  a thought came to  him. He remembered t h a t  i f  h i s  body 
was n o t  reco v e re d  th e  in s u ra n c e  company would withho ld  payment of  h i s  
p o l i c y  f o r  f o u r  y e a r s .  He a l s o  knew t h a t  i f  he remained where he was 
t h e  s p r i n g  r u n - o f f  would wash h i s  body in t o  a r a v in e  where i t  would 
n e v e r  be found.  Managing to  r a i s e  h i s  head he s p o t t e d  a r o c k ,  about  
f i f t y  yards  away, a g a i n s t  which he could  prop h i s  body a s s u r i n g  i t s  
r e c o v e ry  in  th e  s p r i n g .  Knowing t h a t  f a i l u r e  meant t h a t  h i s  w i fe  would
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be p e n n i l e s s  f o r  y e a r s ,  he ga ined  h i s  f e e t  and to ok  t h a t  d e c i s i v e  s t e p  
which e v e n t u a l l y  c a r r i e d  him to  s a f e t y .
G u i l l a u m e t ' s  s t o r y  could have e a s i l y  been t o l d  from the  p e r s p e c t i v e
o f  human w i l l .  One s u s p e c t s  t h a t  a l e s s  humble man would have .  I n  t h i s
c a s e ,  an animal  would n o t  have s u rv iv e d  because o t h e r  an imals  a r e  not
b l e s s e d  w i th  human w i l l s .  I t  was s h e e r  s t r e n g t h ,  courage and
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  which saved G u i l l aum e t .  But Exupery b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e r e
was something more fundamenta l  a t  work than  w i l l  power.
I f  ,we were to t a l k  to  him about  -his courage ,  G uil laumet would 
shrug h i s  s h o u l d e r s . . .He knew t h a t  he was r e s p o n s i b l e  fo r
h i m s e l f ,  f o r  th e  m a i l s ,  f o r  the  f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  th e  hopes o f  
h i s  comrades.  He was h o ld in g  i n  h i s  hands t h e i r  sorrow and 
t h e i r  j o y .  He was r e s p o n s i b l e  fo r  t h a t  new element which the  
l i v i n g  were c o n s t r u c t i n g  and i n  which he was a p a r t i c i p a n t .  
R e s p o n s ib le ,  in  as much as h i s  work c o n t r i b u t e d  to  i t ,  f o r  the  
f a t e  o f  those  m e n . [118]
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  n o t  w i l l p o w e r ,  i s  what saw Gui l laum et  th rough  h i s  
o r d e a l .  However, n o t  C am pbe l l ' s  sense  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  which r e q u i r e s  
t h a t  one "could have done o t h e r w i s e " ,  bu t  the  l i t e r a l  meaning of  
" r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " ;  th e  c a p a c i t y  to  r e spond .  Gu i l laum et  was claimed by 
th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  h i s  comrades,  h i s  w i f e ,  and h i s  p r o f e s s i o n .  He was 
no t  f r e e  to  choose whether  o r  n o t  he would respond to  th e s e  c l a im s ,  he 
was f r e e  i n s o f a r  as  he was e q u a l  to  them. He was a b l e  to  s u r v iv e  what 
no o t h e r  an imal  would have ,  because  as a human he was capa b le  of  
comprehending and respond ing  t o  the s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  r e a l i t y .  What i s  
r e a l ,  what d e t e rm in e s  us i s  n o t  s imply what i s  immediately p r e s e n t ,  the 
p a i n ,  and c o l d n e s s ,  bu t  a r i c h  web of  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  commitments,  
remembrance o f  p a s t  even ts  and a n t i c i p a t i o n  of  f u t u r e  ones .  To say t h a t  
an an imal  would have f a i l e d  to  s u r v i v e ,  i s  to  say t h a t  an an imal i s  no t  
c a p a b le  o f  a t t a i n i n g  what saved G ui l laum et  — a world  r a t h e r  than  a
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n i c h e .
14.0  OBJECTIONS TO SUBSTANTIVE FREEDOM
I n  o r d e r  to  c l e a r  and p r e p a r e  t h e  ground f o r  H e id e g g e r ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  
o f  t e chno logy  and freedom, we must c o n s i d e r  and accomodate the  obvious  
and p l a u s i b l e  o b j e c t i o n s  o f  the  l i b e r t a r i a n .  There a r e  t h r e e  o b j e c t i o n s  
l i k e l y  to  be r a i s e d .  F i r s t ,  t h i s  c o n c e p t io n  of  freedom, w h i le  seemingly  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the  extreme case  of  G u i l l a u m e t ,  i s  a t  odds w i th  the 
a p p a re n t  l o o s e n e s s  o f  everyday r e a l i t y .  A v i a b l e  c o n c e p t io n  of  freedom 
should  apply  to  bo th  th e  f ro z e n  w a s te la n d  o f  th e  Andes and d e c i d in g  
which t o o t h p a s t e  to  buy.  Second,  t h i s  co n c e p t io n  o f  freedom i s  
in c o m p a t i b le  w i th  those  v a l u e s  and concep ts  t h a t  a r e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  freedom: p r i d e  and g u i l t  f o r  example.  T h i r d ,  c l a im ing
t h a t  man i s  ca p a b le  o f  r e spond ing  t o  s i g n i f i c a n c e  seems t o  r e f l e c t  a 
l a t e n t  l i b e r t a r i a n i s m .
The a p p a re n t  l o o s e n e s s  o f  r e a l i t y  is. b e s t  un d e r s to o d  in  t h r e e  ways.  
F i r s t ,  everyday r e a l i t y  i s  u s u a l l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by e n t r o p i c  s i t u a t i o n s  
w here in  n o th i n g  s t a n d s  out  as  d e c i s i v e .  S tan d in g  b e f o r e  an a r r a y  o f  
t o o t h p a s t e ,  f o r  example,  we f e e l  as  i f  we can f r e e l y  choose which one to  
buy.  The f e l t  i n d e te rm in acy  of  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  a r i s e s  no t  from the  
absence  o f  a c a u s a l  nexus ,  bu t  from th e  t r i v i a l i t y  of  the  d e c i s i o n .  I t  
j u s t  does n o t  r e a l l y  m a t t e r  which brand  you p i c k .  The s i t u a t i o n  i s  f a r  
removed from th e  c e n t r a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  o n e ' s  l i f e . [119] As we move 
from the  t r i v i a l  to  th e  d e c i s i v e  f e a t u r e s  o f  o n e ' s  l i f e ,  t h e  a p p a re n t  
a r b i t r a r i n e s s  of  our  a c t i o n s  d e c r e a s e s .
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Second,  in  th ose  s i t u a t i o n s  where we a r e  cla imed by something 
s i g n i f i c a n t ,  t h e r e  a r e  u s u a l l y  v a r i o u s  ways to  respond  to  t h i s  c l a im .  
I f  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  e q u a l ly  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  none w i l l  s t a n d  out  as  
c l e a r l y  th e  one to t a k e .  Hence,  we weigh between them c o n s i d e r i n g  the  
advan tages  and d i s a d v a n t a g e s  o f  eac h .  This  t r a n s l a t i o n  of  th e  g e n e r a l  
gu ida nce  i n t o  s p e c i f i c  a c t i o n  g iv e s  use to  the  i l l u s i o n  t h a t  i t  i s  up to  
us to  choose f r e e l y  which course  to  f o l l o w . [120]
T h i r d ,  some s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by c o n f l i c t i n g  c l a im s .  
Th is  c o n f l i c t  i s  o f t e n  i n t e r p r e t e d  as in d e t e r m i n a c y .  You and your 
f a m i ly  a r e  s i t t i n g  by th e  r i v e r ,  f o r  example,  when suddenly  a c h i l d  
f a l l s  i n  and i s  swept toward a s t r e t c h  o f  r a p i d s .  Perhaps  you would 
immediately  d iv e  in  to  r e s c u e  th e  baby.  But p e rhaps  n o t .  You might  
h e s i t a t e  because  you a r e  n o t  a  s t r o n g  swimmer and th e  s w i f t  w a te r  o f  the  
r i v e r  f r i g h t e n s  you.  And what about  your  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  your  own 
c h i l d ?  I n  such  a s i t u a t i o n  we e x p e r i e n c e  o u r s e l v e s  as  "the locus  of  
c o n f l i c t i n g  c la im s  n o t  th e  locus  o f  c a u s a l  i n d e t e r m i n a c y .  The c o n f l i c t  
i s  r e s o l v e d  no t  when we f r e e l y  choose one cou rse  o f  a c t i o n  bu t  when one 
of  s e v e r a l  c l a im s  proves  to  be th e  s t r o n g e s t .
A l l  t h r e e  o f  th e s e  s i t u a t i o n s ,  which g i v e  r i s e  to  the  ap p a re n t  
lo o s e n e s s ,  o f  everyday l i f e ,  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by our  igno rance  o f  the  
p r e c i s e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  in v o l v e d .  This  i g n o r a n c e ,  I 
b e l i e v e ,  i s  n o t  th e  r e s u l t  o f  some im p e n e t r a b le  core  o f  r e a l i t y  t h a t
t
es cap e s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  R a the r  the  igno rance  i s  b e s t  u n d e r s to o d  as  an 
i n t e l l i g i b l e  ig n o ra n c e .  That  i s ,  we know why we do no t  f u l l y  u n d e r s t a n d  
th e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  Our ign o ran c e  stems from the immense com plex i ty  of  
even th e  s i m p l e s t  s i t u a t i o n .  C o n s id e r in g  th e  com plex ity  of  j u s t  our  own 
f u n c t i o n i n g ,  and ou r  r e l a t i v e  igno rance  conce rn ing  i t ,  i t  i s  easy to  see
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why we would n o t  f u l l y  u n d e r s t a n d  a s i t u a t i o n  in v o l v in g  o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  
p e o p l e ,  and t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  A c c o rd in g ly ,  most o f  our  c la im s  
conce rn ing  th e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  everyday r e a l i t y  must f o r  now, and 
probab ly ,  f o r e v e r ,  be accompanied by the  q u a l i f y i n g  " i n  p r i n c i p l e " .  
However, t h i s  i s  p l e n t y  f o r  de t e rm in i sm  and way too  much f o r  
l i b e r t a r i a n i s m .
But,  a sks  our  c r i t i c ,  i s  n o t  t h i s  c o n c e p t io n  o f  freedom com pa t ib le  
w i th  the  v a l u e s  and concep ts  t h a t  have t r a d i t i o n a l l y  accompanied the  
n o t i o n  o f  freedom? How can " g u i l t "  and " p r i d e " ,  f o r  example,  have any 
sense  w i t h i n  a d e t e r m i n i s t i c  s e t t i n g ?  These q u e s t i o n s  a r e  im por tan t  
because  a r e s o u r c e f u l  d e te rm in i sm  must be a b l e  to  i l l u m i n a t e ,  and not  
j u s t  r e j e c t ,  our  o r d i n a r y  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  th e  w o r ld .  I t  shou ld  be c l e a r  
t h a t  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  does inde ed  r u l e  out  a c e r t a i n  n o t i o n  o f  " g u i l t "  and 
" p r i d e " .  I t  exc ludes  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  them as th e  r e s u l t  o f  be ing  s o l e l y  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  an a c t .  I n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  one e x p e r i e n c e s  g u i l t  when the  
a c t  i n  q u e s t i o n  i s  d e p l o r a b l e  and p r i d e  when i t  i s  s a l u t a r y .  With 
r e s p e c t  t o  g u i l t ,  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  you a r e  s o l e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  an a c t  
i s  a t  odds w i th  our  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  th e  com plex i ty  o f  human a c t i o n  and,  
m oreover ,  i t  i s  a b s o l u t e l y  no he lp  to  the  g u i l t  r id d e n  i n d i v i d u a l .  With 
r e s p e c t  to  p r i d e ,  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  you a l o n e ,  by the  s t r e n g t h  o f  your own 
r i g h t  arm i s  s imply h u b r i s t i c  and ,  as  such ,  i t  should  be r u l e d  o u t .  I t  
shou ld  be r u l e d  ou t  n o t  only  because  o f  the  a r ro g a n c e  t h a t  i t  e n t a i l s ,  
b u t  a l s o  because  i t  i s  a de luded  sense  o f  o n e ' s  p l a c e  in  th e  w or ld .  
[121] But i f  t h i s  n o t i o n  o f  g u i l t  i s  e x c lu d ed ,  what remains?
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G u i l t ,  I  b e l i e v e ,  i s  b e s t  u n d e r s to o d  as f a i l i n g  th e  c l a im  of 
s i g n i f i c a n c e .  That  i s ,  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  be ing  c la im ed  but  be ing 
unequa l  to  i t .  One day w h i le  in  a d r u g s t o r e ,  f o r  example,  my w i f e ,  a 
f r i e n d ,  and I  saw a man c o l l a p s e  in  the  back of  the  s t o r e .  We rushed  
back and saw t h a t  he had o b v io u s ly  s u f f e r e d  a h e a r t  a t t a c k .  Although my 
w i fe  and I  had bo th  completed CPR t r a i n i n g ,  we h e s i t a t e d .  E v e n t u a l l y ,  
two p h a rm a c i s t s  began to  a d m i n i s t e r  CPR. I t  was o b v io u s ,  however,  t h a t  
th e y  d id  n o t  know what th e y  were d o in g .  R a the r  than  s t e p p i n g  forward 
and t a k i n g  o v e r ,  we simply w atched .  We knew t h a t  we should s t e p  i n ,  but 
we d id  n o t .  F i n a l l y , a f t e r  an a g o n i z in g ly  long w a i t  the  paramedics
a r r i v e d .  I  would l i k e  to  t h i n k  t h a t  th e  gentleman s u r v iv e d ,  bu t  I.  f e e l  
s u re  t h a t  he d i e d .
To say t h a t  we s u f f e r e d  g u i l t  would be an u n d e r s t a t e m e n t .  We knew 
t h a t  we f a i l e d  to  do what we were c a l l e d  upon to  do.  Y e t ,  i t  was no t  
th e  h o p e l e s s ,  i n e x p l i c a b l e ,  and u n h e l p fu l  g u i l t  of  a b s o l u t e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  The e x p e r i e n c e  o f  f a i l u r e  s e rved  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  our 
r e s o l v e  i n  th e  f u t u r e .  I t  a l low ed  us  to  see  t h a t  ou r  t r a i n i n g  was 
in a d e q u a te  and t h a t  f u r t h e r  p r e p a r a t i o n  was needed .  I n  o t h e r  words our 
g u i l t  h e lped  p r e p a r e  us to  become eq u a l  to  a- s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n .  We 
u n d e r s t a n d ,  more c l e a r l y  th a n  b e f o r e ,  why we f a i l e d  and what can be done 
about  i t .
P r i d e ,  I  b e l i e v e ,  i s  b e s t  un d e r s to o d  as  th e  ex p e r i e n c e  o f  o n e s e l f  
as  the  locus  o f  a s i g n i f i c a n t  even t  coming to  p a s s .  As such ,  p r i d e  
q u ic k ly  shades  i n t o  g r a t i t u d e .  I  r e c a l l ,  f o r  example,  those  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  f i n e  runs  when I  f e l t  as  i f  I  could  go on f o r e v e r .  The 
m i le s  s l i p p e d  by u n o b t r u s i v e l y  and I  seemed to  almost  f l o a t  a l o n g .  On 
days l i k e  t h i s  you f e e l  proud of  your  body, proud of  the  outcome of  your
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t r a i n i n g  and d i l i g e n c e ,  bu t  a l s o  g r a t e f u l  f o r  the  f a c t  t h a t  your body, 
t r a i n i n g ,  and d e s i r e  have converged so w o n d e r f u l ly .  I t  does no t  ta ke  
many of the  bad days to  convince  you t h a t  good runs  a r e  no t  com ple te ly  
under  our c o n t r o l .
Thus,  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  we can make sense o f  " g u i l t "  and " p r id e "  in  a 
d e t e r m i n i s t i c  s e t t i n g .  F u r the rm ore ,  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e s e  n o t i o n s  of  
g u i l t  and p r i d e  can he lp  th o s e  who s u f f e r  from the  h o p e l e s s  a n x i e ty  of  
o b s e s s i v e  g u i l t  and the  s e l f  d e c e p t io n  of  overweening p r i d e .
F i n a l l y ,  to  say t h a t  man i s  f r e e  i n s o f a r  as  he i s  capab le  o f
comprehending and respond ing  to  the  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  r e a l i t y  seems to  
r e f l e c t  a l a t e n t  l i b e r t a r i a n i s m .  " C a p a b i l i t y "  seems to  imply t h a t  we
can choose whether  or  n o t  to  respond to  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  However, I
b e l i e v e  t h a t  " c a p a b i l i t y "  shou ld  be u n d e r s to o d  i n  te rms o f  p o s s i b i l i t y  
and d i s p o s i t i o n  r a t h e r  than  c h o i c e .  Water ,  f o r  example,  i s  capab le  of  
e x i s t i n g  as a l i q u i d ,  s o l i d ,  o r  g a s .  Obviously  " c a p a b i l i t y "  in  t h i s  
case  does n o t  r e f e r  to  c h o i c e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  we say o f  a man be ing  t r i e d  
f o r  murder ing  h i s  f am i ly  t h a t  he i s  c a p a b le  o f  comprehending and 
r e s p e c t i n g  th e  r i g h t s  o f  o t h e r s  and the  d i g n i t y  o f  l i f e .  With r e s p e c t
to  freedom t h e n ,  " c a p a b i l i t y "  r e f e r s  t o  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r
man t o  comprehend th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  r e a l i t y .  P r e v i o u s l y ,  t h i s
d i s p o s i t i o n  was d i s c u s s e d  in  terms of  a l e t h e i a  and a u t h e n t i c i t y  (second 
s e n s e ) .  Th is  d i s p o s i t i o n  appea rs  to  be un ique  to  our  s p e c i e s .
Yet i t  does n o t  appea r  to  be u n i v e r s a l  w i t h i n  our  s p e c i e s .  There
a r e  two ways in  which man can be u n f r e e .  A p e r son  who i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y
b r a i n -  damaged, m e n ta l l y  r e t a r d e d ,  or  s i m i l a r l y  im pai red  may la ck  the 
c a p a c i t y  to  comprehend the  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  r e a l i t y .  Such -a pe rson  would
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be r a d i c a l l y  u n f r e e .  A p e r son  may p o s se s s  t h i s  b a s i c  sense o f  freedom,  
however,  and s t i l l  be u n f r e e .  Such a p e r son  would be one who, w h i le  
hav ing  th e  c a p a c i t y  to comprehend s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  f a i l s  t o  do so .  Thus,  
we can d i s t i n g u i s h  two s e n s e s  o f  freedom: b a s i c  and f i n a l .  Bas ic
freedom i s  the  c a p a c i t y  to  comprehend s i g n i f i c a n c e .  F i n a l  freedom i s  
no t  on ly  the  c a p a c i t y  to  comprehend s i g n i f i c a n c e  bu t  th e  a c t u a l  
comprehension and r e spond ing  t o  c la ims  o f  f i n a l  o r  u l t i m a t e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Bas ic freedom, t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  a n e c e s s a r y  but  no t  
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  of  f i n a l  freedom. This  l a c k  o f  s u f f i c i e n c y  can be 
approached from t h r e e  d i r e c t i o n s .
F i r s t ,  b a s i c  freedom i s  th e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  no t  the  
c r e a t i o n  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  In  o t h e r  words,  we a re  not  the  m a s t e r s  and 
p o s s e s s o r s  of  the  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  ou r  l i v e s .
I  r e c a l l ,  f o r  example,  a backpacking  t r i p  i n t o  • th e  Miss ion  
M ounta ins .  Th inking  t h a t  we would f i n d  w a te r  a long  th e  way, I  n e g l e c t e d  
to  f i l l  our  w a te r  b o t t l e s  a t  the  t r a i l  head .  N eed le ss  to  s ay ,  no w ate r  
was found .  As the  hours  p a s s e d ,  and we con t in u ed  t o  c l im b ,  the  lack  of  
w a te r  began to  t a k e  e f f e c t ;  I  r e c a l l  d read in g  th e  d i r e c t  s u n l i g h t  o f  
th e  exposed t a l u s  s lo p e s  and f e e l i n g  the  almost  maddening e x p e c t a t i o n  of  
w a te r  around eve ry  bend.  While t r a v e r s i n g  the  s i d e  o f  the  r i d g e ,  we 
u n ex p ec ted ly  came upon a s p r i n g .  At t h a t  i n s t a n c e ,  b e fo re  even 
quenching  our t h i r s t ,  our  d i s c o m fo r t  receded  and the  world took  on the  
s p a r k l i n g  q u a l i t i e s  of  th e  w a te r  i t s e l f .
Looking back ,  I  r e a l i z e  t h a t  t h i s  moment proved t o  be d e c i s i v e  w i th  
r e g a r d s  to  th e  r e s t  o f  the  t r i p .  From t h i s  moment, we were aware of  
o u r s e l v e s  and our  su r ro u n d in g s  more immedia tely  th a n  b e f o r e .  Of co u r s e ,
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i t  w i l l  no t  do to  say t h a t  a l l  we need to  do to  in s u re  the  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
o f  backpack ing  t r i p s  i s  to  l e ave  the  w a te r  b o t t l e s  a t  home. No, I 
b e l i e v e  t h a t  i n  e x p e r i e n c e s  such as t h e s e  we come to  r e a l i z e  t h a t  even 
w i th  our  a b i l i t y  to  c o n t r o l  the  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  o f  a g iven  s i t u a t i o n ,  what 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  i t  may hold  f o r  us i s  more r e c e i v e d  than  a c q u i r e d . [122]
Second,  as  mentioned  in  s e c t i o n  10,  one may e x i s t  under  economic,  
p o l i t i c a l ,  o r  s o c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  which e f f e c t i v e l y  c o n s t r a i n  or  l i m i t  
f i n a l  freedom. In  t h i s  s e n s e ,  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between b a s i c  and f i n a l  
f reedom m i r r o r s  t h a t  between n e g a t i v e  ( f reedom-from) and p o s i t i v e  
( f r e e d o m - f o r ) freedom. Before  one has r eached  a s u f f i c i e n t l y  h igh  l e v e l  
o f  freedom -from c o n s t r a i n t s ,  f r e e d o m -fo r  t h e  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  o f  a 
f u l f i l l i n g  l i f e  i s  i m p o s s i b l e .
T h i r d ,  a l s o  mentioned  in  s e c t i o n  10,  t h e r e  i s  a way of  l i f e  which,  
a l th o u g h  i t  i s  f r e e  from th e  e x c e s s i v e  c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  the  u n f r e e  l i f e  
mentioned  above ,  l i m i t s  and t h r e a t e n s  m an 's  f i n a l  freedom. Heidegger  
u n d e r s to o d  t h i s  way o f  l i f e  . to  be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t e c h n o lo g y .  
U nders tand ing  t e c h n o lo g y ,  and i t s ? t h r e a t  to  freedom, occupied  a c e n t r a l  
p o s i t i o n  in  h i s  ma tu re  t h o u g h t .
15.0  HEIDEGGER'S ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY
I n i t i a l l y ,  i t  seems absu rd  to  say t h a t  t e chno logy  t h r e a t e n s  our  
f i n a l  f reedom . J u s t  th e  o p p o s i t e  seems t r u e .  From as e a r l y  as the  
s e v e n te e n th  c e n t u r y ,  t e chno logy  has been u n d e r s to o d  as a means to  
l i b e r a t i o n ,  n o t  b o n d a g e . [123] T e c h n o lo g ic a l  p r o g r e s s  i s  l a r g e l y  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  our  l i b e r a t i o n  from the  e x c e s s i v e  c o n s t r a i n t s  of  t o i l ,  
i l l i t e r a c y ,  d i s e a s e ,  and g eog raph ic  con f inem en t .  We can f l y  around th e
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w o r ld ,  communicate w i th  a l l  p a r t s  o f  the  g lo b e ,  l i v e  p r a c t i c a l l y  
anywhere we want,  e a t  what we w a n t . , . t h e  l i s t  i s  e n d l e s s .  I f  t h e r e  i s  a 
t h r e a t  to  freedom, i t  seems to  be the  la ck  r a t h e r  than  th e  p r e s e n c e  of  
t e c h n o lo g y .  How can t e chno logy  t h r e a t e n  freedom?
P e rh a p s ,  the  most common r e s p o n s e  to  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s  t h a t
t e chno logy  g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  power o f  o p p r e s s i v e  a u t h o r i t y .  The 
S t a t e  becomes- more and more p o w e r fu l ,  c o n t r o l l i n g  more and more of  our  
l i v e s .  T e c h n o lo g ic a l  advances  i n  s u r v e i l l a n c e  equ ipment,  b eh av io r  
m o d i f i c a t i o n  t e c h n i q u e s ,  automated means of  p r o d u c t i o n  and the  l i k e  make 
i t  easy  f o r  a popu lace  to  be r u l e d  w i th  an i r o n  hand.  O r w e l l ' s  1984 and 
H u x le y ' s  Brave New World exem pl i fy  t h i s  r e sponse  to  the  q u e s t i o n .
C e r t a i n l y ,  t h e r e  a r e  im p o r ta n t  i s s u e s  and q u e s t i o n s  r a i s e d  by t h i s  
a p p ro a c h .  Y e t ,  t h e  t h r e a t  t o  freedom th e y  d i s c u s s  does n o t  so much 
a r i s e  from techno logy  as  i t  does from th e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  use o f  i t .  
Technology mere ly i n c r e a s e s  th e  e f f i c i e n c y  of  th e  modern t y r a n t .
F u r th e rm o re ,  many a rgue  t h a t  t e chno logy  p ro v id e s  the  means by which such 
o p p r e s s i o n  can be av o id e d .  Technology ,  so i t  i s  s a i d ,  w i l l  a l lo w  f o r  a 
more d e c e n t r a l i z e d ,  de m o c ra t i c  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  goods ,  s e r v i c e s ,  and 
i n f o r m a t i o n .  In  t h i s  l i g h t ,  t h e  o p p r e s s io n  o f  techno logy  ap p ea r s  to  be 
a problem f o r  techno logy  to  s o lv e  r a t h e r  than  a problem w i th  te chno logy  
i t s e l f .
Heidegger  o f f e r s  a more p e n e t r a t i n g ,  bu t  l e s s  s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d ,  
r e s p o n s e  to  t h i s  q u e s t i o n .  H e id e g g e r ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  of  t e chno logy  and
freedom must always be u n d e r s to o d  i n  the  c o n t e x t  o f  h i s  most c e n t r a l  
co n ce rn ,  the  q u e s t i o n  of  Being; the  h e a r t  o f  which i s  " r e f l e c t i n g  on 
what i n  ou r  day i s " . [124] A c c o rd in g ly ,  H e i d e g g e r ' s  most e x p l i c i t
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d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t e c h n o lo g y ,  "The Q ues t ion  Concerning Technology" and "The 
Turn ing"  a r e  g a t h e r e d  w i th  "The Thing"  and "The Danger" in  a 
p r e s e n t a t i o n  e n t i t l e d  " I n s i g h t  i n t o  What I s " .  [125] He a rgues  t h a t  the  
p o p u la r  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  our  t ime as  " th e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  age"  i s  
l i t e r a l l y  and p ro fo u n d ly  c o r r e c t .  From t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  " t ech n o lo g y "  
r e f e r s  to  more than  j u s t  th e  a g g r e g a t e  o f  machines and in s t r u m e n t s  which 
su r rounds  u s ;  i t  i s  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  way i n  which we u n d e r s t a n d  and 
t a k e  up w i th  r e a l i t y .
Technology ,  or  i n  o t h e r  words,  our  J&Lme, i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a 
l e v e l i n g  o f  r e a l i t y .  Those t h i n g s  and e v e n t s  t h a t  s tood  as  s i g n i f i c a n t  
e i t h e r  no l o n g e r  do so a t  a l l  o r  t h e i r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i s  muted and 
o b s c u re d .  Thus,  our  f i n a l  freedom i s  t h r e a t e n e d  i n s o f a r  as  t h e r e  a re  
fewer  and fewer em inen t ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h i n g s  t o  respond t o .  Th is  t h r e a t  
i s  the  g r e a t e s t  when te ch n o lo g y  i s  f u n c t i o n i n g  smoothly and amiably  
because  t h e n ,  u n l i k e  i n  th e  case  o f  t y r a n n y ,  t h e  bondage i s  i n v i s i b l e  
and s e d u c t i v e .
The f i r s t  s t e p  in  r e c o g n i z i n g  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  bondage i s  r e c o g n i z in g  
t e chno logy  f o r  what i t  i s .  Heidegger  p u rsues  t h i s  i n  " the  Q ues t ion  
Concern ing Technology" .  The d i f f i c u l t y  w i th  q u e s t i o n i n g  te chno logy  i s  
s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  w i th  q u e s t i o n i n g  t r u t h ;  th e  answer to  bo th  q u e s t i o n s  
ap p ea r s  to  be so obvious  t h a t  th e  q u e s t i o n  n e v e r  g e t s  o f f  the  ground .  
Heidegger  a t t e m p t s  to  b re a k  up th e  compacted s o i l  o f  the  obvious  so t h a t  
genu ine  q u e s t i o n i n g  may f l o u r i s h .  A c c o rd in g ly ,  th e  e s say  has  a r a d i c a l ,  
b u t  undeveloped  c h a r a c t e r .
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He beg in s  by c l a r i f y i n g  h i s  approach  to  the  q u e s t i o n .  The es sence  
o f  t e c h n o lo g y ,  he s a y s ,  i s  n o th in g  t e c h n o l o g i c a l . [126] E s s e n t i a l l y ,  
t e chno logy  i s  n e i t h e r  a c o l l e c t i o n  of  i n s t ru m e n ts  nor  a means to  an end.  
I f  we exc lude  bo th  the  i n s t r u m e n t a l  and u t i l i t a r i a n  c o n c e p t i o n s ,  what 
a r e  we l e f t  w i th?  Heidegger q u e s t i o n s  technology  from the  p e r s p e c t i v e  
of  th e  h i s t o r y  o f  Being .  Keeping i n  mind t h a t  f o r  Heidegger  "Being" 
r e f e r s  to  the  p re sen ce  o f  r e a l i t y ,  the " h i s t o r y  o f  Being" simply means 
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  d i s c e r n i b l e  p e r io d s  w here in  r e a l i t y  was ex p e r i en ced  
u n i q u e l y . ( T h i s  was d i s c u s s e d  in  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  i n  s e c t i o n  7 ) .T echno logy , 
as  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  way i n  which we u n d e r s t a n d  r e a l i t y  i s  th u s  the 
l a t e s t  epoch in  the  h i s t o r y  of  Being .  A c c o rd in g ly ,  b e f o r e  i t  i s  a means 
to  an end,  t e chno logy  i s  a d i s c l o s u r e  o f  r e a l i t y .
The remainder  o f  the  e s s ay  i s  devoted  to  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  r e a l i t y  as 
i t  i s  d i s c l o s e d  by techno logy  and t o  e x p l i c a t i n g  man 's  r e l a t i o n s h i p  to  
t h i s  d i s c l o s u r e .  The f i r s t  t a s k  i s  a c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  e s s en ce  of  
t echnology^  and the  second i s  a d i s c u s s i o n  of  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  bondage and 
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  freedom.
The d i s c l o s u r e  o f  t e chno logy  d i f f e r s  from i t s  p r e d e c e s s o r s  i n  t h a t
" th e  r e v e a l i n g  [o f  r e a l i t y ]  t h a t  r u l e s  i n  modern t e chno logy  i s  a
c h a l l e n g i n g  which p u t s  to  n a t u r e  the  u n re a s o n a b le  demand t h a t  i t  supply
energy  t h a t  can be e x t r a c t e d  and s t o r e d  as s u c h " . [127] In  the
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  e r a  n a t u r e  i s  r e v e a l e d  as a r e s o u r c e :  as  something to  be
used  i n  the  a c q u i s i t i o n  of  something e l s e .  Nature i s  a c t i v e l y  subsumed
under  the  d i r e c t i v e  o f  t e c h n o lo g y .
In  the  c o n te x t  o f  the  i n t e r l o c k i n g  p r o c e s s e s  p e r t a i n i n g  to  the 
o r d e r l y  d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  e l e c t r i c a l  ene rgy ,  even th e  Rhine 
i t s e l f  appears  as something a t  our command. The h y d r o e l e c t r i c  
p l a n t  i s  no t  b u i l t  i n t o  the  Rhine R ive r  as was the  o ld  wooden 
b r i d g e  t h a t  j o i n e d  bank w i th  bank f o r  hundreds o f  y e a r s .
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Rather  th e  r i v e r  i s  damned up i n t o  th e  p o w e rp la n t .  What the
r i v e r  i s  now,namely,  a w a te r  power s u p p l i e r ,  d e r i v e s  from out
o f  th e  e s sence  o f  t h e  power s t a t i o n . [128]
The Rhine ,  and a l l  o f  n a t u r e ,  i s  u n d e r s to o d  in  te rms of  i t s  f u n c t i o n  as
a r e s o u r c e .  R e a l i t y ,  th rough  th e  c h a l l e n g i n g  r e v e l a t i o n  of  t e chno logy
i s  o rd e re d  to  " s t a n d  b y" ,  to  be on c a l l  f o r  f u r t h e r  o r d e r i n g  and u s e ;
t h u s ,  Heidegger  a r g u e s ,  t h a t  r e a l i t y  comes to  be u n d e r s to o d  as s imply
" s t a n d i n g -  r e s e r v e " . [129]
S t a n d i n g - r e s e r v e  i s  b e s t  u n d e r s to o d  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i th  the  c h a r a c t e r  
of  t h i n g s .  I n  h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h i n g s  Heidegger  d i s c u s s e s  t h e i r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e i r  g a t h e r i n g  and fo c u s in g  power.  The ju g ,  
embodied a r i c h  c o n t e x t :  th e  l i f e  o f  m o r t a l s ,  the  p re s e n c e  of  d i v i n i t y ,
th e  e a r t h ,  and th e  s ky .  That which i s  r e v e a l e d  as  s t a n d i n g - r e s e r v e ,  by 
c o n t r a s t ,  on ly  r e f l e c t s  ou r  i n t e n t i o n s .  The f o r e s t  becomes t im b e r ,  the  
s o i l  becomes a m i n e r a l  d e p o s i t ,  and w orkers  become p i e c e s  o f  l a b o r  
r e s o u r c e . [130] R eso u rces ,  as  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  our  p rocu rem en t ,  a re
i n c a p a b le  of  s t a n d i n g  o v e r  a g a i n s t  us as o b j e c t s  (Gegenstand)  in  t h e i r  
own r i g h t .  E v e ry th in g  comes t o  be u n d e r s to o d  ac c o rd in g  to  one
c r i t e r i o n ,  a v a i l a b i l i t y .
Thus,  man i s  c la im ed  by what Heidegger c a l l s  t h e  G e - s t e l l . o r  
f r am e w ork . [131] "G e - s t e l l " i s  th e  u n i f y i n g  term f o r  h i s  co n c e p t io n  of  
t e c h n o lo g y .  G e - s t e l l . as  the  e s sence  o f  t e c h n o lo g y ,  i s  the  mode of  
d i s c l o s u r e  which c h a l l e n g e s  man to  r e v e a l  n a t u r e  as s t a n d i n g  r e s e r v e .
The danger  o f  t e chno logy  i s  t h a t  i t s  mode o f  d i s c l o s i n g  r e a l i t y
w i l l  come to  o b l i t e r a t e  a l l  o t h e r s .
. .Man,  thus  under  way, i s  c o n t i n u a l l y  app roach ing  th e  b r i n k  of  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  p u r s u in g  and push ing  fo rward  n o th i n g  but  
what i s  r e v e a l e d  i n  o r d e r i n g ,  and o f  d e r i v i n g  a l l  h i s  
s t a n d a r d s  on t h i s  b a s i s . . .Where Enframing ho lds  sway,
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r e g u l a t i n g  and r e c u r r i n g  o f  th e  s t a n d i n g - r e s e r v e  mark . a l l  
r e v e a l i n g .  They no lo n g e r  even l e t  t h e i r  own fundam en ta l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  a p p e a r ,  namely ,  t h i s  r e v e a l i n g  as  s u c h . [132]
16.0  FREEDOM IN A TECHNOLOGICAL SETTING
The o b l i t e r a t i o n  o f  o t h e r  modes o f  d i s c l o s u r e  and th e  concom itan t  
l e v e l i n g  o f  r e a l i t y  to  the  homogeneity  o f  s t a n d i n g - r e s e r v e  would r e s u l t  
i n  th e  l o s s  o f  our  f i n a l  freedom. Not because  we a r e  c o n s t r a i n e d  by
o p p r e s s o r s  b u t  r a t h e r ,  i n  th e  m id s t  o f  ou r  ap p a re n t  omnipotence  and
unbounded l i b e r t y ,  t h e r e  i s  n o th i n g  l e f t  t o  respond t o .  Nothing s tan d s
o u t  i n  i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  and la y s  ho ld  o f  u s .
Not only  does t e chno logy  t h r e a t e n  ou r  f i n a l  freedom bu t  we a re  no t
f r e e  to  change i t  as  w e l l .  I n s o f a r  as  t e chno logy  i s  an epoch o f  Being
— th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  way r e a l i t y  p r e s e n c e s  f o r  us — i t  i s  beyond human
c o n t r o l .  Heidegger  r e p e a t e d l y  c l a i m s ,  in  t h i s  e s s ay  and e l s e w h e re ,  t h a t
t h i s  d i s c l o s u r e  or  any o t h e r ,  i s  n o t  a m a t t e r  o f  human w i l l i n g  or
c h o i c e . [133] But,  g ive n  a l l  o f  t h i s ,  Heidegger m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  we are
f r e e  i n  ou r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  t e c h n o lo g y .
A lw a y s ' t h e  d e s t i n i n g  o f  r e v e a l i n g ,  ho ld s  complete sway over
man. ' But - tha t  d e s t i n i n g  i s  n e v e r  a f a t e  t h a t  co m p e l l s .  For 
man, becomes t r u l y  f r e e  only  i n s o f a r  as  he be longs  to  the  
rea lm  o f  d e s t i n i n g  and so becomes one who l i s t e n s  and h e a r s  
and n o t  one who i s  s imply c o n s t r a i n e d  to  o b e y . [134]
How a re  we to  u n d e r s t a n d  t h i s ?  Heidegger  seems to  be s e a r c h i n g  f o r  
a m idd le  p o s i t i o n  between a s t r i c t  d e te rm in i sm  on the  one hand and 
l i b e r t a r i a n i s m  on th e  o t h e r .  We are  n o t  f r e e  to  choose how r e a l i t y  w i l l  
be d i s c l o s e d ,  y e t  we a r e  no t  mere ly  c o n s t r a i n e d  to  obey.  Our freedom, 
a c c o rd in g  to  H e idegge r ,  l i e s  in  our  a b i l i t y  to  "be long t o  the  rea lm of  
des - t iny"  and so become one who " l i s t e n s  and h e a r s " .  He goes on to  say
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t h a t  te chno logy  h a r b o r s  w i t h i n  i t s  e s sence  the  " sa v in g  p o w e r " . [135]
For the  sav ing  power l e t s  man see  and e n t e r  i n t o  the  h i g h e s t  
d i g n i t y  o f  h i s  e s s e n c e .  This  d i g n i t y  l i e s  in  keeping  watch 
o ver  the  unconcealment — and w i th  i t ,  from th e  f i r s t ,  the  
concealment — o f  a l l  coming t o  p r e s e n c e  on t h i s  e a r t h . [136]
What i s  the  " sa v in g  power" w i t h i n  te chno logy?  Technology,  i s  a 
mode of  d i s c l o s u r e  t h a t  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by the  l e v e l l i n g  o f  a l l  r e a l i t y  
t o  th e  s t a t u s  of  s t a n d i n g - r e s e r v e .  The danger  o f  t e c h n o lo g y ,  u n d e r ly in g  
th e  t e c h n i c a l  dan g e r s  o f  p o l l u t i o n ,  n u c l e a r  h o l o c a u s t s ,  and the  l i k e ,  i s  
t h a t  techno logy  w i l l  i n s t a n t i a t e  i t s e l f  co m p le te ly ;  d r i v i n g  out  a l l  
o t h e r  modes o f  d i s c l o s u r e  and,  t h u s ,  n o t  a p p e a r  as a way o f  d i s c l o s u r e  
i t s e l f .  The sav ing  power,  t h e n ,  i s  the  f a c t  t h a t  te chno logy  i s  a mode 
o f  d i s c l o s u r e  and can be r e co g n ized  as such .  I n  o t h e r  words,  we can 
come t o  u n d e r s t a n d  t e chno logy  from th e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  the  h i s t o r y  of  
Being and thus  see  i t  f o r  what i t  i s ,  a p a r t i c u l a r  p r e s e n c in g  of
r e a l i t y ,  un ique  from i t s  p r e d e c e s s o r s .  We can do t h i s ,  because  we, as  
humans, have the  c a p a c i t y  to  "belong  to  the  rea lm o f  d e s t i n y " ,  o r  as  he 
pu t  i t  i n  ."On the  Essence o f  T r u t h " ,  engaging  i n  " th e  d i s c l o s u r e  of  
b e in g s  as  s u c h " . [137] Thus ,  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t e chno logy  to  be a p a r t i c u l a r  
d i s c l o s u r e  o f  r e a l i t y  opens us to  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a n o t h e r ,  d i f f e r e n t  
d i s c l o s u r e  o f  r e a l i t y .  t h a t  i s ,  Heidegger ho lds  ou t  the  hope t h a t  we
may move p a s t  t e c h n o lo g y ,  i n t o  a n o t h e r ,  y e t  unknown epoch o f  Being.  
[138] T h i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  does n o t  mean t h a t  t e c h n o lo g y ,  or  a c o l l e c t i o n  of
in s t r u m e n t s  and m ach ines ,  w i l l  somehow v a n i s h  o f f  the  f a c e  o f  the  e a r t h .
R a t h e r , ,  the  p l a c e  occupied  by t e c h n o lo g y ,  i n  i t s  e s s e n c e  w i l l  be 
d i f f e r e n t .  Other  ways o f  r e v e a l i n g  w i l l  f l o u r i s h  a long s i d e  i t .  But,  
t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  change i s  ou t  of  our  hands .  We cannot  b r in g  t h i s  
change a b o u t ,  bu t  by u n d e r s t a n d i n g  th e  es sence  of  te chno logy  we can make 
room fo r  i t .
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Through t h i s  we a re  not  y e t  s av ed .  But we a r e  the reupon
summoned to  hope i n  the  growing l i g h t  o f  the  sav ing  power.
How can t h i s  happen? Here and now and in  l i t t l e  t h i n g s ,  t h a t  
we may f o s t e r  th e  sav ing  power in  i t s  i n c r e a s e .  This  in c lu d e s  
h o ld i n g  always b e f o r e  our  eyes th e  extreme d a n g e r . [139]
By a t t e n d i n g  t o  th e  l i t t l e  t h i n g s ,  t h a t  su rround us and g a t h e r  our
wor ld i n  t h e i r  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  th e  sav ing  power i s  n u r t u r e d .
T e c h n o lo g ic a l  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  s t a n d i n g  r e s e r v e  i s  seen f o r  what i t  i s  more 
c l e a r l y  ' when c o n t r a s t e d  w i th  th e  d i s c l o s u r e  o'f t h i n g s  i n  t h e i r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e .  L ik ew ise ,  and here  i s  where H e id e g g e r ' s  hope l i e s ,  t h i n g s  
s t a n d  o u t  more c l e a r l y ,  t h a t  i s ,  th e y  a re  more s i g n i f i c a n t ,  a g a i n s t  a 
background o f  s t a n d i n g  r e s e r v e .
H e i d e g g e r ' s  a n a l y s i s  o f  te chno logy  h e l p s  c l a r i f y  how our  f i n a l  
freedom may be t h r e a t e n e d  and ,  p e r h a p s ,  l o s t .  Yet h i s  account  s u f f e r s  
from th e  ambiguous p lacement o f  freedom w i t h i n  t e c h n o lo g y .  On th e  one 
hand,  he s t r o n g l y  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  ou r  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  r e a l i t y  i s  de te rmined  
ou t  o f  th e  d e s t i n y  o f  Being and i s  th u s  no t  a m a t t e r  o f  w i l l  o r  c h o i c e .
On th e  o t h e r  hand ,  he ap p ea ls  to  human freedom and the  human a b i l i t y  to
respond  to  the  " sav ing  power" .  He c e r t a i n l y  does no t  b e l i e v e  freedom i s  
f r e e - c h o i c e ,  y e t  he does no t  embrace de te rm in i sm  e i t h e r .  I  b e l i e v e  t h a t
h i s  p o s i t i o n  would be s t r e n g t h e n e d  and c l a r i f i e d  i f  i t  was e x p l i c i t l y
p la c e d  w i t h i n  a d e t e r m i n i s t i c  s e t t i n g .
Heidegger  b eg in s  by a rg u in g  t h a t  r e a l i t y  comes to  p r e s e n c e  in  
d i f f e r e n t  ways a t  d i f f e r e n t  t i m e s .  We. can d i s t i n g u i s h  e r a s  o r  epochs 
w i t h i n  which r e a l i t y  had a d i s c e r n a b l e  c h a r a c t e r  d i f f e r e n t  from o t h e r s .  
For example,  we might d i s t i n g u i s h  c l a s s i c a l  Greece and medieva l  Europe 
a long  th e s e  l i n e s .  Within  a g iven  e r a ,  th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  r e a l i t y ,  
what s tood  o u t  and what d id  n o t ,  gu ided  human i n t e r a c t i o n  w i th  i t .
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H e i d e g g e r ' s  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  th e  peop le  o f  any g iven  epoch do n o t  choose 
how th e y  w i l l  u n d e r s t a n d  and ta k e  up w i th  r e a l i t y .  In  o t h e r  words,  
H e idegger  a dvoca te s  a form o f  h i s t o r i c a l  de te rm in i sm .
W ith in  ou r  epoch te ch n o lo g y  r e i g n s .  R e a l i t y  p r e s e n c e s  such t h a t  we 
a r e  c h a l l e n g e d  to  o r d e r  i t  as  s t a n d i n g - r e s e r v e .  But ,  says H e idegge r ,  we 
a r e  s t i l l  f r e e .  Our freedom i s  d e s c r i b e d  as  the  c a p a c i t y  to  comprehend 
th e  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  r e a l i t y .  Th is  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same c o n c e p t io n  of  
f reedom t h a t  we e ncoun te red  in  "On the Essence o f  T r u t h " .  This  freedom 
i s  b e s t  u n d e r s to o d  in  te rm s  o f  b a s i c  freedom. Bas ic  freedom i s  the 
c a p a c i t y  to  comprehend and respond  t o  r e a l i t y .  I n  o t h e r  words,  man i s  
ca p a b le  o f  comprehending and r e spond ing  to  the  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of  h i s  
l i f e .
But,  as  Heidegger p o i n t s  o u t ,  t h i s  freedom a lone  i s  n o t  enough to  
ward o f f  th e  t h r e a t  o f  t o t a l  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  Technology 
may c o n t in u e  t o  i n s t a n t i a t e  i t s e l f  f u r t h e r  and f u r t h e r  u n t i l  e v e r y t h in g  
p r e s e n c e s  as  s t a n d i n g - r e s e r v e  and a l l  o t h e r  modes o f  d i s c l o s u r e  are 
o b s c u re d .  Such a s i t u a t i o n  would le av e  our  b a s i c  freedom untouched bu t  
would com ple te ly  d e s t r o y  our  f i n a l  freedom.
Thus ,  th e  " sa v in g  power" does not  a r i s e  from our  b a s i c  freedom 
a l o n e .  I t  a l s o  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  we have moments o f  f i n a l  freedom. Without  
such  moments, t e c h n o l o g i c a l  e x i s t e n c e  could  no t  be r e c o g n iz e d  f o r  what 
i t  i s .  H e id e g g e r ' s  a p p e a l  to  the  l i t t l e ,  i n c onsp icuous  t h i n g s  of  
everyday  l i f e  p o i n t s  to  those  moments o f  f i n a l  freedom.  Claimed by 
t h e s e  t h i n g s  and even ts  we a re  moved to  make room fo r  them in  the  c e n t e r  
o f  our  l i v e s .  The " sa v in g  power" ,  t h e n ,  c o n s i s t s  i n  bo th  our  c a p a c i t y  
of  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  th e  e s sence  of  t e chno logy  and the  c l a im s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t
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t h i n g s  and e v e n t s .
The u n c e r t a i n t y  and openness  t h a t  Heidegger  p o r t r a y s  and we 
e x p e r i e n c e  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  th e  d e s t i n y  o f  te chno logy  i n d i c a t e  the  
t r a n s i t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  our t i m e .  Guided by s i g n i f i c a n t  t h i n g s  t h a t  
s t a n d  ou t  i n  a new l i g h t  we a r e  beg inn ing  to  r e c o g n i z e  and pass  th rough 
t e c h n o lo g y .  We know o u r s e l v e s  to  be g race d  and empowered by th e s e  
t h i n g s ,  y e t  we a r e  un ab le  to comrehend and p r e d i c t  the  d e t a i l s  of  the 
p e r i o d  o f  t r a n s i t i o n .  We f i n d  o u r s e l v e s  immersed i n  a g rave  and f a t e f u l  
v e r s i o n  of  t h e  lo o s e n e s s  of  l i f e ,  whose t r i v i a l  f e a t u r e s  were d i s c u s s e d  
i n  S e c t io n  14.  Th is  lo o s e n e s s  i s  n e i t h e r  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  of  
in d e te rm in a c y ,  of  uncaused  l i b e r t y ,  n o r  the  f e e l i n g  o f  be ing  fo rc e d  and 
c o n s t r a i n e d  by a s i n g l e  s e t  o f  f a c t o r s  the  way h a rd  d e te rm in ism  would 
have  i t .  R a ther  we know o u r s e l v e s  to  be g raced  and empowered by g r e a t  
t h i n g s ,  and i t  i s  such  g r a c e  and power, as  w e l l  as  th e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  
hav ing  f a i l e d  them, t h a t  w i l l  move one to  w r i t e  a t h e s i s  such as t h i s .  
But he re  p h i l o s o p h i z i n g  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  g iv e s  way to  p o e t i z i n g .
The L i l i e s
Hunting them, a man must sw ea t ,  b e a r  
t h e  whine of  a mosquito  in  h i s  e a r ,  
grow t h i r s t y ,  t i r e d ,  d e s p a i r  pe rhaps  
o f  eve r  f i n d i n g  them, walk a long way.
He must g iv e  h im s e l f  over  to  chance,  
f o r  they  l i v e  beyond p r e d i c t i o n .
He must g i v e  h im s e l f  over  to  p a t i e n c e ,  
f o r . t h e y  l i v e  beyond w i l l .  He must be le d  
a long  the  h i l l  a s  by a p r a y e r .
I f  he f i n d s  them anywhere,  he w i l l  f i n d  
a few, p a i r e d  on t h e i r  s t a l k s ,  
a t  ease  in  t h e  a i r  as  s o u l s  in  b l i s s .
I  found them h e re  a t  f i r s t  w i th o u t  h u n t i n g ,  
by g r a c e ,  as  a l l  b e a u t i e s  a re  f i r s t  found.
I  have hun ted  and n o t  found them h e r e .  
Found, unfound,  they  b r e a t h e  t h e i r  l i g h t  
i n t o  the  mind,  y e a r  a f t e r  y e a r . [140]
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